mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c

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/*
* SSL client with options
*
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* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
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* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
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#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_free free
#define mbedtls_time time
#define mbedtls_time_t time_t
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#define mbedtls_exit exit
#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS
#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) )
int main( void )
{
mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or "
"MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C and/or "
"MBEDTLS_NET_C not defined, or "
"neither MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C nor MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C defined.\n");
Merge mbedtls 2.16.6 into baremetal Conflicts: mbedtls.doxyfile - PROJECT_NAME - mbed TLS v2.16.6 chosen. doc_mainpage.h - mbed TLS v2.16.6 version chosen. hmac_drbg.h - line 260, extended description chosen. - line 313, extended description chosen. - line 338, extended description chosen. version.h - 2.16.6 chosen. CMakeLists.txt - 2.16.6 chosen. test_suite_version.data - 2.16.6 chosen. Makefile - 141 - manual correction - baremetal version of C_SOURCE_FILES with variables for directories plus 2.16.6 CTAGS addition. pkparse.c - lines 846 onwards - the asn1_get_nonzero_mpi implementation chosen. ssl_tls.c - line 5269 - edited manually, left the ret=0, because baremetal has a different behaviour since commit 87b5626, but added a debug message that's new in 2.16.6. all.sh: - component_build_deprecated - chosen the refactored version from 2.16.6, but with extra flags from baremetal. - rest of the _no_xxx tests - merged make options to have PTHREAD=1 and other changes from 2.16.6 (like -O1 instead of -O0). - component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication - added TINYCRYPT_BUILD=0 to the 2.16.6 version of make. x509/req_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/crl_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/cert_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_mail_client.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_fork_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client1.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client2.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. - line 132 - new options of both branches added. - skip close notify handled as in 2.16.6, but with `ssl` instead of `&ssl`. - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. - Merged options from baremetal and 2.16.6. ssl_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_server2.c - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. config.pl - fixed missing defines from the documentation, removed duplicates, and reorganised so that the documentation and excluded list are ordered in the same way. test_suite_x509parse.data - only added the two new pathlen tests. x509_crt.c - change the return code by removing MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, since it's added by x509_crt_frame_parse_ext not by an "or", but by "+=". Changelog - Assigned all entries to appropriate sections. ssl-opt.sh - line 8263 - merged options. - removed lines 1165 - 1176 - there was a duplicate test, probably an artifact of previous merges. check-files.py - sticked to old formatting. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
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mbedtls_exit( 0 );
}
#else
#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
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#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h"
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#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
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#include "mbedtls/certs.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#if !defined(_MSC_VER)
#include <inttypes.h>
#endif
#if !defined(_WIN32)
#include <signal.h>
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
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#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h"
#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C)
#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C)
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#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
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#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
#define SNI_OPTION
#endif
#if defined(_WIN32)
#include <windows.h>
#endif
/* Size of memory to be allocated for the heap, when using the library's memory
* management and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is enabled. */
#define MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE 140000
#define DFL_SERVER_ADDR NULL
#define DFL_SERVER_PORT "4433"
#define DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE -1
#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0
#define DFL_NBIO 0
#define DFL_EVENT 0
#define DFL_READ_TIMEOUT 0
#define DFL_CA_FILE ""
#define DFL_CA_PATH ""
#define DFL_CRT_FILE ""
#define DFL_KEY_FILE ""
#define DFL_CRT_FILE2 ""
#define DFL_KEY_FILE2 ""
#define DFL_ASYNC_OPERATIONS "-"
#define DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY1 ( -1 )
#define DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY2 ( -1 )
#define DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_ERROR ( 0 )
#define DFL_PSK ""
#define DFL_PSK_IDENTITY "Client_identity"
#define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW NULL
#define DFL_PSK_LIST NULL
#define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER 0
#define DFL_VERSION_SUITES NULL
#define DFL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
#define DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY -2
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#define DFL_RENEGOTIATE 0
#define DFL_RENEGO_DELAY -2
#define DFL_RENEGO_PERIOD ( (uint64_t)-1 )
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#define DFL_EXCHANGES 1
#define DFL_MIN_VERSION -1
#define DFL_MAX_VERSION -1
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#define DFL_ARC4 -1
#define DFL_SHA1 -1
#define DFL_CID_ENABLED 0
#define DFL_CID_VALUE ""
#define DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO -1
#define DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO NULL
#define DFL_AUTH_MODE -1
#define DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED
#define DFL_MFL_CODE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE
#define DFL_TRUNC_HMAC -1
#define DFL_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED
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#define DFL_TICKET_TIMEOUT 86400
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#define DFL_CACHE_MAX -1
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#define DFL_CACHE_TIMEOUT -1
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#define DFL_SNI NULL
#define DFL_ALPN_STRING NULL
#define DFL_CURVES NULL
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#define DFL_DHM_FILE NULL
#define DFL_TRANSPORT MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM
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#define DFL_COOKIES 1
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#define DFL_ANTI_REPLAY -1
#define DFL_HS_TO_MIN 0
#define DFL_HS_TO_MAX 0
#define DFL_DTLS_MTU -1
#define DFL_BADMAC_LIMIT -1
#define DFL_DGRAM_PACKING 1
#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS -1
#define DFL_ETM -1
#define DFL_SERIALIZE 0
#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE -1
#define LONG_RESPONSE "<p>01-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \
"02-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \
"03-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \
"04-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \
"05-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \
"06-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah\r\n" \
"07-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah</p>\r\n"
/* Uncomment LONG_RESPONSE at the end of HTTP_RESPONSE to test sending longer
* packets (for fragmentation purposes) */
#define HTTP_RESPONSE \
"HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \
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"<h2>mbed TLS Test Server</h2>\r\n" \
"<p>Successful connection using: %s</p>\r\n" // LONG_RESPONSE
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/*
* Size of the basic I/O buffer. Able to hold our default response.
*
* You will need to adapt the mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail() test in ssl-opt.sh
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* if you change this value to something outside the range <= 100 or > 500
*/
#define DFL_IO_BUF_LEN 200
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
#define USAGE_IO \
" ca_file=%%s The single file containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \
" default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \
" use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \
" ca_path=%%s The path containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \
" default: \"\" (pre-loaded) (overrides ca_file)\n" \
" use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \
" crt_file=%%s Your own cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted)\n" \
" default: see note after key_file2\n" \
" key_file=%%s default: see note after key_file2\n" \
" crt_file2=%%s Your second cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted)\n" \
" default: see note after key_file2\n" \
" key_file2=%%s default: see note below\n" \
" note: if neither crt_file/key_file nor crt_file2/key_file2 are used,\n" \
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" preloaded certificate(s) and key(s) are used if available\n" \
" dhm_file=%%s File containing Diffie-Hellman parameters\n" \
" default: preloaded parameters\n"
#else
#define USAGE_IO \
"\n" \
" No file operations available (MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined)\n" \
"\n"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#else
#define USAGE_IO ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
#define USAGE_SSL_ASYNC \
" async_operations=%%c... d=decrypt, s=sign (default: -=off)\n" \
" async_private_delay1=%%d Asynchronous delay for key_file or preloaded key\n" \
" async_private_delay2=%%d Asynchronous delay for key_file2 and sni\n" \
" default: -1 (not asynchronous)\n" \
" async_private_error=%%d Async callback error injection (default=0=none,\n" \
" 1=start, 2=cancel, 3=resume, negative=first time only)"
#else
#define USAGE_SSL_ASYNC ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define USAGE_CID \
" cid=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension.\n" \
" default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" cid_renego=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension during renegotiation.\n" \
" default: same as 'cid' parameter\n" \
" cid_val=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x).\n" \
" default: \"\"\n" \
" cid_val_renego=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x) after renegotiation.\n" \
" default: same as 'cid_val' parameter\n"
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#define USAGE_CID ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
#define USAGE_PSK \
" psk=%%s default: \"\" (in hex, without 0x)\n" \
" psk_list=%%s default: \"\"\n" \
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" A list of (PSK identity, PSK value) pairs.\n" \
" The PSK values are in hex, without 0x.\n" \
" id1,psk1[,id2,psk2[,...]]\n" \
" psk_identity=%%s default: \"Client_identity\"\n"
#else
#define USAGE_PSK ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
#define USAGE_TICKETS \
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" tickets=%%d default: 1 (enabled)\n" \
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" ticket_timeout=%%d default: 86400 (one day)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_TICKETS ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
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#define USAGE_CACHE \
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" cache_max=%%d default: cache default (50)\n" \
" cache_timeout=%%d default: cache default (1d)\n"
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#else
#define USAGE_CACHE ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */
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#if defined(SNI_OPTION)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
#define SNI_CRL ",crl"
#else
#define SNI_CRL ""
#endif
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#define USAGE_SNI \
" sni=%%s name1,cert1,key1,ca1"SNI_CRL",auth1[,...]\n" \
" default: disabled\n"
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#else
#define USAGE_SNI ""
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#endif /* SNI_OPTION */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \
" max_frag_len=%%d default: 16384 (tls default)\n" \
" options: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096\n"
#else
#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \
" trunc_hmac=%%d default: library default\n"
#else
#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
#define USAGE_ALPN \
" alpn=%%s default: \"\" (disabled)\n" \
" example: spdy/1,http/1.1\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ALPN ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
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#define USAGE_COOKIES \
" cookies=0/1/-1 default: 1 (enabled)\n" \
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" 0: disabled, -1: library default (broken)\n"
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#else
#define USAGE_COOKIES ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ANTI_REPLAY)
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#define USAGE_ANTI_REPLAY \
" anti_replay=0/1 default: (library default: enabled)\n"
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#else
#define USAGE_ANTI_REPLAY ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_BADMAC_LIMIT)
#define USAGE_BADMAC_LIMIT \
" badmac_limit=%%d default: (library default: disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_BADMAC_LIMIT ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
#define USAGE_DTLS \
" dtls=%%d default: 0 (TLS) (if both enabled)\n" \
" hs_timeout=%%d-%%d default: (library default: 1000-60000)\n" \
" range of DTLS handshake timeouts in millisecs\n" \
" mtu=%%d default: (library default: unlimited)\n" \
" dgram_packing=%%d default: 1 (allowed)\n" \
" allow or forbid packing of multiple\n" \
" records within a single datgram.\n"
#else
#define USAGE_DTLS ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ENFORCE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
#define USAGE_EMS \
" extended_ms=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n" \
" enforce_extended_master_secret=0/1 default: (library default: off)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_EMS ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
#define USAGE_ETM \
" etm=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ETM ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
#define USAGE_RENEGO \
" renegotiation=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" renegotiate=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
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" renego_delay=%%d default: -2 (library default)\n" \
" renego_period=%%d default: (2^64 - 1 for TLS, 2^48 - 1 for DTLS)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_RENEGO ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
#define USAGE_ECJPAKE \
" ecjpake_pw=%%s default: none (disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ECJPAKE ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
#define USAGE_CURVES \
" curves=a,b,c,d default: \"default\" (library default)\n" \
" example: \"secp521r1,brainpoolP512r1\"\n" \
" - use \"none\" for empty list\n" \
" - see mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()\n" \
" for acceptable curve names\n"
#else
#define USAGE_CURVES ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION \
" serialize=%%d default: 0 (do not serialize/deserialize)\n" \
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" options: 1 (serialize)\n" \
" 2 (serialize with re-initialization)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE)
#define USAGE_AUTH_MODE \
" auth_mode=%%s default: (library default: none)\n" \
" options: none, optional, required\n"
#else
#define USAGE_AUTH_MODE ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
#define USAGE_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGO \
" allow_legacy=%%d default: (library default: no)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGO ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_READ_TIMEOUT)
#define USAGE_READ_TIMEOUT \
" read_timeout=%%d default: 0 ms (no timeout)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_READ_TIMEOUT ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST)
#define USAGE_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST \
" cert_req_ca_list=%%d default: 1 (send ca list)\n" \
" options: 1 (send ca list), 0 (don't send)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MAJOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MAJOR_VER)
#define USAGE_MAX_VERSION " max_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"
#define USAGE_MIN_VERSION " min_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1)\n"
#define USAGE_FORCE_VERSION " force_version=%%s default: \"\" (none)\n" \
" options: ssl3, tls1, tls1_1, tls1_2, dtls1, dtls1_2\n"
#else
#define USAGE_MAX_VERSION ""
#define USAGE_MIN_VERSION ""
#define USAGE_FORCE_VERSION ""
#endif
Merge mbedtls 2.16.6 into baremetal Conflicts: mbedtls.doxyfile - PROJECT_NAME - mbed TLS v2.16.6 chosen. doc_mainpage.h - mbed TLS v2.16.6 version chosen. hmac_drbg.h - line 260, extended description chosen. - line 313, extended description chosen. - line 338, extended description chosen. version.h - 2.16.6 chosen. CMakeLists.txt - 2.16.6 chosen. test_suite_version.data - 2.16.6 chosen. Makefile - 141 - manual correction - baremetal version of C_SOURCE_FILES with variables for directories plus 2.16.6 CTAGS addition. pkparse.c - lines 846 onwards - the asn1_get_nonzero_mpi implementation chosen. ssl_tls.c - line 5269 - edited manually, left the ret=0, because baremetal has a different behaviour since commit 87b5626, but added a debug message that's new in 2.16.6. all.sh: - component_build_deprecated - chosen the refactored version from 2.16.6, but with extra flags from baremetal. - rest of the _no_xxx tests - merged make options to have PTHREAD=1 and other changes from 2.16.6 (like -O1 instead of -O0). - component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication - added TINYCRYPT_BUILD=0 to the 2.16.6 version of make. x509/req_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/crl_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/cert_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_mail_client.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_fork_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client1.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client2.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. - line 132 - new options of both branches added. - skip close notify handled as in 2.16.6, but with `ssl` instead of `&ssl`. - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. - Merged options from baremetal and 2.16.6. ssl_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_server2.c - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. config.pl - fixed missing defines from the documentation, removed duplicates, and reorganised so that the documentation and excluded list are ordered in the same way. test_suite_x509parse.data - only added the two new pathlen tests. x509_crt.c - change the return code by removing MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, since it's added by x509_crt_frame_parse_ext not by an "or", but by "+=". Changelog - Assigned all entries to appropriate sections. ssl-opt.sh - line 8263 - merged options. - removed lines 1165 - 1176 - there was a duplicate test, probably an artifact of previous merges. check-files.py - sticked to old formatting. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
2020-05-18 17:47:25 +02:00
/* USAGE is arbitrarily split to stay under the portable string literal
* length limit: 4095 bytes in C99. */
#define USAGE1 \
"\n usage: ssl_server2 param=<>...\n" \
"\n acceptable parameters:\n" \
" server_addr=%%s default: (all interfaces)\n" \
" server_port=%%d default: 4433\n" \
" debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" buffer_size=%%d default: 200 \n" \
" (minimum: 1, max: 16385)\n" \
" response_size=%%d default: about 152 (basic response)\n" \
" (minimum: 0, max: 16384)\n" \
" increases buffer_size if bigger\n"\
" nbio=%%d default: 0 (blocking I/O)\n" \
" options: 1 (non-blocking), 2 (added delays)\n" \
" event=%%d default: 0 (loop)\n" \
" options: 1 (level-triggered, implies nbio=1),\n" \
USAGE_READ_TIMEOUT \
"\n" \
USAGE_DTLS \
USAGE_COOKIES \
USAGE_ANTI_REPLAY \
USAGE_BADMAC_LIMIT \
Merge mbedtls 2.16.6 into baremetal Conflicts: mbedtls.doxyfile - PROJECT_NAME - mbed TLS v2.16.6 chosen. doc_mainpage.h - mbed TLS v2.16.6 version chosen. hmac_drbg.h - line 260, extended description chosen. - line 313, extended description chosen. - line 338, extended description chosen. version.h - 2.16.6 chosen. CMakeLists.txt - 2.16.6 chosen. test_suite_version.data - 2.16.6 chosen. Makefile - 141 - manual correction - baremetal version of C_SOURCE_FILES with variables for directories plus 2.16.6 CTAGS addition. pkparse.c - lines 846 onwards - the asn1_get_nonzero_mpi implementation chosen. ssl_tls.c - line 5269 - edited manually, left the ret=0, because baremetal has a different behaviour since commit 87b5626, but added a debug message that's new in 2.16.6. all.sh: - component_build_deprecated - chosen the refactored version from 2.16.6, but with extra flags from baremetal. - rest of the _no_xxx tests - merged make options to have PTHREAD=1 and other changes from 2.16.6 (like -O1 instead of -O0). - component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication - added TINYCRYPT_BUILD=0 to the 2.16.6 version of make. x509/req_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/crl_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/cert_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_mail_client.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_fork_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client1.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client2.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. - line 132 - new options of both branches added. - skip close notify handled as in 2.16.6, but with `ssl` instead of `&ssl`. - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. - Merged options from baremetal and 2.16.6. ssl_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_server2.c - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. config.pl - fixed missing defines from the documentation, removed duplicates, and reorganised so that the documentation and excluded list are ordered in the same way. test_suite_x509parse.data - only added the two new pathlen tests. x509_crt.c - change the return code by removing MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, since it's added by x509_crt_frame_parse_ext not by an "or", but by "+=". Changelog - Assigned all entries to appropriate sections. ssl-opt.sh - line 8263 - merged options. - removed lines 1165 - 1176 - there was a duplicate test, probably an artifact of previous merges. check-files.py - sticked to old formatting. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
2020-05-18 17:47:25 +02:00
"\n"
#define USAGE2 \
USAGE_AUTH_MODE \
USAGE_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST \
USAGE_IO \
USAGE_SSL_ASYNC \
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
USAGE_SNI \
"\n" \
USAGE_PSK \
USAGE_ECJPAKE \
Merge mbedtls 2.16.6 into baremetal Conflicts: mbedtls.doxyfile - PROJECT_NAME - mbed TLS v2.16.6 chosen. doc_mainpage.h - mbed TLS v2.16.6 version chosen. hmac_drbg.h - line 260, extended description chosen. - line 313, extended description chosen. - line 338, extended description chosen. version.h - 2.16.6 chosen. CMakeLists.txt - 2.16.6 chosen. test_suite_version.data - 2.16.6 chosen. Makefile - 141 - manual correction - baremetal version of C_SOURCE_FILES with variables for directories plus 2.16.6 CTAGS addition. pkparse.c - lines 846 onwards - the asn1_get_nonzero_mpi implementation chosen. ssl_tls.c - line 5269 - edited manually, left the ret=0, because baremetal has a different behaviour since commit 87b5626, but added a debug message that's new in 2.16.6. all.sh: - component_build_deprecated - chosen the refactored version from 2.16.6, but with extra flags from baremetal. - rest of the _no_xxx tests - merged make options to have PTHREAD=1 and other changes from 2.16.6 (like -O1 instead of -O0). - component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication - added TINYCRYPT_BUILD=0 to the 2.16.6 version of make. x509/req_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/crl_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/cert_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_mail_client.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_fork_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client1.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client2.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. - line 132 - new options of both branches added. - skip close notify handled as in 2.16.6, but with `ssl` instead of `&ssl`. - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. - Merged options from baremetal and 2.16.6. ssl_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_server2.c - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. config.pl - fixed missing defines from the documentation, removed duplicates, and reorganised so that the documentation and excluded list are ordered in the same way. test_suite_x509parse.data - only added the two new pathlen tests. x509_crt.c - change the return code by removing MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, since it's added by x509_crt_frame_parse_ext not by an "or", but by "+=". Changelog - Assigned all entries to appropriate sections. ssl-opt.sh - line 8263 - merged options. - removed lines 1165 - 1176 - there was a duplicate test, probably an artifact of previous merges. check-files.py - sticked to old formatting. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
2020-05-18 17:47:25 +02:00
"\n"
#define USAGE3 \
USAGE_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGO \
USAGE_RENEGO \
2014-08-15 11:17:27 +02:00
" exchanges=%%d default: 1\n" \
"\n" \
USAGE_TICKETS \
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
USAGE_CACHE \
USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \
USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \
USAGE_ALPN \
USAGE_EMS \
USAGE_ETM \
USAGE_CURVES \
Merge mbedtls 2.16.6 into baremetal Conflicts: mbedtls.doxyfile - PROJECT_NAME - mbed TLS v2.16.6 chosen. doc_mainpage.h - mbed TLS v2.16.6 version chosen. hmac_drbg.h - line 260, extended description chosen. - line 313, extended description chosen. - line 338, extended description chosen. version.h - 2.16.6 chosen. CMakeLists.txt - 2.16.6 chosen. test_suite_version.data - 2.16.6 chosen. Makefile - 141 - manual correction - baremetal version of C_SOURCE_FILES with variables for directories plus 2.16.6 CTAGS addition. pkparse.c - lines 846 onwards - the asn1_get_nonzero_mpi implementation chosen. ssl_tls.c - line 5269 - edited manually, left the ret=0, because baremetal has a different behaviour since commit 87b5626, but added a debug message that's new in 2.16.6. all.sh: - component_build_deprecated - chosen the refactored version from 2.16.6, but with extra flags from baremetal. - rest of the _no_xxx tests - merged make options to have PTHREAD=1 and other changes from 2.16.6 (like -O1 instead of -O0). - component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication - added TINYCRYPT_BUILD=0 to the 2.16.6 version of make. x509/req_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/crl_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/cert_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_mail_client.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_fork_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client1.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client2.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. - line 132 - new options of both branches added. - skip close notify handled as in 2.16.6, but with `ssl` instead of `&ssl`. - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. - Merged options from baremetal and 2.16.6. ssl_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_server2.c - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. config.pl - fixed missing defines from the documentation, removed duplicates, and reorganised so that the documentation and excluded list are ordered in the same way. test_suite_x509parse.data - only added the two new pathlen tests. x509_crt.c - change the return code by removing MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, since it's added by x509_crt_frame_parse_ext not by an "or", but by "+=". Changelog - Assigned all entries to appropriate sections. ssl-opt.sh - line 8263 - merged options. - removed lines 1165 - 1176 - there was a duplicate test, probably an artifact of previous merges. check-files.py - sticked to old formatting. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
2020-05-18 17:47:25 +02:00
"\n"
#define USAGE4 \
" arc4=%%d default: (library default: 0)\n" \
" allow_sha1=%%d default: 0\n" \
USAGE_MIN_VERSION \
USAGE_MAX_VERSION \
USAGE_FORCE_VERSION \
"\n" \
" version_suites=a,b,c,d per-version ciphersuites\n" \
" in order from ssl3 to tls1_2\n" \
" default: all enabled\n" \
" force_ciphersuite=<name> default: all enabled\n" \
" query_config=<name> return 0 if the specified\n" \
" configuration macro is defined and 1\n" \
" otherwise. The expansion of the macro\n" \
" is printed if it is defined\n" \
USAGE_SERIALIZATION \
" acceptable ciphersuite names:\n"
#define ALPN_LIST_SIZE 10
#define CURVE_LIST_SIZE 20
#define PUT_UINT64_BE(out_be,in_le,i) \
{ \
(out_be)[(i) + 0] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 56 ) & 0xFF ); \
(out_be)[(i) + 1] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 48 ) & 0xFF ); \
(out_be)[(i) + 2] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 40 ) & 0xFF ); \
(out_be)[(i) + 3] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 32 ) & 0xFF ); \
(out_be)[(i) + 4] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 24 ) & 0xFF ); \
(out_be)[(i) + 5] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 16 ) & 0xFF ); \
(out_be)[(i) + 6] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); \
(out_be)[(i) + 7] = (unsigned char)( ( (in_le) >> 0 ) & 0xFF ); \
}
/*
* global options
*/
struct options
{
const char *server_addr; /* address on which the ssl service runs */
const char *server_port; /* port on which the ssl service runs */
int debug_level; /* level of debugging */
int nbio; /* should I/O be blocking? */
int event; /* loop or event-driven IO? level or edge triggered? */
uint32_t read_timeout; /* timeout on mbedtls_ssl_read() in milliseconds */
int response_size; /* pad response with header to requested size */
uint16_t buffer_size; /* IO buffer size */
const char *ca_file; /* the file with the CA certificate(s) */
const char *ca_path; /* the path with the CA certificate(s) reside */
const char *crt_file; /* the file with the server certificate */
const char *key_file; /* the file with the server key */
const char *crt_file2; /* the file with the 2nd server certificate */
const char *key_file2; /* the file with the 2nd server key */
const char *async_operations; /* supported SSL asynchronous operations */
int async_private_delay1; /* number of times f_async_resume needs to be called for key 1, or -1 for no async */
int async_private_delay2; /* number of times f_async_resume needs to be called for key 2, or -1 for no async */
int async_private_error; /* inject error in async private callback */
const char *psk; /* the pre-shared key */
const char *psk_identity; /* the pre-shared key identity */
char *psk_list; /* list of PSK id/key pairs for callback */
const char *ecjpake_pw; /* the EC J-PAKE password */
int force_ciphersuite[2]; /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all */
const char *version_suites; /* per-version ciphersuites */
int renegotiation; /* enable / disable renegotiation */
int allow_legacy; /* allow legacy renegotiation */
int renegotiate; /* attempt renegotiation? */
int renego_delay; /* delay before enforcing renegotiation */
uint64_t renego_period; /* period for automatic renegotiation */
int exchanges; /* number of data exchanges */
int min_version; /* minimum protocol version accepted */
int max_version; /* maximum protocol version accepted */
int arc4; /* flag for arc4 suites support */
int allow_sha1; /* flag for SHA-1 support */
int auth_mode; /* verify mode for connection */
int cert_req_ca_list; /* should we send the CA list? */
unsigned char mfl_code; /* code for maximum fragment length */
int trunc_hmac; /* accept truncated hmac? */
int tickets; /* enable / disable session tickets */
int ticket_timeout; /* session ticket lifetime */
int cache_max; /* max number of session cache entries */
int cache_timeout; /* expiration delay of session cache entries */
char *sni; /* string describing sni information */
const char *curves; /* list of supported elliptic curves */
const char *alpn_string; /* ALPN supported protocols */
const char *dhm_file; /* the file with the DH parameters */
int extended_ms; /* allow negotiation of extended MS? */
int enforce_extended_master_secret; /* Enforce the usage of extended
* master secret */
int etm; /* allow negotiation of encrypt-then-MAC? */
int transport; /* TLS or DTLS? */
int cookies; /* Use cookies for DTLS? -1 to break them */
int anti_replay; /* Use anti-replay for DTLS? -1 for default */
uint32_t hs_to_min; /* Initial value of DTLS handshake timer */
uint32_t hs_to_max; /* Max value of DTLS handshake timer */
int dtls_mtu; /* UDP Maximum tranport unit for DTLS */
int dgram_packing; /* allow/forbid datagram packing */
int badmac_limit; /* Limit of records with bad MAC */
int cid_enabled; /* whether to use the CID extension or not */
int cid_enabled_renego; /* whether to use the CID extension or not
* during renegotiation */
const char *cid_val; /* the CID to use for incoming messages */
int serialize; /* serialize/deserialize connection */
const char *cid_val_renego; /* the CID to use for incoming messages
* after renegotiation */
} opt;
int query_config( const char *config );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
2015-06-23 17:35:03 +02:00
static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *str )
{
const char *p, *basename;
/* Extract basename from file */
for( p = basename = file; *p != '\0'; p++ )
if( *p == '/' || *p == '\\' )
basename = p + 1;
mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: |%d| %s", basename, line, level, str );
fflush( (FILE *) ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT)
/*
* Test recv/send functions that make sure each try returns
* WANT_READ/WANT_WRITE at least once before sucesseding
*/
static int delayed_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
static int first_try = 1;
int ret;
if( first_try )
{
first_try = 0;
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
}
ret = mbedtls_net_recv( ctx, buf, len );
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ )
first_try = 1; /* Next call will be a new operation */
return( ret );
}
static int delayed_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
static int first_try = 1;
int ret;
if( first_try )
{
first_try = 0;
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE );
}
ret = mbedtls_net_send( ctx, buf, len );
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
first_try = 1; /* Next call will be a new operation */
return( ret );
}
typedef struct
{
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl;
mbedtls_net_context *net;
} io_ctx_t;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
static int ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char const *buf, size_t len )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *tmp_buf;
/* Record checking may modify the input buffer,
* so make a copy. */
tmp_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len );
if( tmp_buf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( tmp_buf, buf, len );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_check_record( ssl, tmp_buf, len );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
{
int ret_repeated;
/* Test-only: Make sure that mbedtls_ssl_check_record()
* doesn't alter state. */
memcpy( tmp_buf, buf, len ); /* Restore buffer */
ret_repeated = mbedtls_ssl_check_record( ssl, tmp_buf, len );
if( ret != ret_repeated )
{
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() returned inconsistent results.\n" );
return( -1 );
}
switch( ret )
{
case 0:
break;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD:
if( opt.debug_level > 1 )
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected invalid record.\n" );
break;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC:
if( opt.debug_level > 1 )
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected unauthentic record.\n" );
break;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD:
if( opt.debug_level > 1 )
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected unexpected record.\n" );
break;
default:
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() failed fatally with -%#04x.\n", -ret );
return( -1 );
}
/* Regardless of the outcome, forward the record to the stack. */
}
mbedtls_free( tmp_buf );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */
static int recv_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx;
size_t recv_len;
int ret;
if( opt.nbio == 2 )
ret = delayed_recv( io_ctx->net, buf, len );
else
ret = mbedtls_net_recv( io_ctx->net, buf, len );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
recv_len = (size_t) ret;
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Here's the place to do any datagram/record checking
* in between receiving the packet from the underlying
* transport and passing it on to the TLS stack. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
if( ssl_check_record( io_ctx->ssl, buf, recv_len ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */
}
return( (int) recv_len );
}
static int recv_timeout_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
uint32_t timeout )
{
io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx;
int ret;
size_t recv_len;
ret = mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( io_ctx->net, buf, len, timeout );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
recv_len = (size_t) ret;
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Here's the place to do any datagram/record checking
* in between receiving the packet from the underlying
* transport and passing it on to the TLS stack. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
if( ssl_check_record( io_ctx->ssl, buf, recv_len ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */
}
return( (int) recv_len );
}
static int send_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char const *buf, size_t len )
{
io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx;
if( opt.nbio == 2 )
return( delayed_send( io_ctx->net, buf, len ) );
return( mbedtls_net_send( io_ctx->net, buf, len ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT */
#if defined(SNI_OPTION) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE)
/*
* Return authmode from string, or -1 on error
*/
static int get_auth_mode( const char *s )
{
if( strcmp( s, "none" ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE );
if( strcmp( s, "optional" ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL );
if( strcmp( s, "required" ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
return( -1 );
}
#endif /* SNI_OPTION || !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE */
2014-06-10 15:15:06 +02:00
/*
* Used by sni_parse and psk_parse to handle coma-separated lists
*/
#define GET_ITEM( dst ) \
do \
{ \
(dst) = p; \
while( *p != ',' ) \
if( ++p > end ) \
goto error; \
*p++ = '\0'; \
} while( 0 )
2014-06-10 15:15:06 +02:00
2015-04-03 16:41:52 +02:00
#if defined(SNI_OPTION)
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
typedef struct _sni_entry sni_entry;
struct _sni_entry {
const char *name;
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert;
mbedtls_pk_context *key;
mbedtls_x509_crt* ca;
mbedtls_x509_crl* crl;
int authmode;
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
sni_entry *next;
};
void sni_free( sni_entry *head )
{
sni_entry *cur = head, *next;
while( cur != NULL )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->cert );
mbedtls_free( cur->cert );
mbedtls_pk_free( cur->key );
mbedtls_free( cur->key );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cur->ca );
mbedtls_free( cur->ca );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crl_free( cur->crl );
mbedtls_free( cur->crl );
#endif
next = cur->next;
mbedtls_free( cur );
cur = next;
}
}
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
/*
* Parse a string of sextuples name1,crt1,key1,ca1,crl1,auth1[,...]
* into a usable sni_entry list. For ca1, crl1, auth1, the special value
* '-' means unset. If ca1 is unset, then crl1 is ignored too.
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
*
2014-06-10 15:15:06 +02:00
* Modifies the input string! This is not production quality!
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
*/
sni_entry *sni_parse( char *sni_string )
{
sni_entry *cur = NULL, *new = NULL;
char *p = sni_string;
char *end = p;
char *crt_file, *key_file, *ca_file, *auth_str;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
char *crl_file;
#endif
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
while( *end != '\0' )
++end;
*end = ',';
while( p <= end )
{
if( ( new = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( sni_entry ) ) ) == NULL )
{
sni_free( cur );
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
return( NULL );
}
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
GET_ITEM( new->name );
GET_ITEM( crt_file );
GET_ITEM( key_file );
GET_ITEM( ca_file );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
GET_ITEM( crl_file );
#endif
GET_ITEM( auth_str );
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
if( ( new->cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL ||
( new->key = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_context ) ) ) == NULL )
goto error;
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( new->cert );
mbedtls_pk_init( new->key );
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( new->cert, crt_file ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( new->key, key_file, "" ) != 0 )
goto error;
if( strcmp( ca_file, "-" ) != 0 )
{
if( ( new->ca = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL )
goto error;
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( new->ca );
if( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( new->ca, ca_file ) != 0 )
goto error;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
if( strcmp( crl_file, "-" ) != 0 )
{
if( ( new->crl = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crl ) ) ) == NULL )
goto error;
mbedtls_x509_crl_init( new->crl );
if( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( new->crl, crl_file ) != 0 )
goto error;
}
#endif
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
if( strcmp( auth_str, "-" ) != 0 )
{
if( ( new->authmode = get_auth_mode( auth_str ) ) < 0 )
goto error;
}
else
new->authmode = DFL_AUTH_MODE;
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
new->next = cur;
cur = new;
}
return( cur );
error:
sni_free( new );
sni_free( cur );
return( NULL );
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
}
/*
* SNI callback.
*/
int sni_callback( void *p_info, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
const unsigned char *name, size_t name_len )
{
const sni_entry *cur = (const sni_entry *) p_info;
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
while( cur != NULL )
{
if( name_len == strlen( cur->name ) &&
memcmp( name, cur->name, name_len ) == 0 )
{
if( cur->ca != NULL )
mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain( ssl, cur->ca, cur->crl );
if( cur->authmode != DFL_AUTH_MODE )
mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode( ssl, cur->authmode );
2015-05-10 23:10:37 +02:00
return( mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert( ssl, cur->cert, cur->key ) );
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
}
cur = cur->next;
}
return( -1 );
}
2015-04-03 16:41:52 +02:00
#endif /* SNI_OPTION */
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
2014-06-09 19:06:00 +02:00
#define HEX2NUM( c ) \
do \
{ \
if( (c) >= '0' && (c) <= '9' ) \
(c) -= '0'; \
else if( (c) >= 'a' && (c) <= 'f' ) \
(c) -= 'a' - 10; \
else if( (c) >= 'A' && (c) <= 'F' ) \
(c) -= 'A' - 10; \
else \
return( -1 ); \
} while( 0 )
2014-06-09 19:06:00 +02:00
/*
* Convert a hex string to bytes.
* Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
int unhexify( unsigned char *output, const char *input, size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char c;
size_t j;
*olen = strlen( input );
if( *olen % 2 != 0 || *olen / 2 > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN )
2014-06-09 19:06:00 +02:00
return( -1 );
*olen /= 2;
for( j = 0; j < *olen * 2; j += 2 )
{
c = input[j];
HEX2NUM( c );
output[ j / 2 ] = c << 4;
c = input[j + 1];
HEX2NUM( c );
output[ j / 2 ] |= c;
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
typedef struct _psk_entry psk_entry;
struct _psk_entry
{
const char *name;
size_t key_len;
unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN];
psk_entry *next;
};
/*
* Free a list of psk_entry's
*/
void psk_free( psk_entry *head )
{
psk_entry *next;
while( head != NULL )
{
next = head->next;
mbedtls_free( head );
head = next;
}
}
/*
* Parse a string of pairs name1,key1[,name2,key2[,...]]
* into a usable psk_entry list.
*
* Modifies the input string! This is not production quality!
*/
psk_entry *psk_parse( char *psk_string )
{
psk_entry *cur = NULL, *new = NULL;
char *p = psk_string;
char *end = p;
char *key_hex;
while( *end != '\0' )
++end;
*end = ',';
while( p <= end )
{
if( ( new = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( psk_entry ) ) ) == NULL )
goto error;
memset( new, 0, sizeof( psk_entry ) );
2014-06-10 15:15:06 +02:00
GET_ITEM( new->name );
GET_ITEM( key_hex );
if( unhexify( new->key, key_hex, &new->key_len ) != 0 )
goto error;
new->next = cur;
cur = new;
}
return( cur );
error:
psk_free( new );
psk_free( cur );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* PSK callback
*/
int psk_callback( void *p_info, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *name, size_t name_len )
{
psk_entry *cur = (psk_entry *) p_info;
while( cur != NULL )
{
if( name_len == strlen( cur->name ) &&
memcmp( name, cur->name, name_len ) == 0 )
{
return( mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk( ssl, cur->key, cur->key_len ) );
}
cur = cur->next;
}
return( -1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
2014-06-09 19:06:00 +02:00
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
static mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd;
/* Interruption handler to ensure clean exit (for valgrind testing) */
#if !defined(_WIN32)
static int received_sigterm = 0;
void term_handler( int sig )
{
((void) sig);
received_sigterm = 1;
mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd ); /* causes mbedtls_net_accept() to abort */
mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd ); /* causes net_read() to abort */
}
#endif
#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_HASH) ) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
static int available_hashes[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
/* Allow SHA-1 as we use it extensively in tests. */
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
#endif
MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
};
#endif /* ( MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_HASH ) ||
!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
/** Return true if \p ret is a status code indicating that there is an
* operation in progress on an SSL connection, and false if it indicates
* success or a fatal error.
*
* The possible operations in progress are:
*
* - A read, when the SSL input buffer does not contain a full message.
* - A write, when the SSL output buffer contains some data that has not
* been sent over the network yet.
* - An asynchronous callback that has not completed yet. */
static int mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( int ret )
{
return( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ||
ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE ||
ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
typedef struct
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< Certificate corresponding to the key */
mbedtls_pk_context *pk; /*!< Private key */
unsigned delay; /*!< Number of resume steps to go through */
unsigned pk_owned : 1; /*!< Whether to free the pk object on exit */
} ssl_async_key_slot_t;
typedef enum {
2018-04-26 00:19:16 +02:00
SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_NONE = 0, /*!< Let the callbacks succeed */
SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_START, /*!< Inject error during start */
SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_CANCEL, /*!< Close the connection after async start */
SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_RESUME, /*!< Inject error during resume */
#define SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_MAX SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_RESUME
} ssl_async_inject_error_t;
typedef struct
{
ssl_async_key_slot_t slots[4]; /* key, key2, sni1, sni2 */
size_t slots_used;
ssl_async_inject_error_t inject_error;
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t);
void *p_rng;
} ssl_async_key_context_t;
int ssl_async_set_key( ssl_async_key_context_t *ctx,
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
int pk_take_ownership,
unsigned delay )
{
if( ctx->slots_used >= sizeof( ctx->slots ) / sizeof( *ctx->slots ) )
return( -1 );
ctx->slots[ctx->slots_used].cert = cert;
ctx->slots[ctx->slots_used].pk = pk;
ctx->slots[ctx->slots_used].delay = delay;
ctx->slots[ctx->slots_used].pk_owned = pk_take_ownership;
++ctx->slots_used;
return( 0 );
}
#define SSL_ASYNC_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 512
typedef enum
{
ASYNC_OP_SIGN,
ASYNC_OP_DECRYPT,
} ssl_async_operation_type_t;
/* Note that the enum above and the array below need to be kept in sync!
* `ssl_async_operation_names[op]` is the name of op for each value `op`
* of type `ssl_async_operation_type_t`. */
static const char *const ssl_async_operation_names[] =
{
"sign",
"decrypt",
};
typedef struct
{
unsigned slot;
ssl_async_operation_type_t operation_type;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
unsigned char input[SSL_ASYNC_INPUT_MAX_SIZE];
size_t input_len;
unsigned remaining_delay;
} ssl_async_operation_context_t;
static int ssl_async_start( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
ssl_async_operation_type_t op_type,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *input,
size_t input_len )
{
int ret;
ssl_async_key_context_t *config_data =
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( ssl->conf );
unsigned slot;
ssl_async_operation_context_t *ctx = NULL;
const char *op_name = ssl_async_operation_names[op_type];
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
{
char dn[100];
mbedtls_x509_name *subject;
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_get_subject( cert, &subject );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( dn, sizeof( dn ), subject ) > 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "Async %s callback: looking for DN=%s\n",
op_name, dn );
mbedtls_x509_name_free( subject );
}
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
/* Look for a private key that matches the public key in cert.
* Since this test code has the private key inside Mbed TLS,
* we call mbedtls_pk_check_pair to match a private key with the
* public key. */
for( slot = 0; slot < config_data->slots_used; slot++ )
{
mbedtls_pk_context *pk;
int match;
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( cert, &pk );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
match = mbedtls_pk_check_pair( pk, config_data->slots[slot].pk );
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( cert );
if( match == 0 )
break;
}
if( slot == config_data->slots_used )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Async %s callback: no key matches this certificate.\n",
op_name );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH );
}
mbedtls_printf( "Async %s callback: using key slot %u, delay=%u.\n",
op_name, slot, config_data->slots[slot].delay );
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
if( config_data->inject_error == SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_START )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Async %s callback: injected error\n", op_name );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
if( input_len > SSL_ASYNC_INPUT_MAX_SIZE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ctx ) );
if( ctx == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
ctx->slot = slot;
ctx->operation_type = op_type;
ctx->md_alg = md_alg;
memcpy( ctx->input, input, input_len );
ctx->input_len = input_len;
ctx->remaining_delay = config_data->slots[slot].delay;
mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, ctx );
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
if( ctx->remaining_delay == 0 )
return( 0 );
else
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS );
}
static int ssl_async_sign( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash,
size_t hash_len )
{
return( ssl_async_start( ssl, cert,
ASYNC_OP_SIGN, md_alg,
hash, hash_len ) );
}
static int ssl_async_decrypt( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
const unsigned char *input,
size_t input_len )
{
return( ssl_async_start( ssl, cert,
ASYNC_OP_DECRYPT, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
input, input_len ) );
}
static int ssl_async_resume( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *output,
size_t *output_len,
size_t output_size )
{
ssl_async_operation_context_t *ctx = mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( ssl );
ssl_async_key_context_t *config_data =
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data( ssl->conf );
ssl_async_key_slot_t *key_slot = &config_data->slots[ctx->slot];
int ret;
const char *op_name;
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
if( ctx->remaining_delay > 0 )
{
--ctx->remaining_delay;
mbedtls_printf( "Async resume (slot %u): call %u more times.\n",
ctx->slot, ctx->remaining_delay );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS );
}
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
switch( ctx->operation_type )
{
case ASYNC_OP_DECRYPT:
ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( key_slot->pk,
ctx->input, ctx->input_len,
output, output_len, output_size,
config_data->f_rng, config_data->p_rng );
break;
case ASYNC_OP_SIGN:
ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( key_slot->pk,
ctx->md_alg,
ctx->input, ctx->input_len,
output, output_len,
config_data->f_rng, config_data->p_rng );
break;
default:
mbedtls_printf( "Async resume (slot %u): unknown operation type %ld. This shouldn't happen.\n",
ctx->slot, (long) ctx->operation_type );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
break;
}
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
op_name = ssl_async_operation_names[ctx->operation_type];
if( config_data->inject_error == SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_RESUME )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Async resume callback: %s done but injected error\n",
op_name );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
2018-04-24 13:05:39 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "Async resume (slot %u): %s done, status=%d.\n",
ctx->slot, op_name, ret );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
return( ret );
}
static void ssl_async_cancel( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
ssl_async_operation_context_t *ctx = mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data( ssl );
mbedtls_printf( "Async cancel callback.\n" );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
/*
* Wait for an event from the underlying transport or the timer
* (Used in event-driven IO mode).
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
int idle( mbedtls_net_context *fd,
int idle_reason )
#else
int idle( mbedtls_net_context *fd,
mbedtls_timing_delay_context *timer,
int idle_reason )
#endif
{
int ret;
int poll_type = 0;
if( idle_reason == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
poll_type = MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE;
else if( idle_reason == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ )
poll_type = MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
else
return( 0 );
#endif
while( 1 )
{
/* Check if timer has expired */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
if( timer != NULL &&
mbedtls_timing_get_delay( timer ) == 2 )
{
break;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */
/* Check if underlying transport became available */
if( poll_type != 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_net_poll( fd, poll_type, 0 );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
if( ret == poll_type )
break;
}
}
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
int report_cid_usage( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const char *additional_description )
{
int ret;
unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
size_t peer_cid_len;
int cid_negotiated;
if( opt.transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
return( 0 );
/* Check if the use of a CID has been negotiated */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated,
peer_cid, &peer_cid_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
return( ret );
}
if( cid_negotiated == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
{
if( opt.cid_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED )
{
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID was not offered by client.\n",
additional_description );
}
}
else
{
size_t idx=0;
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated.\n",
additional_description );
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Peer CID (length %u Bytes): ",
additional_description,
(unsigned) peer_cid_len );
while( idx < peer_cid_len )
{
mbedtls_printf( "%02x ", peer_cid[ idx ] );
idx++;
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RNG)
int rng_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *dst, size_t len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *rng_ctx_global = NULL;
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *rng_ctx_global = NULL;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
int rng_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *dst, size_t len )
{
/* We expect the NULL parameter here. */
if( ctx != NULL )
return( -1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( rng_ctx_global, dst, len ) );
#else
return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( rng_ctx_global, dst, len ) );
#endif
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
int mbedtls_hardware_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output,
size_t len, size_t *olen )
{
size_t i;
(void) data;
for( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
output[i] = rand();
*olen = len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
2015-01-22 11:33:29 +01:00
int ret = 0, len, written, frags, exchanges_left;
int version_suites[4][2];
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT)
io_ctx_t io_ctx;
#endif
unsigned char* buf = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char psk[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN];
size_t psk_len = 0;
psk_entry *psk_info = NULL;
#endif
const char *pers = "ssl_server2";
unsigned char client_ip[16] = { 0 };
size_t cliip_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx cookie_ctx;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_profile crt_profile_for_test = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
#endif
mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctr_drbg = NULL;
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *hmac_drbg = NULL;
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl = NULL;
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
mbedtls_timing_delay_context *timer = NULL;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
2014-11-05 14:23:03 +01:00
unsigned char renego_period[8] = { 0 };
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
uint32_t flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt *cacert = NULL;
mbedtls_x509_crt *srvcert = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_context *pkey = NULL;
mbedtls_x509_crt *srvcert2 = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_context *pkey2 = NULL;
int key_cert_init = 0, key_cert_init2 = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
ssl_async_key_context_t ssl_async_keys;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_dhm_context dhm;
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = NULL;
#endif
2015-05-19 15:28:00 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ticket_ctx = NULL;
2015-05-19 15:28:00 +02:00
#endif
2015-04-03 16:41:52 +02:00
#if defined(SNI_OPTION)
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
sni_entry *sni_info = NULL;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE];
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info * curve_cur;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
const char *alpn_list[ALPN_LIST_SIZE];
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
unsigned char alloc_buf[MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE];
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
unsigned char cid_renego[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
size_t cid_len = 0;
size_t cid_renego_len = 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
unsigned char *context_buf = NULL;
size_t context_buf_len;
#endif
int i;
char *p, *q;
const int *list;
#if !defined(_WIN32)
/* Abort cleanly on SIGTERM and SIGINT */
signal( SIGTERM, term_handler );
signal( SIGINT, term_handler );
#endif
if( argc == 0 )
{
usage:
if( ret == 0 )
ret = 1;
Merge mbedtls 2.16.6 into baremetal Conflicts: mbedtls.doxyfile - PROJECT_NAME - mbed TLS v2.16.6 chosen. doc_mainpage.h - mbed TLS v2.16.6 version chosen. hmac_drbg.h - line 260, extended description chosen. - line 313, extended description chosen. - line 338, extended description chosen. version.h - 2.16.6 chosen. CMakeLists.txt - 2.16.6 chosen. test_suite_version.data - 2.16.6 chosen. Makefile - 141 - manual correction - baremetal version of C_SOURCE_FILES with variables for directories plus 2.16.6 CTAGS addition. pkparse.c - lines 846 onwards - the asn1_get_nonzero_mpi implementation chosen. ssl_tls.c - line 5269 - edited manually, left the ret=0, because baremetal has a different behaviour since commit 87b5626, but added a debug message that's new in 2.16.6. all.sh: - component_build_deprecated - chosen the refactored version from 2.16.6, but with extra flags from baremetal. - rest of the _no_xxx tests - merged make options to have PTHREAD=1 and other changes from 2.16.6 (like -O1 instead of -O0). - component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication - added TINYCRYPT_BUILD=0 to the 2.16.6 version of make. x509/req_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/crl_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/cert_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_mail_client.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_fork_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client1.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client2.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. - line 132 - new options of both branches added. - skip close notify handled as in 2.16.6, but with `ssl` instead of `&ssl`. - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. - Merged options from baremetal and 2.16.6. ssl_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_server2.c - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. config.pl - fixed missing defines from the documentation, removed duplicates, and reorganised so that the documentation and excluded list are ordered in the same way. test_suite_x509parse.data - only added the two new pathlen tests. x509_crt.c - change the return code by removing MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, since it's added by x509_crt_frame_parse_ext not by an "or", but by "+=". Changelog - Assigned all entries to appropriate sections. ssl-opt.sh - line 8263 - merged options. - removed lines 1165 - 1176 - there was a duplicate test, probably an artifact of previous merges. check-files.py - sticked to old formatting. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
2020-05-18 17:47:25 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( USAGE1 );
mbedtls_printf( USAGE2 );
mbedtls_printf( USAGE3 );
mbedtls_printf( USAGE4 );
list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites();
while( *list )
{
mbedtls_printf(" %-42s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) );
list++;
if( !*list )
break;
mbedtls_printf(" %s\n", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) );
list++;
}
mbedtls_printf("\n");
goto exit;
}
opt.buffer_size = DFL_IO_BUF_LEN;
opt.server_addr = DFL_SERVER_ADDR;
opt.server_port = DFL_SERVER_PORT;
opt.debug_level = DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL;
opt.event = DFL_EVENT;
opt.response_size = DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE;
opt.nbio = DFL_NBIO;
opt.cid_enabled = DFL_CID_ENABLED;
opt.cid_enabled_renego = DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO;
opt.cid_val = DFL_CID_VALUE;
opt.cid_val_renego = DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO;
opt.read_timeout = DFL_READ_TIMEOUT;
opt.ca_file = DFL_CA_FILE;
opt.ca_path = DFL_CA_PATH;
opt.crt_file = DFL_CRT_FILE;
opt.key_file = DFL_KEY_FILE;
opt.crt_file2 = DFL_CRT_FILE2;
opt.key_file2 = DFL_KEY_FILE2;
opt.async_operations = DFL_ASYNC_OPERATIONS;
opt.async_private_delay1 = DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY1;
opt.async_private_delay2 = DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_DELAY2;
opt.async_private_error = DFL_ASYNC_PRIVATE_ERROR;
opt.psk = DFL_PSK;
opt.psk_identity = DFL_PSK_IDENTITY;
opt.psk_list = DFL_PSK_LIST;
opt.ecjpake_pw = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW;
opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER;
opt.version_suites = DFL_VERSION_SUITES;
opt.renegotiation = DFL_RENEGOTIATION;
opt.allow_legacy = DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY;
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
opt.renegotiate = DFL_RENEGOTIATE;
opt.renego_delay = DFL_RENEGO_DELAY;
2014-11-05 14:23:03 +01:00
opt.renego_period = DFL_RENEGO_PERIOD;
2014-08-15 11:17:27 +02:00
opt.exchanges = DFL_EXCHANGES;
opt.min_version = DFL_MIN_VERSION;
opt.max_version = DFL_MAX_VERSION;
opt.arc4 = DFL_ARC4;
opt.allow_sha1 = DFL_SHA1;
opt.auth_mode = DFL_AUTH_MODE;
opt.cert_req_ca_list = DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST;
opt.mfl_code = DFL_MFL_CODE;
opt.trunc_hmac = DFL_TRUNC_HMAC;
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
opt.tickets = DFL_TICKETS;
2014-02-21 09:18:13 +01:00
opt.ticket_timeout = DFL_TICKET_TIMEOUT;
2014-02-20 21:32:41 +01:00
opt.cache_max = DFL_CACHE_MAX;
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
opt.cache_timeout = DFL_CACHE_TIMEOUT;
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
opt.sni = DFL_SNI;
opt.alpn_string = DFL_ALPN_STRING;
opt.curves = DFL_CURVES;
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
opt.dhm_file = DFL_DHM_FILE;
opt.transport = DFL_TRANSPORT;
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
opt.cookies = DFL_COOKIES;
2014-09-24 14:41:11 +02:00
opt.anti_replay = DFL_ANTI_REPLAY;
opt.hs_to_min = DFL_HS_TO_MIN;
opt.hs_to_max = DFL_HS_TO_MAX;
opt.dtls_mtu = DFL_DTLS_MTU;
opt.dgram_packing = DFL_DGRAM_PACKING;
opt.badmac_limit = DFL_BADMAC_LIMIT;
opt.extended_ms = DFL_EXTENDED_MS;
opt.enforce_extended_master_secret = DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE;
opt.etm = DFL_ETM;
opt.serialize = DFL_SERIALIZE;
for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ )
{
p = argv[i];
if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL )
goto usage;
*q++ = '\0';
if( strcmp( p, "server_port" ) == 0 )
opt.server_port = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "server_addr" ) == 0 )
opt.server_addr = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "dtls" ) == 0 )
{
int t = atoi( q );
if( t == 0 )
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM;
else if( t == 1 )
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "debug_level" ) == 0 )
{
opt.debug_level = atoi( q );
if( opt.debug_level < 0 || opt.debug_level > 65535 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "nbio" ) == 0 )
{
opt.nbio = atoi( q );
if( opt.nbio < 0 || opt.nbio > 2 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "event" ) == 0 )
{
opt.event = atoi( q );
if( opt.event < 0 || opt.event > 2 )
goto usage;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_READ_TIMEOUT)
else if( strcmp( p, "read_timeout" ) == 0 )
opt.read_timeout = atoi( q );
#endif
else if( strcmp( p, "buffer_size" ) == 0 )
{
opt.buffer_size = atoi( q );
if( opt.buffer_size < 1 || opt.buffer_size > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "response_size" ) == 0 )
{
opt.response_size = atoi( q );
if( opt.response_size < 0 || opt.response_size > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
goto usage;
if( opt.buffer_size < opt.response_size )
opt.buffer_size = opt.response_size;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "ca_file" ) == 0 )
opt.ca_file = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "ca_path" ) == 0 )
opt.ca_path = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file" ) == 0 )
opt.crt_file = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "key_file" ) == 0 )
opt.key_file = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file2" ) == 0 )
opt.crt_file2 = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "key_file2" ) == 0 )
opt.key_file2 = q;
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "dhm_file" ) == 0 )
opt.dhm_file = q;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
else if( strcmp( p, "async_operations" ) == 0 )
opt.async_operations = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "async_private_delay1" ) == 0 )
opt.async_private_delay1 = atoi( q );
else if( strcmp( p, "async_private_delay2" ) == 0 )
opt.async_private_delay2 = atoi( q );
else if( strcmp( p, "async_private_error" ) == 0 )
{
int n = atoi( q );
if( n < -SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_MAX ||
n > SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_MAX )
{
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.async_private_error = n;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
else if( strcmp( p, "cid" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_enabled = atoi( q );
if( opt.cid_enabled != 0 && opt.cid_enabled != 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_renego" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_enabled_renego = atoi( q );
if( opt.cid_enabled_renego != 0 && opt.cid_enabled_renego != 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_val = q;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val_renego" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_val_renego = q;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
else if( strcmp( p, "psk" ) == 0 )
opt.psk = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_identity" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_identity = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_list" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_list = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "ecjpake_pw" ) == 0 )
opt.ecjpake_pw = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "force_ciphersuite" ) == 0 )
{
opt.force_ciphersuite[0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( q );
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] == 0 )
{
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.force_ciphersuite[1] = 0;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
else if( strcmp( p, "curves" ) == 0 )
opt.curves = q;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC */
else if( strcmp( p, "version_suites" ) == 0 )
opt.version_suites = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiation" ) == 0 )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
opt.renegotiation = (atoi( q )) ?
MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED :
MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( strcmp( p, "allow_legacy" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
case -1:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE;
break;
case 0:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
break;
case 1:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION;
break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION */
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiate" ) == 0 )
{
opt.renegotiate = atoi( q );
if( opt.renegotiate < 0 || opt.renegotiate > 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "renego_delay" ) == 0 )
{
opt.renego_delay = atoi( q );
}
2014-11-05 14:23:03 +01:00
else if( strcmp( p, "renego_period" ) == 0 )
{
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
opt.renego_period = _strtoui64( q, NULL, 10 );
#else
if( sscanf( q, "%" SCNu64, &opt.renego_period ) != 1 )
goto usage;
#endif /* _MSC_VER */
if( opt.renego_period < 2 )
2014-11-05 14:23:03 +01:00
goto usage;
}
2014-08-15 11:17:27 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "exchanges" ) == 0 )
{
opt.exchanges = atoi( q );
if( opt.exchanges < 0 )
2014-08-15 11:17:27 +02:00
goto usage;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MAJOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MAJOR_VER)
else if( strcmp( p, "min_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "max_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "force_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
}
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
}
2014-03-26 12:16:44 +01:00
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
}
2014-03-26 12:16:44 +01:00
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
2014-03-26 12:16:44 +01:00
}
else if( strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
2014-03-26 12:16:44 +01:00
}
else if( strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
}
else
goto usage;
}
#endif
else if( strcmp( p, "arc4" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "allow_sha1" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.allow_sha1 = 0; break;
case 1: opt.allow_sha1 = 1; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MAJOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MAJOR_VER)
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE)
else if( strcmp( p, "auth_mode" ) == 0 )
{
if( ( opt.auth_mode = get_auth_mode( q ) ) < 0 )
goto usage;
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE */
else if( strcmp( p, "cert_req_ca_list" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cert_req_ca_list = atoi( q );
if( opt.cert_req_ca_list < 0 || opt.cert_req_ca_list > 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "max_frag_len" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "512" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512;
else if( strcmp( q, "1024" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024;
else if( strcmp( q, "2048" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048;
else if( strcmp( q, "4096" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "alpn" ) == 0 )
{
opt.alpn_string = q;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "trunc_hmac" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "extended_ms" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
case 0:
opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED;
break;
case 1:
opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "enforce_extended_master_secret" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0:
opt.enforce_extended_master_secret =
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE_DISABLED;
break;
case 1:
opt.enforce_extended_master_secret =
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE_ENABLED;
break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "etm" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "tickets" ) == 0 )
{
opt.tickets = atoi( q );
if( opt.tickets < 0 || opt.tickets > 1 )
goto usage;
}
2014-02-21 09:18:13 +01:00
else if( strcmp( p, "ticket_timeout" ) == 0 )
{
opt.ticket_timeout = atoi( q );
if( opt.ticket_timeout < 0 )
goto usage;
}
2014-02-20 21:32:41 +01:00
else if( strcmp( p, "cache_max" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cache_max = atoi( q );
if( opt.cache_max < 0 )
goto usage;
}
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
else if( strcmp( p, "cache_timeout" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cache_timeout = atoi( q );
if( opt.cache_timeout < 0 )
goto usage;
}
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "cookies" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cookies = atoi( q );
if( opt.cookies < -1 || opt.cookies > 1)
goto usage;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ANTI_REPLAY)
2014-09-24 14:41:11 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "anti_replay" ) == 0 )
{
opt.anti_replay = atoi( q );
if( opt.anti_replay < 0 || opt.anti_replay > 1)
goto usage;
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ANTI_REPLAY */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_BADMAC_LIMIT)
else if( strcmp( p, "badmac_limit" ) == 0 )
{
opt.badmac_limit = atoi( q );
if( opt.badmac_limit < 0 )
goto usage;
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_BADMAC_LIMIT */
else if( strcmp( p, "hs_timeout" ) == 0 )
{
if( ( p = strchr( q, '-' ) ) == NULL )
goto usage;
*p++ = '\0';
opt.hs_to_min = atoi( q );
opt.hs_to_max = atoi( p );
if( opt.hs_to_min == 0 || opt.hs_to_max < opt.hs_to_min )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "mtu" ) == 0 )
{
opt.dtls_mtu = atoi( q );
if( opt.dtls_mtu < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "dgram_packing" ) == 0 )
{
opt.dgram_packing = atoi( q );
if( opt.dgram_packing != 0 &&
opt.dgram_packing != 1 )
{
goto usage;
}
}
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
else if( strcmp( p, "sni" ) == 0 )
{
opt.sni = q;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "query_config" ) == 0 )
{
Merge mbedtls 2.16.6 into baremetal Conflicts: mbedtls.doxyfile - PROJECT_NAME - mbed TLS v2.16.6 chosen. doc_mainpage.h - mbed TLS v2.16.6 version chosen. hmac_drbg.h - line 260, extended description chosen. - line 313, extended description chosen. - line 338, extended description chosen. version.h - 2.16.6 chosen. CMakeLists.txt - 2.16.6 chosen. test_suite_version.data - 2.16.6 chosen. Makefile - 141 - manual correction - baremetal version of C_SOURCE_FILES with variables for directories plus 2.16.6 CTAGS addition. pkparse.c - lines 846 onwards - the asn1_get_nonzero_mpi implementation chosen. ssl_tls.c - line 5269 - edited manually, left the ret=0, because baremetal has a different behaviour since commit 87b5626, but added a debug message that's new in 2.16.6. all.sh: - component_build_deprecated - chosen the refactored version from 2.16.6, but with extra flags from baremetal. - rest of the _no_xxx tests - merged make options to have PTHREAD=1 and other changes from 2.16.6 (like -O1 instead of -O0). - component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication - added TINYCRYPT_BUILD=0 to the 2.16.6 version of make. x509/req_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/crl_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/cert_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_mail_client.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_fork_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client1.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client2.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. - line 132 - new options of both branches added. - skip close notify handled as in 2.16.6, but with `ssl` instead of `&ssl`. - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. - Merged options from baremetal and 2.16.6. ssl_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_server2.c - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. config.pl - fixed missing defines from the documentation, removed duplicates, and reorganised so that the documentation and excluded list are ordered in the same way. test_suite_x509parse.data - only added the two new pathlen tests. x509_crt.c - change the return code by removing MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, since it's added by x509_crt_frame_parse_ext not by an "or", but by "+=". Changelog - Assigned all entries to appropriate sections. ssl-opt.sh - line 8263 - merged options. - removed lines 1165 - 1176 - there was a duplicate test, probably an artifact of previous merges. check-files.py - sticked to old formatting. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
2020-05-18 17:47:25 +02:00
mbedtls_exit( query_config( q ) );
}
else if( strcmp( p, "serialize") == 0 )
{
opt.serialize = atoi( q );
if( opt.serialize < 0 || opt.serialize > 2)
goto usage;
}
else
goto usage;
}
/* Event-driven IO is incompatible with the above custom
* receive and send functions, as the polling builds on
* refers to the underlying net_context. */
if( opt.event == 1 && opt.nbio != 1 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "Warning: event-driven IO mandates nbio=1 - overwrite\n" );
opt.nbio = 1;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( opt.debug_level );
#endif
buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, opt.buffer_size + 1 );
if( buf == NULL )
{
2018-06-20 14:17:04 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "Could not allocate %u bytes\n", opt.buffer_size );
ret = 3;
goto exit;
}
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] > 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info;
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] );
if( opt.max_version != -1 &&
mbedtls_ssl_ver_gt(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info ),
opt.max_version ) )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.min_version != -1 &&
mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info ),
opt.min_version ) )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
/* If we select a version that's not supported by
* this suite, then there will be no common ciphersuite... */
if( opt.max_version == -1 ||
mbedtls_ssl_ver_gt(
opt.max_version,
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info ) ) )
{
opt.max_version = mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info );
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt(
opt.min_version,
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info ) ) )
{
opt.min_version = mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info );
/* DTLS starts with TLS 1.1 */
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt( opt.min_version,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
}
}
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
/* Enable RC4 if needed and not explicitly disabled */
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_cipher( ciphersuite_info ) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
{
if( opt.arc4 == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED )
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
{
mbedtls_printf("forced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabled\n");
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED;
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
}
}
if( opt.version_suites != NULL )
{
const char *name[4] = { 0 };
/* Parse 4-element coma-separated list */
for( i = 0, p = (char *) opt.version_suites;
i < 4 && *p != '\0';
i++ )
{
name[i] = p;
/* Terminate the current string and move on to next one */
while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' )
p++;
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
}
if( i != 4 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "too few values for version_suites\n" );
ret = 1;
goto exit;
}
memset( version_suites, 0, sizeof( version_suites ) );
/* Get the suites identifiers from their name */
for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ )
{
version_suites[i][0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( name[i] );
if( version_suites[i][0] == 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "unknown ciphersuite: '%s'\n", name[i] );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) );
#endif
ssl = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ssl ) );
conf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *conf ) );
entropy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *entropy) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
cacert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *cacert ) );
srvcert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *srvcert ) );
pkey = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *pkey ) );
srvcert2 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *srvcert2 ) );
pkey2 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *pkey2 ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *cache ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
timer = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *timer ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
ticket_ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ticket_ctx ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
ctr_drbg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ctr_drbg ) );
#else
hmac_drbg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *hmac_drbg ) );
#endif
if( ssl == NULL || conf == NULL ||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
cacert == NULL || srvcert == NULL ||
pkey == NULL || srvcert2 == NULL ||
pkey2 == NULL ||
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
ticket_ctx == NULL ||
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
cache == NULL ||
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
timer == NULL ||
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
ctr_drbg == NULL ||
#else
hmac_drbg == NULL ||
#endif
entropy == NULL)
{
mbedtls_printf( "Initial allocations failed!\n" );
goto exit;
}
/*
* Make sure memory references are valid in case we exit early.
*/
mbedtls_net_init( &client_fd );
mbedtls_net_init( &listen_fd );
mbedtls_ssl_init( ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_config_init( conf );
mbedtls_entropy_init( entropy );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctr_drbg );
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( cacert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( srvcert );
mbedtls_pk_init( pkey );
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( srvcert2 );
mbedtls_pk_init( pkey2 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
memset( &ssl_async_keys, 0, sizeof( ssl_async_keys ) );
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_dhm_init( &dhm );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_cache_init( cache );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( ticket_ctx );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
memset( (void *) alpn_list, 0, sizeof( alpn_list ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init( &cookie_ctx );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( unhexify( cid, opt.cid_val, &cid_len ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid hex\n" );
goto exit;
}
/* Keep CID settings for renegotiation unless
* specified otherwise. */
if( opt.cid_enabled_renego == DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO )
opt.cid_enabled_renego = opt.cid_enabled;
if( opt.cid_val_renego == DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO )
opt.cid_val_renego = opt.cid_val;
if( unhexify( cid_renego, opt.cid_val_renego, &cid_renego_len ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid hex\n" );
goto exit;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
/*
* Unhexify the pre-shared key and parse the list if any given
*/
if( unhexify( psk, opt.psk, &psk_len ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "pre-shared key not valid hex\n" );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.psk_list != NULL )
{
if( ( psk_info = psk_parse( opt.psk_list ) ) == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( "psk_list invalid" );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
if( opt.curves != NULL )
{
p = (char *) opt.curves;
i = 0;
if( strcmp( p, "none" ) == 0 )
{
curve_list[0] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "default" ) != 0 )
{
/* Leave room for a final NULL in curve list */
while( i < CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
q = p;
/* Terminate the current string */
while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' )
p++;
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
if( ( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) != NULL )
{
curve_list[i++] = curve_cur->grp_id;
}
else
{
mbedtls_printf( "unknown curve %s\n", q );
mbedtls_printf( "supported curves: " );
for( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
curve_cur->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
curve_cur++ )
{
mbedtls_printf( "%s ", curve_cur->name );
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf("Number of curves: %d\n", i );
if( i == CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
mbedtls_printf( "curves list too long, maximum %d",
CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 );
goto exit;
}
curve_list[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
{
p = (char *) opt.alpn_string;
i = 0;
/* Leave room for a final NULL in alpn_list */
while( i < ALPN_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
alpn_list[i++] = p;
/* Terminate the current string and move on to next one */
while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' )
p++;
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
/*
* 0. Initialize the RNG and the session data
*/
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." );
fflush( stdout );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func,
entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers,
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%x\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( hmac_drbg,
mbedtls_md_info_from_type(
available_hashes[0] ),
mbedtls_entropy_func,
entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers,
strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%x\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG */
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* 1.1. Load the trusted CA
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) == 0 )
{
ret = 0;
}
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
if( strlen( opt.ca_path ) )
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( cacert, opt.ca_path );
else if( strlen( opt.ca_file ) )
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( cacert, opt.ca_file );
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas[i] != NULL; i++ )
{
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( cacert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas[i],
mbedtls_test_cas_len[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
break;
}
if( ret == 0 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas_der[i] != NULL; i++ )
{
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( cacert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_der[i],
mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
break;
}
}
#else
{
ret = 1;
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */
if( ret < 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret );
/*
* 1.2. Load own certificate and private key
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the server cert. and key..." );
fflush( stdout );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
if( strlen( opt.crt_file ) && strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) != 0 )
{
key_cert_init++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( srvcert, opt.crt_file ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
if( strlen( opt.key_file ) && strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) != 0 )
{
key_cert_init++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( pkey, opt.key_file, "" ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
if( key_cert_init == 1 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! crt_file without key_file or vice-versa\n\n" );
goto exit;
}
if( strlen( opt.crt_file2 ) && strcmp( opt.crt_file2, "none" ) != 0 )
{
key_cert_init2++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( srvcert2, opt.crt_file2 ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(2) returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
if( strlen( opt.key_file2 ) && strcmp( opt.key_file2, "none" ) != 0 )
{
key_cert_init2++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( pkey2, opt.key_file2, "" ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(2) returned -0x%x\n\n",
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
if( key_cert_init2 == 1 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! crt_file2 without key_file2 or vice-versa\n\n" );
goto exit;
}
#endif
if( key_cert_init == 0 &&
strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) != 0 &&
strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) != 0 &&
key_cert_init2 == 0 &&
strcmp( opt.crt_file2, "none" ) != 0 &&
strcmp( opt.key_file2, "none" ) != 0 )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C)
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "Not certificated or key provided, and \nMBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined!\n" );
goto exit;
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( srvcert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa,
mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( pkey,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa,
mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
key_cert_init = 2;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
2019-08-23 13:01:45 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( srvcert2,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec,
mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! x509_crt_parse2 returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( pkey2,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec,
mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len, NULL, 0 ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! pk_parse_key2 returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
key_cert_init2 = 2;
2019-08-23 13:01:45 +02:00
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
if( opt.dhm_file != NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " . Loading DHM parameters..." );
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
fflush( stdout );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile( &dhm, opt.dhm_file ) ) != 0 )
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile returned -0x%04X\n\n",
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
-ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
}
#endif
2015-04-03 16:41:52 +02:00
#if defined(SNI_OPTION)
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
if( opt.sni != NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up SNI information..." );
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
fflush( stdout );
if( ( sni_info = sni_parse( opt.sni ) ) == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" );
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
}
2015-04-03 16:41:52 +02:00
#endif /* SNI_OPTION */
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
/*
* 2. Setup the listening TCP socket
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Bind on %s://%s:%s/ ...",
opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ? "tcp" : "udp",
opt.server_addr ? opt.server_addr : "*",
opt.server_port );
fflush( stdout );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_bind( &listen_fd, opt.server_addr, opt.server_port,
opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ?
MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP : MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_bind returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
* 3. Setup stuff
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( conf,
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER,
opt.transport,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 )
2015-05-04 14:56:36 +02:00
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/* The default algorithms profile disables SHA-1, but our tests still
rely on it heavily. Hence we allow it here. A real-world server
should use the default profile unless there is a good reason not to. */
if( opt.allow_sha1 > 0 )
{
crt_profile_for_test.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 );
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( conf, &crt_profile_for_test );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_HASH)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( conf, available_hashes );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE)
if( opt.auth_mode != DFL_AUTH_MODE )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( conf, opt.auth_mode );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST)
if( opt.cert_req_ca_list != DFL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( conf, opt.cert_req_ca_list );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.hs_to_min != DFL_HS_TO_MIN || opt.hs_to_max != DFL_HS_TO_MAX )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( conf, opt.hs_to_min, opt.hs_to_max );
if( opt.dgram_packing != DFL_DGRAM_PACKING )
mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( ssl, opt.dgram_packing );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( conf, opt.mfl_code ) ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-11 09:50:24 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto exit;
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_CID_LEN) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_CID)
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 || opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 )
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 14:06:44 +02:00
{
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 &&
opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 &&
cid_len != cid_renego_len )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID length must not change during renegotiation\n" );
goto usage;
}
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 )
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( conf, cid_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE );
else
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( conf, cid_renego_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE );
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 14:06:44 +02:00
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len returned -%#04x\n\n",
-ret );
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 14:06:44 +02:00
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_CID_LEN &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_CID */
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 14:06:44 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
if( opt.trunc_hmac != DFL_TRUNC_HMAC )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( conf, opt.trunc_hmac );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ENFORCE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
if( opt.extended_ms != DFL_EXTENDED_MS )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( conf, opt.extended_ms );
if( opt.enforce_extended_master_secret != DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret_enforce( conf,
opt.enforce_extended_master_secret );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
if( opt.etm != DFL_ETM )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( conf, opt.etm );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( conf, alpn_list ) ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-11 09:50:24 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RNG)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, ctr_drbg );
#else
rng_ctx_global = ctr_drbg;
#endif
#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RNG)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( conf, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, hmac_drbg );
#else
rng_ctx_global = hmac_drbg;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( conf, my_debug, stdout );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
2014-02-20 21:32:41 +01:00
if( opt.cache_max != -1 )
mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries( cache, opt.cache_max );
2014-02-20 21:32:41 +01:00
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
if( opt.cache_timeout != -1 )
mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout( cache, opt.cache_timeout );
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_CACHE)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache( conf, cache,
2015-05-06 19:06:26 +02:00
mbedtls_ssl_cache_get,
mbedtls_ssl_cache_set );
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_CACHE */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
2015-05-19 15:28:00 +02:00
if( opt.tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( ticket_ctx,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, ctr_drbg,
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, hmac_drbg,
#endif
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM,
2015-05-19 15:28:00 +02:00
opt.ticket_timeout ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto exit;
}
2014-02-21 09:18:13 +01:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb( conf,
2015-05-19 15:28:00 +02:00
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write,
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse,
ticket_ctx );
2015-05-19 15:28:00 +02:00
}
#endif
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C)
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
if( opt.cookies > 0 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup( &cookie_ctx,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, ctr_drbg
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, hmac_drbg
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
2019-09-03 10:01:49 +02:00
) ) != 0 )
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup returned %d\n\n", ret );
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( conf, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write, mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check,
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
&cookie_ctx );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
if( opt.cookies == 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( conf, NULL, NULL, NULL );
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
2014-07-23 19:34:59 +02:00
{
; /* Nothing to do */
}
2014-09-24 14:41:11 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ANTI_REPLAY)
2014-09-24 14:41:11 +02:00
if( opt.anti_replay != DFL_ANTI_REPLAY )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay( conf, opt.anti_replay );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_BADMAC_LIMIT)
if( opt.badmac_limit != DFL_BADMAC_LIMIT )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( conf, opt.badmac_limit );
2014-09-24 14:41:11 +02:00
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( conf, opt.force_ciphersuite );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE */
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C)
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
if( opt.arc4 != DFL_ARC4 )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( conf, opt.arc4 );
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
if( opt.version_suites != NULL )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( conf, version_suites[0],
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 );
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( conf, version_suites[1],
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 );
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( conf, version_suites[2],
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 );
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( conf, version_suites[3],
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
if( opt.allow_legacy != DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( conf, opt.allow_legacy );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( conf, opt.renegotiation );
2014-11-05 14:23:03 +01:00
if( opt.renego_delay != DFL_RENEGO_DELAY )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced( conf, opt.renego_delay );
2014-11-05 14:23:03 +01:00
if( opt.renego_period != DFL_RENEGO_PERIOD )
{
PUT_UINT64_BE( renego_period, opt.renego_period, 0 );
mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period( conf, renego_period );
2014-11-05 14:23:03 +01:00
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) != 0 &&
strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( conf, cacert, NULL );
}
if( key_cert_init )
{
mbedtls_pk_context *pk = pkey;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if( opt.async_private_delay1 >= 0 )
{
ret = ssl_async_set_key( &ssl_async_keys, srvcert, pk, 0,
opt.async_private_delay1 );
if( ret < 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " Test error: ssl_async_set_key failed (%d)\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
pk = NULL;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( conf, srvcert, pk ) ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-11 09:50:24 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto exit;
}
}
if( key_cert_init2 )
{
mbedtls_pk_context *pk = pkey2;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if( opt.async_private_delay2 >= 0 )
{
ret = ssl_async_set_key( &ssl_async_keys, srvcert2, pk, 0,
opt.async_private_delay2 );
if( ret < 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " Test error: ssl_async_set_key failed (%d)\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
pk = NULL;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( conf, srvcert2, pk ) ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-11 09:50:24 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if( opt.async_operations[0] != '-' )
{
mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *sign = NULL;
mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *decrypt = NULL;
2018-04-24 12:32:04 +02:00
const char *r;
for( r = opt.async_operations; *r; r++ )
{
2018-04-24 12:32:04 +02:00
switch( *r )
{
case 'd':
decrypt = ssl_async_decrypt;
break;
case 's':
sign = ssl_async_sign;
break;
}
}
ssl_async_keys.inject_error = ( opt.async_private_error < 0 ?
- opt.async_private_error :
opt.async_private_error );
ssl_async_keys.f_rng = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random;
ssl_async_keys.p_rng = ctr_drbg;
mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( conf,
sign,
decrypt,
ssl_async_resume,
ssl_async_cancel,
&ssl_async_keys );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
2015-04-03 16:41:52 +02:00
#if defined(SNI_OPTION)
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
if( opt.sni != NULL )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni( conf, sni_callback, sni_info );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if( opt.async_private_delay2 >= 0 )
{
sni_entry *cur;
for( cur = sni_info; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
{
ret = ssl_async_set_key( &ssl_async_keys,
cur->cert, cur->key, 1,
opt.async_private_delay2 );
if( ret < 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " Test error: ssl_async_set_key failed (%d)\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
cur->key = NULL;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
}
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
if( opt.curves != NULL &&
strcmp( opt.curves, "default" ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( conf, curve_list );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC */
2019-08-23 13:01:45 +02:00
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( strlen( opt.psk ) != 0 && strlen( opt.psk_identity ) != 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( conf, psk, psk_len,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
2015-05-11 09:50:24 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk returned -0x%04X\n\n", - ret );
goto exit;
}
}
if( opt.psk_list != NULL )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( conf, psk_callback, psk_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
2012-09-28 09:33:00 +02:00
/*
* Use different group than default DHM group
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
if( opt.dhm_file != NULL )
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx( conf, &dhm );
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
#endif
if( ret != 0 )
{
2015-05-11 09:50:24 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param returned -0x%04X\n\n", - ret );
2014-06-09 11:29:50 +02:00
goto exit;
}
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MAJOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MAJOR_VER)
if( opt.min_version != DFL_MIN_VERSION )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, opt.min_version );
if( opt.max_version != DFL_MIN_VERSION )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, opt.max_version );
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( ssl, conf ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT)
io_ctx.ssl = ssl;
io_ctx.net = &client_fd;
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( ssl, &io_ctx, send_cb, recv_cb,
opt.nbio == 0 ? recv_timeout_cb : NULL );
#else
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio_ctx( ssl, &client_fd );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( ssl, opt.cid_enabled,
cid, cid_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.dtls_mtu != DFL_DTLS_MTU )
mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( ssl, opt.dtls_mtu );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SET_TIMER) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_GET_TIMER)
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( ssl, timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay,
mbedtls_timing_get_delay );
#else
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb_ctx( ssl, timer );
#endif
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
reset:
#if !defined(_WIN32)
if( received_sigterm )
{
mbedtls_printf( " interrupted by SIGTERM (not in net_accept())\n" );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT )
ret = 0;
goto exit;
}
#endif
2015-09-08 11:58:14 +02:00
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT )
{
mbedtls_printf( " ! Client initiated reconnection from same port\n" );
goto handshake;
}
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
if( ret != 0 )
{
char error_buf[100];
mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 );
mbedtls_printf("Last error was: %d - %s\n\n", ret, error_buf );
}
#endif
mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd );
mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( ssl );
/*
* 3. Wait until a client connects
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Waiting for a remote connection ..." );
fflush( stdout );
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_accept( &listen_fd, &client_fd,
client_ip, sizeof( client_ip ), &cliip_len ) ) != 0 )
{
#if !defined(_WIN32)
if( received_sigterm )
{
mbedtls_printf( " interrupted by SIGTERM (in net_accept())\n" );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED )
ret = 0;
goto exit;
}
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_accept returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.nbio > 0 )
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
ret = mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( &client_fd );
else
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
ret = mbedtls_net_set_block( &client_fd );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_READ_TIMEOUT)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( conf, opt.read_timeout );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_READ_TIMEOUT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( ssl,
client_ip, cliip_len ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id() returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( opt.ecjpake_pw != DFL_ECJPAKE_PW )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( ssl,
(const unsigned char *) opt.ecjpake_pw,
strlen( opt.ecjpake_pw ) ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
* 4. Handshake
*/
2015-09-08 11:58:14 +02:00
handshake:
mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." );
fflush( stdout );
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl_async_keys.inject_error == SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_CANCEL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " cancelling on injected error\n" );
break;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
Merge branch 'mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls-return_hashlen' into tls_async_server-2.9 Conflict resolution: * ChangeLog: put the new entry from my branch in the proper place. * include/mbedtls/error.h: counted high-level module error codes again. * include/mbedtls/ssl.h: picked different numeric codes for the concurrently added errors; made the new error a full sentence per current standards. * library/error.c: ran scripts/generate_errors.pl. * library/ssl_srv.c: * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange "DHE key exchanges": the conflict was due to style corrections in development (4cb1f4d49cff999d0c853bc696ad7eea68888c35) which I merged with my refactoring. * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange "For key exchanges involving the server signing", first case, variable declarations: merged line by line: * dig_signed_len: added in async * signature_len: removed in async * hashlen: type changed to size_t in development * hash: size changed to MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE in async * ret: added in async * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange "For key exchanges involving the server signing", first cae comment: the conflict was due to style corrections in development (4cb1f4d49cff999d0c853bc696ad7eea68888c35) which I merged with my comment changes made as part of refactoring the function. * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange "Compute the hash to be signed" if `md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE`: conflict between ebd652fe2dfc2c82d774bfd334398279d9027492 "ssl_write_server_key_exchange: calculate hashlen explicitly" and 46f5a3e9b4d5db3cacfe2ba33480a27317c62d46 "Check return codes from MD in ssl code". I took the code from commit ca1d74290439ec9e2723a911657fd96aa320e219 made on top of development which makes mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls return the hash length. * programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c: multiple conflicts between the introduction of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS and new auxiliary functions and definitions for async support, and the introduction of idle(). * definitions before main: concurrent additions, kept both. * main, just after `handshake:`: in the loop around mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), merge the addition of support for MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS and SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_CANCEL with the addition of the idle() call. * main, if `opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM`: take the code from development and add a check for MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS. * main, loop around mbedtls_ssl_read() in the datagram case: take the code from development and add a check for MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; revert to a do...while loop. * main, loop around mbedtls_ssl_write() in the datagram case: take the code from development and add a check for MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; revert to a do...while loop.
2018-04-24 12:18:19 +02:00
if( ! mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) )
break;
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
ret = idle( &client_fd, timer, ret );
#else
ret = idle( &client_fd, ret );
#endif
if( ret != 0 )
goto reset;
}
}
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
{
mbedtls_printf( " hello verification requested\n" );
ret = 0;
goto reset;
}
else if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED )
{
char vrfy_buf[512];
flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( ssl );
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), " ! ", flags );
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
if( opt.async_private_error < 0 )
/* Injected error only the first time round, to test reset */
ssl_async_keys.inject_error = SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_NONE;
#endif
goto reset;
}
else /* ret == 0 */
{
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n [ Protocol is %s ]\n [ Ciphersuite is %s ]\n",
mbedtls_ssl_get_version( ssl ), mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( ssl ) );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ) ) >= 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is %d ]\n", ret );
2014-10-14 17:47:31 +02:00
else
mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is unknown (compression) ]\n" );
2014-10-14 17:47:31 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
mbedtls_printf( " [ Maximum fragment length is %u ]\n",
(unsigned int) mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
{
const char *alp = mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( ssl );
mbedtls_printf( " [ Application Layer Protocol is %s ]\n",
alp ? alp : "(none)" );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* 5. Verify the client certificate
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying peer X.509 certificate..." );
if( ( flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
char vrfy_buf[512];
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
2015-05-11 19:54:43 +02:00
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ), " ! ", flags );
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf );
#endif
}
else
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( ssl ) != NULL )
{
char crt_buf[512];
mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ...\n" );
mbedtls_x509_crt_info( crt_buf, sizeof( crt_buf ), " ",
mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert( ssl ) );
2015-07-02 11:15:48 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", crt_buf );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ret = report_cid_usage( ssl, "initial handshake" );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( ssl, opt.cid_enabled_renego,
cid_renego, cid_renego_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
if( opt.exchanges == 0 )
goto close_notify;
2015-01-22 11:33:29 +01:00
exchanges_left = opt.exchanges;
data_exchange:
/*
* 6. Read the HTTP Request
*/
mbedtls_printf( " < Read from client:" );
fflush( stdout );
/*
* TLS and DTLS need different reading styles (stream vs datagram)
*/
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM )
{
do
{
int terminated = 0;
len = opt.buffer_size - 1;
memset( buf, 0, opt.buffer_size );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( ssl, buf, len );
if( mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) )
{
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &client_fd, timer, ret );
#else
idle( &client_fd, ret );
#endif
}
continue;
}
if( ret <= 0 )
{
switch( ret )
{
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" );
goto close_notify;
case 0:
case MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was reset by peer\n" );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET;
goto reset;
default:
mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", -ret );
goto reset;
}
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( ssl ) == 0 )
{
len = ret;
buf[len] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s\n", len, (char *) buf );
/* End of message should be detected according to the syntax of the
* application protocol (eg HTTP), just use a dummy test here. */
if( buf[len - 1] == '\n' )
terminated = 1;
}
else
{
int extra_len, ori_len;
unsigned char *larger_buf;
ori_len = ret;
extra_len = (int) mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( ssl );
larger_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ori_len + extra_len + 1 );
if( larger_buf == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " ! memory allocation failed\n" );
ret = 1;
goto reset;
}
memset( larger_buf, 0, ori_len + extra_len );
memcpy( larger_buf, buf, ori_len );
/* This read should never fail and get the whole cached data */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( ssl, larger_buf + ori_len, extra_len );
if( ret != extra_len ||
mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( ssl ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " ! mbedtls_ssl_read failed on cached data\n" );
ret = 1;
goto reset;
}
larger_buf[ori_len + extra_len] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %u bytes read (%u + %u)\n\n%s\n",
ori_len + extra_len, ori_len, extra_len,
(char *) larger_buf );
/* End of message should be detected according to the syntax of the
* application protocol (eg HTTP), just use a dummy test here. */
if( larger_buf[ori_len + extra_len - 1] == '\n' )
terminated = 1;
mbedtls_free( larger_buf );
}
if( terminated )
{
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
while( 1 );
}
else /* Not stream, so datagram */
{
len = opt.buffer_size - 1;
memset( buf, 0, opt.buffer_size );
Merge branch 'mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls-return_hashlen' into tls_async_server-2.9 Conflict resolution: * ChangeLog: put the new entry from my branch in the proper place. * include/mbedtls/error.h: counted high-level module error codes again. * include/mbedtls/ssl.h: picked different numeric codes for the concurrently added errors; made the new error a full sentence per current standards. * library/error.c: ran scripts/generate_errors.pl. * library/ssl_srv.c: * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange "DHE key exchanges": the conflict was due to style corrections in development (4cb1f4d49cff999d0c853bc696ad7eea68888c35) which I merged with my refactoring. * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange "For key exchanges involving the server signing", first case, variable declarations: merged line by line: * dig_signed_len: added in async * signature_len: removed in async * hashlen: type changed to size_t in development * hash: size changed to MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE in async * ret: added in async * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange "For key exchanges involving the server signing", first cae comment: the conflict was due to style corrections in development (4cb1f4d49cff999d0c853bc696ad7eea68888c35) which I merged with my comment changes made as part of refactoring the function. * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange "Compute the hash to be signed" if `md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE`: conflict between ebd652fe2dfc2c82d774bfd334398279d9027492 "ssl_write_server_key_exchange: calculate hashlen explicitly" and 46f5a3e9b4d5db3cacfe2ba33480a27317c62d46 "Check return codes from MD in ssl code". I took the code from commit ca1d74290439ec9e2723a911657fd96aa320e219 made on top of development which makes mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls return the hash length. * programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c: multiple conflicts between the introduction of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS and new auxiliary functions and definitions for async support, and the introduction of idle(). * definitions before main: concurrent additions, kept both. * main, just after `handshake:`: in the loop around mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), merge the addition of support for MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS and SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_CANCEL with the addition of the idle() call. * main, if `opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM`: take the code from development and add a check for MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS. * main, loop around mbedtls_ssl_read() in the datagram case: take the code from development and add a check for MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; revert to a do...while loop. * main, loop around mbedtls_ssl_write() in the datagram case: take the code from development and add a check for MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; revert to a do...while loop.
2018-04-24 12:18:19 +02:00
do
{
/* Without the call to `mbedtls_ssl_check_pending`, it might
* happen that the client sends application data in the same
* datagram as the Finished message concluding the handshake.
* In this case, the application data would be ready to be
* processed while the underlying transport wouldn't signal
* any further incoming data.
*
* See the test 'Event-driven I/O: session-id resume, UDP packing'
* in tests/ssl-opt.sh.
*/
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( ssl ) == 0 &&
opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &client_fd, timer, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
#else
idle( &client_fd, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
#endif
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( ssl, buf, len );
/* Note that even if `mbedtls_ssl_check_pending` returns true,
* it can happen that the subsequent call to `mbedtls_ssl_read`
* returns `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ`, because the pending messages
* might be discarded (e.g. because they are retransmissions). */
}
while( mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) );
if( ret <= 0 )
{
switch( ret )
{
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" );
ret = 0;
goto close_notify;
default:
mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", -ret );
goto reset;
}
}
len = ret;
buf[len] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf );
ret = 0;
}
/*
* 7a. Request renegotiation while client is waiting for input from us.
2014-10-15 12:44:41 +02:00
* (only on the first exchange, to be able to test retransmission)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( opt.renegotiate && exchanges_left == opt.exchanges )
{
mbedtls_printf( " . Requestion renegotiation..." );
fflush( stdout );
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ! mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto reset;
}
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &client_fd, timer, ret );
#else
idle( &client_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ret = report_cid_usage( ssl, "after renegotiation" );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
/*
* 7. Write the 200 Response
*/
mbedtls_printf( " > Write to client:" );
fflush( stdout );
len = sprintf( (char *) buf, HTTP_RESPONSE,
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( ssl ) );
/* Add padding to the response to reach opt.response_size in length */
if( opt.response_size != DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE &&
len < opt.response_size )
{
memset( buf + len, 'B', opt.response_size - len );
len += opt.response_size - len;
}
/* Truncate if response size is smaller than the "natural" size */
if( opt.response_size != DFL_RESPONSE_SIZE &&
len > opt.response_size )
{
len = opt.response_size;
/* Still end with \r\n unless that's really not possible */
if( len >= 2 ) buf[len - 2] = '\r';
if( len >= 1 ) buf[len - 1] = '\n';
}
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM )
{
for( written = 0, frags = 0; written < len; written += ret, frags++ )
{
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( ssl, buf + written, len - written ) )
<= 0 )
{
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! peer closed the connection\n\n" );
goto reset;
}
if( ! mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto reset;
}
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &client_fd, timer, ret );
#else
idle( &client_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
}
}
else /* Not stream, so datagram */
{
while( 1 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( ssl, buf, len );
if( ! mbedtls_status_is_ssl_in_progress( ret ) )
break;
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &client_fd, timer, ret );
#else
idle( &client_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
if( ret < 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto reset;
}
frags = 1;
written = ret;
}
buf[written] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes written in %d fragments\n\n%s\n", written, frags, (char *) buf );
ret = 0;
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
/*
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
* 7b. Simulate serialize/deserialize and go back to data exchange
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
if( opt.serialize != 0 )
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
{
2019-06-06 14:10:07 +02:00
size_t buf_len;
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " . Serializing live connection..." );
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( ssl, NULL, 0, &buf_len );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", -ret );
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
goto exit;
}
2019-06-06 14:10:07 +02:00
if( ( context_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buf_len ) ) == NULL )
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Couldn't allocate buffer for "
"serialized context" );
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
goto exit;
}
context_buf_len = buf_len;
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( ssl, context_buf,
2019-06-13 11:22:50 +02:00
buf_len, &buf_len ) ) != 0 )
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", -ret );
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
* This simulates a workflow where you have a long-lived server
* instance, potentially with a pool of ssl_context objects, and you
* just want to re-use one while the connection is inactive: in that
* case you can just reset() it, and then it's ready to receive
* serialized data from another connection (or the same here).
*/
if( opt.serialize == 1 )
{
/* nothing to do here, done by context_save() already */
mbedtls_printf( " . Context has been reset... ok" );
}
/*
* This simulates a workflow where you have one server instance per
* connection, and want to release it entire when the connection is
* inactive, and spawn it again when needed again - this would happen
* between ssl_free() and ssl_init() below, together with any other
* teardown/startup code needed - for example, preparing the
* ssl_config again (see section 3 "setup stuff" in this file).
*/
if( opt.serialize == 2 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " . Freeing and reinitializing context..." );
mbedtls_ssl_free( ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_init( ssl );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( ssl, conf ) ) != 0 )
{
2019-06-13 11:22:50 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
/*
* This illustrates the minimum amount of things you need to set
* up: I/O and timer callbacks/contexts; however you could set up
* much more if desired, for example if you want to share your set
* up code between the case of establishing a new connection and
* this case.
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT)
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( ssl, &io_ctx, send_cb, recv_cb,
opt.nbio == 0 ? recv_timeout_cb : NULL );
#else
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio_ctx( ssl, &client_fd );
#endif
2019-06-13 10:45:06 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SET_TIMER) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_GET_TIMER)
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( ssl, timer,
mbedtls_timing_set_delay,
mbedtls_timing_get_delay );
#else
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb_ctx( ssl, timer );
#endif
2019-06-13 10:45:06 +02:00
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
}
mbedtls_printf( " . Deserializing connection..." );
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_load( ssl, context_buf,
2019-06-13 11:22:50 +02:00
buf_len ) ) != 0 )
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
{
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_load returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", -ret );
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_free( context_buf );
context_buf = NULL;
context_buf_len = 0;
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
2019-05-29 14:41:21 +02:00
/*
* 7c. Continue doing data exchanges?
*/
2015-01-22 11:33:29 +01:00
if( --exchanges_left > 0 )
goto data_exchange;
/*
* 8. Done, cleanly close the connection
*/
close_notify:
mbedtls_printf( " . Closing the connection..." );
2014-10-09 19:56:44 +02:00
/* No error checking, the connection might be closed already */
do ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( ssl );
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE );
2014-10-09 19:56:44 +02:00
ret = 0;
mbedtls_printf( " done\n" );
goto reset;
/*
* Cleanup and exit
*/
exit:
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
if( ret != 0 )
{
char error_buf[100];
mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 );
mbedtls_printf("Last error was: -0x%X - %s\n\n", -ret, error_buf );
}
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " . Cleaning up..." );
2014-11-21 11:54:41 +01:00
fflush( stdout );
mbedtls_net_free( &client_fd );
mbedtls_net_free( &listen_fd );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm );
2014-06-18 16:44:11 +02:00
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cacert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( srvcert );
mbedtls_pk_free( pkey );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( srvcert2 );
mbedtls_pk_free( pkey2 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
for( i = 0; (size_t) i < ssl_async_keys.slots_used; i++ )
{
if( ssl_async_keys.slots[i].pk_owned )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( ssl_async_keys.slots[i].pk );
mbedtls_free( ssl_async_keys.slots[i].pk );
ssl_async_keys.slots[i].pk = NULL;
}
}
#endif
2015-04-03 16:41:52 +02:00
#if defined(SNI_OPTION)
2014-02-21 16:52:06 +01:00
sni_free( sni_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
psk_free( psk_info );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_dhm_free( &dhm );
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_free( ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_config_free( conf );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctr_drbg );
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( hmac_drbg );
#endif
mbedtls_entropy_free( entropy );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_cache_free( cache );
#endif
2015-05-19 15:28:00 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free( ticket_ctx );
2015-05-19 15:28:00 +02:00
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free( &cookie_ctx );
#endif
mbedtls_free( buf );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
if( context_buf != NULL )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len );
mbedtls_free( context_buf );
#endif
mbedtls_free( ssl );
mbedtls_free( conf );
mbedtls_free( entropy );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_free( cacert );
mbedtls_free( srvcert );
mbedtls_free( pkey );
mbedtls_free( srvcert2 );
mbedtls_free( pkey2 );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C)
mbedtls_free( cache );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
mbedtls_free( timer );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
mbedtls_free( ticket_ctx );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_free( ctr_drbg );
#else
mbedtls_free( hmac_drbg );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status();
#endif
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free();
2013-09-29 14:45:34 +02:00
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " done.\n" );
2014-11-21 11:54:41 +01:00
#if defined(_WIN32)
mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" );
fflush( stdout ); getchar();
#endif
// Shell can not handle large exit numbers -> 1 for errors
if( ret < 0 )
ret = 1;
Merge mbedtls 2.16.6 into baremetal Conflicts: mbedtls.doxyfile - PROJECT_NAME - mbed TLS v2.16.6 chosen. doc_mainpage.h - mbed TLS v2.16.6 version chosen. hmac_drbg.h - line 260, extended description chosen. - line 313, extended description chosen. - line 338, extended description chosen. version.h - 2.16.6 chosen. CMakeLists.txt - 2.16.6 chosen. test_suite_version.data - 2.16.6 chosen. Makefile - 141 - manual correction - baremetal version of C_SOURCE_FILES with variables for directories plus 2.16.6 CTAGS addition. pkparse.c - lines 846 onwards - the asn1_get_nonzero_mpi implementation chosen. ssl_tls.c - line 5269 - edited manually, left the ret=0, because baremetal has a different behaviour since commit 87b5626, but added a debug message that's new in 2.16.6. all.sh: - component_build_deprecated - chosen the refactored version from 2.16.6, but with extra flags from baremetal. - rest of the _no_xxx tests - merged make options to have PTHREAD=1 and other changes from 2.16.6 (like -O1 instead of -O0). - component_build_arm_none_eabi_gcc_no_64bit_multiplication - added TINYCRYPT_BUILD=0 to the 2.16.6 version of make. x509/req_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/crl_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. x509/cert_app.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_mail_client.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_pthread_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl/ssl_fork_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client1.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_client2.c - line 54 - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. - line 132 - new options of both branches added. - skip close notify handled as in 2.16.6, but with `ssl` instead of `&ssl`. - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. - Merged options from baremetal and 2.16.6. ssl_server.c - left baremetal log but with mbedtls_exit( 0 ) call. ssl_server2.c - Merged the 2.16.6 usage split with additional baremetal usages. config.pl - fixed missing defines from the documentation, removed duplicates, and reorganised so that the documentation and excluded list are ordered in the same way. test_suite_x509parse.data - only added the two new pathlen tests. x509_crt.c - change the return code by removing MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, since it's added by x509_crt_frame_parse_ext not by an "or", but by "+=". Changelog - Assigned all entries to appropriate sections. ssl-opt.sh - line 8263 - merged options. - removed lines 1165 - 1176 - there was a duplicate test, probably an artifact of previous merges. check-files.py - sticked to old formatting. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
2020-05-18 17:47:25 +02:00
mbedtls_exit( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C &&
MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C &&
( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C || MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C ) */