mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c

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/*
* SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions
*
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* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
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* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
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#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
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#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
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#endif
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t hostname_len;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->hostname == NULL )
return;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s",
ssl->hostname ) );
hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < hostname_len + 9 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
/*
* Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions)
*
* In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an
* extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The
* "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain
* "ServerNameList" where:
*
* struct {
* NameType name_type;
* select (name_type) {
* case host_name: HostName;
* } name;
* } ServerName;
*
* enum {
* host_name(0), (255)
* } NameType;
*
* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
*
* struct {
* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
* } ServerNameList;
*
*/
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 5) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 5) ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 3) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 3) ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( hostname_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( hostname_len ) & 0xFF );
memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len );
*olen = hostname_len + 9;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
/* We're always including an TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the
* initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation
* info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
return;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 + ssl->verify_data_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
/*
* Secure renegotiation
*/
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ) & 0xFF;
*p++ = ssl->verify_data_len & 0xFF;
memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
*olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/*
* Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t sig_alg_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6;
#endif
*olen = 0;
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) !=
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS( hash )
((void) hash);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
sig_alg_len += 2;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
sig_alg_len += 2;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < sig_alg_len + 6 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
/*
* Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2)
*/
sig_alg_len = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS( hash )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = hash;
sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA;
#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = hash;
sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS
/*
* enum {
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* none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
* sha512(6), (255)
* } HashAlgorithm;
*
* enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) }
* SignatureAlgorithm;
*
* struct {
* HashAlgorithm hash;
* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
*
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
* supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
*/
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( sig_alg_len + 2 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( sig_alg_len + 2 ) ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( sig_alg_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( sig_alg_len ) & 0xFF );
*olen = 6 + sig_alg_len;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static size_t ssl_get_ec_curve_list_length( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
size_t ec_list_len = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID( tls_id )
((void) tls_id);
ec_list_len++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID
return( ec_list_len );
}
static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0;
*olen = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) );
/* Each elliptic curve is encoded in 2 bytes. */
elliptic_curve_len = 2 * ssl_get_ec_curve_list_length( ssl );
if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 )
return;
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + elliptic_curve_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len ) ) & 0xFF );
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID( tls_id )
*p++ = tls_id >> 8;
*p++ = tls_id & 0xFF;
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID
*olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len;
}
static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 2;
*p++ = 1;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
*olen = 6;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
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static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t kkpp_len;
*olen = 0;
/* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */
if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
return;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
if( end - p < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP ) & 0xFF );
/*
* We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification.
* We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance
* and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content.
*/
if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ||
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0 )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) );
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
return;
}
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len );
if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) );
return;
}
memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len );
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) );
kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len;
if( (size_t)( end - p - 2 ) < kkpp_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len );
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}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len ) & 0xFF );
*olen = kkpp_len + 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
static void ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t ext_len;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
/*
* Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
*
* struct {
* opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
* } ConnectionId;
*/
*olen = 0;
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
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if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport ) ||
ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) );
/* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
* which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
/* Add extension ID + size */
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID ) & 0xFF );
ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len );
*olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) {
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 1;
*p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code;
*olen = 5;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac "
"extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
*olen = 0;
Exemplify harcoding SSL config at compile-time in example of ExtMS This commit is the first in a series demonstrating how code-size can be reduced by hardcoding parts of the SSL configuration at compile-time, focusing on the example of the configuration of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. The flexibility of an SSL configuration defined a runtime vs. compile-time is necessary for the use of Mbed TLS as a dynamically linked library, but is undesirable in constrained environments because it introduces the following overhead: - Definition of SSL configuration API (code-size overhead) (and on the application-side: The API needs to be called) - Additional fields in the SSL configuration (RAM overhead, and potentially code-size overhead if structures grow beyond immediate-offset bounds). - Dereferencing is needed to obtain configuration settings. - Code contains branches and potentially additional structure fields to distinguish between different configurations. Considering the example of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension, this instantiates as follows: - mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret_enforced() are introduced to configure the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. - mbedtls_ssl_config contains bitflags `extended_ms` and `enforce_extended_master_secret` reflecting the runtime configuration of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. - Whenever we need to access these fields, we need a chain of dereferences `ssl->conf->extended_ms`. - Determining whether Client/Server should write the ExtendedMasterSecret extension needs a branch depending on `extended_ms`, and the state of the ExtendedMasterSecret negotiation needs to be stored in a new handshake-local variable mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params::extended_ms. Finally (that's the point of ExtendedMasterSecret) key derivation depends on this handshake-local state of ExtendedMasterSecret. All this is unnecessary if it is known at compile-time that the ExtendedMasterSecret extension is used and enforced: - No API calls are necessary because the configuration is fixed at compile-time. - No SSL config fields are necessary because there are corresponding compile-time constants instead. - Accordingly, no dereferences for field accesses are necessary, and these accesses can instead be replaced by the corresponding compile-time constants. - Branches can be eliminated at compile-time because the compiler knows the configuration. Also, specifically for the ExtendedMasterSecret extension, the field `extended_ms` in the handshake structure is unnecessary, because we can fail immediately during the Hello- stage of the handshake if the ExtendedMasterSecret extension is not negotiated; accordingly, the non-ExtendedMS code-path can be eliminated from the key derivation logic. A way needs to be found to allow fixing parts of the SSL configuration at compile-time which removes this overhead in case it is used, while at the same time maintaining readability and backwards compatibility. This commit proposes the following approach: From the user perspective, for aspect of the SSL configuration mbedtls_ssl_config that should be configurable at compile-time, introduce a compile-time option MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIELD_NAME. If this option is not defined, the field is kept and configurable at runtime as usual. If the option is defined, the field is logically forced to the value of the option at compile time. Internally, read-access to fields in the SSL configuration which are configurable at compile-time gets replaced by new `static inline` getter functions which evaluate to the corresponding field access or to the constant MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIELD_NAME, depending on whether the latter is defined or not. Write-access to fields which are configurable at compile-time needs to be removed: Specifically, the corresponding API itself either needs to be removed or replaced by a stub function without effect. This commit takes the latter approach, which has the benefit of not requiring any change on the example applications, but introducing the risk of mismatching API calls and compile-time configuration, in case a user doesn't correctly keep track of which parts of the configuration have been fixed at compile-time, and which haven't. Write-access for the purpose of setting defaults is simply omitted.
2019-06-11 14:43:27 +02:00
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret "
"extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED )
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 + tlen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( tlen >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( tlen ) & 0xFF );
*olen = 4;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "sending session ticket of length %d", tlen ) );
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen );
*olen += tlen;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t alpnlen = 0;
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
const char **cur;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
alpnlen += (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ) + 1;
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + alpnlen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF );
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
/*
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
*
* struct {
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
* } ProtocolNameList;
*/
/* Skip writing extension and list length for now */
p += 4;
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
{
*p = (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF );
memcpy( p + 1, *cur, *p );
p += 1 + *p;
}
*olen = p - buf;
/* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */
buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF );
/* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */
buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
/*
* Generate random bytes for ClientHello
*/
static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t t;
#endif
/*
* When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL )
{
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
t = mbedtls_time( NULL );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %lu", t ) );
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
p += 4;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), p, 28 ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
/**
* \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context.
*
* \param suite_info cipher suite to validate
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite
* \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite
*
* \return 0 if valid, else 1
*/
static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t suite_info,
const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl,
int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver )
{
(void) ssl;
if( suite_info == MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITE_INVALID_HANDLE )
return( 1 );
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( suite_info ) > max_minor_ver ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( suite_info ) < min_minor_ver )
{
return( 1 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_flags( suite_info ) &
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) != 0 )
{
return( 1 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C)
if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED &&
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_cipher( suite_info ) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
{
return( 1 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( suite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
{
return( 1 );
}
#endif
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0;
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *q;
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
unsigned char offer_compress;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
int uses_ec = 0;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client hello" ) );
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ) == NULL )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG );
2013-11-21 17:31:06 +01:00
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER)
ssl->major_ver = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER)
ssl->minor_ver = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER */
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "configured max major version is invalid, "
"consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
/*
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
* 4 . 5 highest version supported
* 6 . 9 current UNIX time
* 10 . 37 random bytes
*/
buf = ssl->out_msg;
p = buf + 4;
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
ssl->conf->transport, p );
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, max version: [%d:%d]",
buf[4], buf[5] ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_generate_random( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_generate_random", ret );
return( ret );
}
memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 32 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32 );
p += 32;
/*
* 38 . 38 session id length
* 39 . 39+n session id
* 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
* 40+n . .. DTSL only: cookie
* .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes)
* .. . .. ciphersuitelist
* .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte)
* .. . .. compression methods
* .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes)
* .. . .. extensions
*/
/*
* We'll write a session of non-zero length if resumption was requested
* by the user, we're not renegotiating, and the session ID is of
* appropriate length. Otherwise make the length 0 (for now, see next code
* block for behaviour with tickets).
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) == 0 ||
mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len < 16 ||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len > 32 )
{
n = 0;
}
else
{
n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
/*
* RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY
* generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello."
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0 )
2015-03-10 12:40:43 +01:00
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
*p++ = (unsigned char) n;
for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
*p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i];
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n );
/*
* DTLS cookie
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
{
2014-07-11 02:43:49 +02:00
if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no verify cookie to send" ) );
2014-07-11 02:43:49 +02:00
*p++ = 0;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie",
2014-07-11 02:43:49 +02:00
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie,
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len );
*p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len;
memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie,
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len );
p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len;
}
}
#endif
/*
* Ciphersuite list
*/
/* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */
n = 0;
q = p;
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE( ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
ciphersuite_info )
{
if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ciphersuite_info, ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) != 0 )
{
continue;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x",
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( ciphersuite_info ) ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( ciphersuite_info );
#endif
n++;
*p++ = (unsigned char)(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( ciphersuite_info ) >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( ciphersuite_info ) );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) );
/*
* Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" ) );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO );
n++;
}
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
/* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
if( ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK )
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" ) );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE );
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
n++;
}
#endif
*q++ = (unsigned char)( n >> 7 );
*q++ = (unsigned char)( n << 1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
offer_compress = 1;
#else
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
offer_compress = 0;
#endif
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
/*
2018-01-06 09:46:57 +01:00
* We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
* in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one.
* We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is
* an actual need for it.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
offer_compress = 0;
#endif
if( offer_compress )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 2 ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d %d",
MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) );
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
*p++ = 2;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 1 ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d",
MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) );
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
*p++ = 1;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
}
// First write extensions, then the total length
//
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
/* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added
* even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( uses_ec )
{
ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
2015-09-15 16:55:05 +02:00
ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
ext_len += olen;
#endif
2014-11-06 02:38:02 +01:00
/* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */
((void) olen);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %d",
ext_len ) );
if( ext_len > 0 )
{
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF );
p += ext_len;
}
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO;
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl );
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client hello" ) );
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1,
ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
{
if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
}
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
/*
* server should use the extension only if we did,
* and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1)
*/
if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ||
len != 1 ||
buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ||
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
((void) buf);
ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
size_t peer_cid_len;
if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport ) ||
/* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */
ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
if( len == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
peer_cid_len = *buf++;
len--;
if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
if( len != peer_cid_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
((void) buf);
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
Exemplify harcoding SSL config at compile-time in example of ExtMS This commit is the first in a series demonstrating how code-size can be reduced by hardcoding parts of the SSL configuration at compile-time, focusing on the example of the configuration of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. The flexibility of an SSL configuration defined a runtime vs. compile-time is necessary for the use of Mbed TLS as a dynamically linked library, but is undesirable in constrained environments because it introduces the following overhead: - Definition of SSL configuration API (code-size overhead) (and on the application-side: The API needs to be called) - Additional fields in the SSL configuration (RAM overhead, and potentially code-size overhead if structures grow beyond immediate-offset bounds). - Dereferencing is needed to obtain configuration settings. - Code contains branches and potentially additional structure fields to distinguish between different configurations. Considering the example of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension, this instantiates as follows: - mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret_enforced() are introduced to configure the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. - mbedtls_ssl_config contains bitflags `extended_ms` and `enforce_extended_master_secret` reflecting the runtime configuration of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. - Whenever we need to access these fields, we need a chain of dereferences `ssl->conf->extended_ms`. - Determining whether Client/Server should write the ExtendedMasterSecret extension needs a branch depending on `extended_ms`, and the state of the ExtendedMasterSecret negotiation needs to be stored in a new handshake-local variable mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params::extended_ms. Finally (that's the point of ExtendedMasterSecret) key derivation depends on this handshake-local state of ExtendedMasterSecret. All this is unnecessary if it is known at compile-time that the ExtendedMasterSecret extension is used and enforced: - No API calls are necessary because the configuration is fixed at compile-time. - No SSL config fields are necessary because there are corresponding compile-time constants instead. - Accordingly, no dereferences for field accesses are necessary, and these accesses can instead be replaced by the corresponding compile-time constants. - Branches can be eliminated at compile-time because the compiler knows the configuration. Also, specifically for the ExtendedMasterSecret extension, the field `extended_ms` in the handshake structure is unnecessary, because we can fail immediately during the Hello- stage of the handshake if the ExtendedMasterSecret extension is not negotiated; accordingly, the non-ExtendedMS code-path can be eliminated from the key derivation logic. A way needs to be found to allow fixing parts of the SSL configuration at compile-time which removes this overhead in case it is used, while at the same time maintaining readability and backwards compatibility. This commit proposes the following approach: From the user perspective, for aspect of the SSL configuration mbedtls_ssl_config that should be configurable at compile-time, introduce a compile-time option MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIELD_NAME. If this option is not defined, the field is kept and configurable at runtime as usual. If the option is defined, the field is logically forced to the value of the option at compile time. Internally, read-access to fields in the SSL configuration which are configurable at compile-time gets replaced by new `static inline` getter functions which evaluate to the corresponding field access or to the constant MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIELD_NAME, depending on whether the latter is defined or not. Write-access to fields which are configurable at compile-time needs to be removed: Specifically, the corresponding API itself either needs to be removed or replaced by a stub function without effect. This commit takes the latter approach, which has the benefit of not requiring any change on the example applications, but introducing the risk of mismatching API calls and compile-time configuration, in case a user doesn't correctly keep track of which parts of the configuration have been fixed at compile-time, and which haven't. Write-access for the purpose of setting defaults is simply omitted.
2019-06-11 14:43:27 +02:00
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
((void) buf);
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ||
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
}
((void) buf);
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ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
size_t list_size;
const unsigned char *p;
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if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
2018-05-30 09:13:21 +02:00
list_size = buf[0];
p = buf + 1;
while( list_size > 0 )
{
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
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#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0];
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
return( 0 );
}
list_size--;
p++;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
2015-09-16 16:01:00 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
int ret;
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange(
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake ) )
!= MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache );
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0;
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
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return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
size_t list_len, name_len;
const char **p;
/* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
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/*
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
*
* struct {
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
* } ProtocolNameList;
*
* the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
*/
/* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
if( len < 4 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
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list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
if( list_len != len - 2 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
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name_len = buf[2];
if( name_len != list_len - 1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
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/* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ )
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{
if( name_len == strlen( *p ) &&
memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *p;
return( 0 );
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
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}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
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/*
* Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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{
const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
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int major_ver, minor_ver;
unsigned char cookie_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) );
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/*
* struct {
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
* opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
* } HelloVerifyRequest;
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 );
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, p );
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p += 2;
/*
* Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1)
* even is lower than our min version.
*/
if( major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ||
minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ||
major_ver > mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ) ||
minor_ver > mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server version" ) );
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mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
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}
cookie_len = *p++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len );
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if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );
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ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len );
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if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
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}
memcpy( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, p, cookie_len );
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len;
/* Start over at ClientHello */
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( ssl );
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mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse hello verify request" ) );
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return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
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static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
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int ret, i;
size_t n;
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size_t ext_len;
unsigned char *buf, *ext;
unsigned char comp;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
int accept_comp;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
int extended_ms_seen = 0;
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#endif
int handshake_failure = 0;
/* The ciphersuite chosen by the server. */
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t server_suite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
/* No alert on a read error. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
buf = ssl->in_msg;
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
{
ssl->renego_records_seen++;
if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 &&
ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, "
"but not honored by server" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-handshake message during renego" ) );
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
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{
if( buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received hello verify request" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
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return( ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
}
else
{
/* We made it through the verification process */
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );
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ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL;
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
if( ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
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/*
* 0 . 1 server_version
* 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time)
* 34 . 34 session_id length = n
* 35 . 34+n session_id
* 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite
* 37+n . 37+n compression_method
*
* 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional)
* 40+n . .. extensions
*/
buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
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{
int major_ver, minor_ver;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2 );
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport,
buf + 0 );
if( major_ver < mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf ) ||
minor_ver < mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ||
major_ver > mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ) ||
minor_ver > mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server version out of bounds - "
" min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]",
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
major_ver, minor_ver,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER)
ssl->minor_ver = minor_ver;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER)
ssl->major_ver = major_ver;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER */
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu",
( (uint32_t) buf[2] << 24 ) |
( (uint32_t) buf[3] << 16 ) |
( (uint32_t) buf[4] << 8 ) |
( (uint32_t) buf[5] ) ) );
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memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 );
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n = buf[34];
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
if( n > 32 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n )
{
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ext_len = ( ( buf[38 + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[39 + n] ) );
if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) ||
ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
}
else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n )
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{
ext_len = 0;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
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}
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/* ciphersuite (used later) */
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i = ( buf[35 + n] << 8 ) | buf[36 + n];
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/*
* Read and check compression
*/
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comp = buf[37 + n];
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
/* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */
Use new tools for all cases with TLS-specific code This commit handles occurrences of case 2 and 3 in the following list: 1. Some DTLS-specific code with no TLS-specific code (most frequent) 2. Some specific code for each protocol 3. Some TLS-specific code with no DTLS-specific code (least frequent) Case 3 previously had a weird structure in that the TLS-specific code was always present, but the if structure was conditional on DTLS being enabled. This is changed by this commit to a more logical structure where both the code and the test are conditional on TLS being enabled. Case 2 doesn't require any change in the code structure in general. However, there is one occurrence where the if/else structure is simplified to assigning the result of a boolean operation, and one occurrence where I also noticed a useless use of `ssl_ep_len()` in a TLS-specific branch, that I turned to the constant 0 as it makes more sense. Case 1 will be handled in the next commit, as it can easily be handled in an automated way - only cases 2 and 3 (sometimes) required manual intervention. The list of occurrences for cases 2 and 3 was established manually by looking for occurrences of '= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_' in the code and manually checking if there was a TLS-specific branch. New sizes (see previous commit for the measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17068 0 0 17068 42ac ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17553 0 0 17553 4491 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38499 60 0 38559 969f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87903 60 600 88563 159f3 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 10:34:48 +02:00
accept_comp = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport );
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if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL &&
( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE || accept_comp == 0 ) )
#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
#endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
2014-07-14 17:38:41 +02:00
}
/*
* Initialize update checksum functions
*/
server_suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = server_suite_info;
#endif
if( server_suite_info == MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITE_INVALID_HANDLE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, server_suite_info );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n );
/*
* Check if the session can be resumed
*
* We're only resuming a session if it was requested (handshake->resume
* already set to 1 by mbedtls_ssl_set_session()), and further conditions
* are satisfied (not renegotiating, ID and ciphersuite match, etc).
*
* Update handshake->resume to the value it will keep for the rest of the
* handshake, and that will be used to determine the relative order
* client/server last flights, as well as in handshake_wrapup().
*/
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION)
if( n == 0 ||
mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate ) != i ||
ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp ||
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ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n ||
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memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->resume = 0;
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION */
if( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) == 1 )
{
/* Resume a session */
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( ret );
}
}
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
else
{
/* Start a new session */
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE */
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n;
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) ? "a" : "no" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", i ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", buf[37 + n] ) );
/*
* Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE( ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
ciphersuite_info )
{
if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ciphersuite_info, ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) != 0 )
{
continue;
}
if( ciphersuite_info != server_suite_info )
continue;
goto server_picked_valid_suite;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE
/* If we reach this code-path, the server's chosen ciphersuite
* wasn't among those advertised by us. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
server_picked_valid_suite:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_name( server_suite_info ) ) );
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( server_suite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA &&
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
{
ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1;
}
#endif
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
&& comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE
#endif
)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
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ext = buf + 40 + n;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d",
ext_len ) );
while( ext_len )
{
unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 )
| ( ext[1] ) );
unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 )
| ( ext[3] ) );
if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
switch( ext_id )
{
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
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#endif
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4,
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated_hmac extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl,
ext + 4,
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
extended_ms_seen = 1;
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session_ticket extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
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if( ( ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
2014-04-07 10:57:45 +02:00
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)",
ext_id ) );
}
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
ext += 4 + ext_size;
if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
}
/*
* Renegotiation security checks
*/
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_allow_legacy_renegotiation( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
2013-04-16 13:15:56 +02:00
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
renegotiation_info_seen == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_allow_legacy_renegotiation( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
renegotiation_info_seen == 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/*
* Check if extended master secret is being enforced
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
Exemplify harcoding SSL config at compile-time in example of ExtMS This commit is the first in a series demonstrating how code-size can be reduced by hardcoding parts of the SSL configuration at compile-time, focusing on the example of the configuration of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. The flexibility of an SSL configuration defined a runtime vs. compile-time is necessary for the use of Mbed TLS as a dynamically linked library, but is undesirable in constrained environments because it introduces the following overhead: - Definition of SSL configuration API (code-size overhead) (and on the application-side: The API needs to be called) - Additional fields in the SSL configuration (RAM overhead, and potentially code-size overhead if structures grow beyond immediate-offset bounds). - Dereferencing is needed to obtain configuration settings. - Code contains branches and potentially additional structure fields to distinguish between different configurations. Considering the example of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension, this instantiates as follows: - mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret_enforced() are introduced to configure the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. - mbedtls_ssl_config contains bitflags `extended_ms` and `enforce_extended_master_secret` reflecting the runtime configuration of the ExtendedMasterSecret extension. - Whenever we need to access these fields, we need a chain of dereferences `ssl->conf->extended_ms`. - Determining whether Client/Server should write the ExtendedMasterSecret extension needs a branch depending on `extended_ms`, and the state of the ExtendedMasterSecret negotiation needs to be stored in a new handshake-local variable mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params::extended_ms. Finally (that's the point of ExtendedMasterSecret) key derivation depends on this handshake-local state of ExtendedMasterSecret. All this is unnecessary if it is known at compile-time that the ExtendedMasterSecret extension is used and enforced: - No API calls are necessary because the configuration is fixed at compile-time. - No SSL config fields are necessary because there are corresponding compile-time constants instead. - Accordingly, no dereferences for field accesses are necessary, and these accesses can instead be replaced by the corresponding compile-time constants. - Branches can be eliminated at compile-time because the compiler knows the configuration. Also, specifically for the ExtendedMasterSecret extension, the field `extended_ms` in the handshake structure is unnecessary, because we can fail immediately during the Hello- stage of the handshake if the ExtendedMasterSecret extension is not negotiated; accordingly, the non-ExtendedMS code-path can be eliminated from the key derivation logic. A way needs to be found to allow fixing parts of the SSL configuration at compile-time which removes this overhead in case it is used, while at the same time maintaining readability and backwards compatibility. This commit proposes the following approach: From the user perspective, for aspect of the SSL configuration mbedtls_ssl_config that should be configurable at compile-time, introduce a compile-time option MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIELD_NAME. If this option is not defined, the field is kept and configurable at runtime as usual. If the option is defined, the field is logically forced to the value of the option at compile time. Internally, read-access to fields in the SSL configuration which are configurable at compile-time gets replaced by new `static inline` getter functions which evaluate to the corresponding field access or to the constant MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIELD_NAME, depending on whether the latter is defined or not. Write-access to fields which are configurable at compile-time needs to be removed: Specifically, the corresponding API itself either needs to be removed or replaced by a stub function without effect. This commit takes the latter approach, which has the benefit of not requiring any change on the example applications, but introducing the risk of mismatching API calls and compile-time configuration, in case a user doesn't correctly keep track of which parts of the configuration have been fixed at compile-time, and which haven't. Write-access for the purpose of setting defaults is simply omitted.
2019-06-11 14:43:27 +02:00
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED )
{
if( extended_ms_seen )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCED)
ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCED */
}
else if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems_enforced( ssl->conf ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE_ENABLED )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Peer not offering extended master "
"secret, while it is enforced") );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
if( handshake_failure == 1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
/*
* Ephemeral DH parameters:
*
* struct {
* opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
* } ServerDHParams;
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
2015-06-11 14:49:42 +02:00
if( ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len * 8 < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen )
{
2015-06-11 14:49:42 +02:00
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %d < %d",
ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len * 8,
ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id;
#else
grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id;
#endif
curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id );
if( curve_info == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 )
2014-02-04 16:18:07 +01:00
#else
if( ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 ||
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521 )
2014-02-04 16:18:07 +01:00
#endif
return( -1 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C &&
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED))
static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
/*
* Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
*
* struct {
* ECParameters curve_params;
* ECPoint public;
* } ServerECDHParams;
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
(const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C &&
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t len;
((void) ssl);
/*
* PSK parameters:
*
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( end - (*p) < 2 )
2018-03-13 11:31:14 +01:00
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
2013-10-15 11:55:33 +02:00
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( end - (*p) < (int) len )
{
2017-05-11 15:06:43 +02:00
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
/*
* Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one
* PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if
* someone needs that feature.
*/
*p += len;
ret = 0;
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
/* This function assumes that `out` points to a writable buffer
* of size 48 Bytes if `add_length_tag == 0` and size 50 Bytes
* if `add_length_tag != 0`. */
static int ssl_rsa_generate_partial_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char* out,
unsigned add_length_tag )
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
{
int ret;
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
/*
* Generate (part of) the pre-master secret as
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
* struct {
* [ uint16 length(48) ]
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
* opaque random[46];
* } PreMasterSecret;
*/
if( add_length_tag )
{
out[0] = 0;
out[1] = 48;
out += 2;
}
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
ssl->conf->transport, out );
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), out + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 )
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_rng", ret );
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Encrypt the randomly chosen part of the Premaster Secret with the
* server's RSA key and write it to the provided buffer.
*/
static int ssl_rsa_encrypt_partial_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char const *ppms,
unsigned char *out, size_t buflen,
size_t *olen )
{
int ret;
size_t len_bytes = mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2;
mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk = NULL;
if( buflen < len_bytes )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small for encrypted pms" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* Because the peer CRT pubkey is embedded into the handshake
* params currently, and there's no 'is_init' functions for PK
* contexts, we need to break the abstraction and peek into
* the PK context to see if it has been initialized. */
if( ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey.pk_info != NULL )
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
{
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
&peer_pk );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( peer_pk == NULL )
{
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
/*
* Encrypt the partial premaster secret and write it out.
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk,
ppms, 48, out + len_bytes,
olen, buflen - len_bytes,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) ) ) != 0 )
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret );
goto cleanup;
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
if( len_bytes == 2 )
{
out[0] = (unsigned char)( *olen >> 8 );
out[1] = (unsigned char)( *olen );
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
*olen += 2;
}
#endif
cleanup:
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#else
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( ret );
2013-10-14 17:39:48 +02:00
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
2015-10-23 08:48:41 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg,
mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg )
{
((void) ssl);
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
*pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
/* Only in TLS 1.2 */
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( (*p) + 2 > end )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
/*
* Get hash algorithm
*/
if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Server used unsupported "
"HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
/*
* Get signature algorithm
*/
if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used unsupported "
"SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
2015-06-17 14:34:48 +02:00
/*
* Check if the hash is acceptable
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, *md_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered",
*(p)[0] ) );
2015-06-17 14:34:48 +02:00
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", (*p)[0] ) );
*p += 2;
return( 0 );
}
2015-10-23 08:48:41 +02:00
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
&peer_pk );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key,
MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret );
goto cleanup;
}
if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
* operations like ECDHE. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#else
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
/*
*
* STATE HANDLING: ServerKeyExchange
*
*/
/*
* Overview
*/
/* Main entry point; orchestrates the other functions. */
static int ssl_process_in_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/* Coordination:
* Check if a ServerKeyExchange message is expected, and skip if not.
* Returns a negative code on failure, or
* - SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP
* - SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_EXPECTED
* indicating if a ServerKeyExchange message is expected or not.
*/
#define SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP 0
#define SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_EXPECTED 1
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/* Preparation
* If applicable, prepare DH parameters from Server certificate. */
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_prepare( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/* Parse SrvKeyExchange message and store contents
* (PSK or DH parameters) in handshake structure. */
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen );
/* Update the handshake state */
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/*
* Implementation
*/
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_prepare( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
((void) ciphersuite_info);
/* If applicable, extract static DH parameters from Server CRT. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
/* The ServerKeyExchange message is not used for
* - RSA or
* - static ECDH
* ciphersuites.
* It MAY be used in PSK or RSA-PSK.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
return( SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
return( SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
/*
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint. Peek at next message to decide whether
* the ServerKeyExchange is being skipped or not.
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
/* Current message is probably either
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
return( SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP );
}
}
return( SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_EXPECTED );
}
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *end;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
p = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = buf + buflen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
} /* FALLTROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
; /* nothing more to do */
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA )
{
static const uint16_t secp256r1_tls_id = 23;
static const unsigned char ecdh_group[] = {
MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE,
( secp256r1_tls_id >> 8 ) & 0xFF,
( secp256r1_tls_id >> 0 ) & 0xFF,
};
/* Check for fixed ECDH parameter preamble. */
if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ecdh_group ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad server key exchange (too short)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
if( memcmp( p, ecdh_group, sizeof( ecdh_group ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad server key exchange (unexpected header)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
p += sizeof( ecdh_group );
/* Read server's key share. */
if( mbedtls_ssl_ecdh_read_peerkey( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) )
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
2013-10-11 16:53:50 +02:00
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
2013-10-11 16:53:50 +02:00
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C &&
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
((void) ret);
((void) p);
((void) end);
((void) ciphersuite_info);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
2012-04-11 14:09:53 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
2012-04-11 14:09:53 +02:00
{
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
unsigned char hash[64];
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
2013-08-28 16:21:34 +02:00
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
2013-08-28 16:21:34 +02:00
}
if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
2013-08-28 16:21:34 +02:00
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
2013-08-28 16:21:34 +02:00
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
2013-08-28 16:21:34 +02:00
}
/*
* Read signature
*/
if( p > end - 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( p != end - sig_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
/*
* Compute the hash that has been signed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
hashlen = 36;
2017-07-20 17:17:51 +02:00
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
params_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen,
params, params_len,
md_alg );
2017-07-20 17:17:51 +02:00
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
&peer_pk );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
#endif
{
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( ret );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
* operations like ECDHE. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#else
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_process_in_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
/* Preparation:
* Potentially extract DH parameters from Server's certificate.
*
* Consider: Why don't we do this as post-processing after
* the server certificate has been read?
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_server_key_exchange_prepare( ssl ) );
/* Coordination:
* Check if we expect a ServerKeyExchange */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_server_key_exchange_coordinate( ssl ) );
if( ret == SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_EXPECTED )
{
/* Reading step */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto cleanup;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( ssl, ssl->in_msg,
ssl->in_hslen ) );
}
}
else if( ret == SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
}
/* Update state */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_server_key_exchange_postprocess( ssl ) );
cleanup:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( ret );
}
#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t n = 0;
size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
ssl->state++;
ssl->client_auth = ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request",
ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) );
if( ssl->client_auth == 0 )
{
/* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
/*
* struct {
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
* supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateRequest;
*
* Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just
* ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a
* certificate.
*
* We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out
* if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway,
* and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate
* the connection when it doesn't like our certificate.
*
* Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this
* point we only have one hash available (see comments in
* write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have.
*
* However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least
* superficially sane.
*/
buf = ssl->in_msg;
2013-04-16 13:15:56 +02:00
/* certificate_types */
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
}
cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )];
n = cert_type_len;
/*
2018-04-05 14:48:55 +02:00
* In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf:
* * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of
* SSL is 3),
* * distinguished name length otherwise.
* Both reach at most the index:
* ...hdr_len + 2 + n,
* therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that
* regardless of the actual code path.
*/
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
}
/* supported_signature_algorithms */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
size_t sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
2018-03-20 14:09:53 +01:00
unsigned char* sig_alg;
size_t i;
2018-03-20 14:09:53 +01:00
#endif
2018-03-20 14:09:53 +01:00
/*
2018-04-05 14:48:55 +02:00
* The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below:
2018-03-20 14:09:53 +01:00
* sig_alg[i + 1],
* where:
* sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n,
* max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1.
2018-04-05 14:48:55 +02:00
* Therefore the furthest access is:
2018-03-20 14:09:53 +01:00
* buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1],
* which reduces to:
* buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len],
* which is one less than we need the buf to be.
*/
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
2018-03-20 14:09:53 +01:00
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
}
2018-03-20 14:09:53 +01:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n;
for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 )
{
2017-05-11 15:06:43 +02:00
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d"
",%d", sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) );
}
#endif
n += 2 + sig_alg_len;
2013-04-16 13:15:56 +02:00
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/* certificate_authorities */
dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
n += dn_len;
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
}
exit:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE );
}
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
2019-06-06 12:43:51 +02:00
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
2014-09-19 15:09:21 +02:00
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello done" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
*
* STATE HANDLING: Client Key Exchange
*
*/
/*
* Overview
*/
/* Main entry point; orchestrates the other functions */
static int ssl_process_out_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/* Preparation
2019-08-01 10:44:07 +02:00
* - For ECDH: Generate client params and derive premaster secret
* - For RSA-suites: Encrypt PMS
* - For ECJPAKE: Do Round 2
*/
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_prepare( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen,
size_t *olen );
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/*
* Implementation
*/
static int ssl_process_out_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> process client key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret )
goto cli_key_exchange_postprocess;
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx );
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_out_client_key_exchange_prepare( ssl ) );
/* Prepare CertificateVerify message in output buffer. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( ssl, ssl->out_msg,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN,
&ssl->out_msglen ) );
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
/* Calculate secrets and update state */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
cli_key_exchange_postprocess:
#endif
ret = ssl_out_client_key_exchange_postprocess( ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ret );
/* Dispatch message */
2019-07-23 15:29:13 +02:00
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) );
/* NOTE: For the new messaging layer, the postprocessing step
* might come after the dispatching step if the latter
* doesn't send the message immediately.
* At the moment, we must do the postprocessing
* prior to the dispatching because if the latter
* returns WANT_WRITE, we want the handshake state
* to be updated in order to not enter
* this function again on retry. */
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= process client key exchange" ) );
return( ret );
}
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_prepare( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
((void) ret);
((void) ciphersuite_info);
/* TODO: The current API for DH and ECDH does not allow
* to separate public key generation from public key export.
*
* Ideally, we would like to pick the private (EC)DH keys
* in this preparation step, exporting the corresponding
* public key in the writing step only.
*
* The necessary extension of the (EC)DH API is being
* considered, but until then we perform the public
* generation + export in the writing step.
*
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
/* For RSA-PSK, the premaster secret is composed of
* - Length tag with value 48, encoded as a uint16
* - 2 bytes indicating the TLS version
* - 46 randomly chosen bytes
* - the chosen PSK.
* The following call takes care of all but the PSK. */
ret = ssl_rsa_generate_partial_pms( ssl, ssl->handshake->premaster,
1 /* Add length tag */ );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
/* For RSA, the premaster secret is composed of
* - 2 bytes indicating the TLS version
* - 46 randomly chosen bytes
* which the following call generates. */
ret = ssl_rsa_generate_partial_pms( ssl, ssl->handshake->premaster,
0 /* Omit length tag */ );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
return( 0 );
}
/* Warning: Despite accepting a length argument, this function is currently
* still lacking some bounds checks and assumes that `buf` has length
* `MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN`. Eventually, it should be rewritten to work
* with any buffer + length pair, returning MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
* on insufficient writing space. */
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen,
size_t *olen )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p, *end;
size_t n;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
/* NOTE: This function will generate different messages
* when it's called multiple times, because it currently
* includes private/public key generation in case of
* (EC)DH ciphersuites.
*
* It is therefore not suitable to be registered as a callback
* for retransmission, if such get introduced at some point.
*
* Also see the documentation of ssl_out_client_key_exchange_prepare().
*/
p = buf + 4;
end = buf + buflen;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
{
/*
* DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P
*/
n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
if( (size_t)( end - p ) < n + 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
p[0] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
p[1] = (unsigned char)( n );
p += 2;
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
p, n, mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
p += n;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
2019-07-23 18:01:13 +02:00
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA )
{
const struct uECC_Curve_t * uecc_curve = uECC_secp256r1();
2019-07-23 18:01:13 +02:00
((void) n);
((void) ret);
2019-07-23 18:01:13 +02:00
if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES + 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
2019-07-23 18:01:13 +02:00
*p++ = 2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES + 1;
*p++ = 0x04; /* uncompressed point presentation */
if( !uECC_make_key( p, ssl->handshake->ecdh_privkey,
uecc_curve ) )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
2019-07-23 18:01:13 +02:00
p += 2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
/*
* ECDH key exchange -- generate and send client public value
*/
/* NOTE: If we ever switch the ECDH stack/API to allow
* independent key generation and export, we should have
* generated our key share in the preparation step, and
* we'd only do the export here. */
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&n, p, end - p,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
p += n;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && (
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
/*
* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for PSK" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
n = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
if( buflen < n + 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity too long or "
"SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
p[0] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
p[1] = (unsigned char)( n );
p += 2;
memcpy( p, ssl->conf->psk_identity, n );
p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
{
((void) ret);
((void) end);
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_rsa_encrypt_partial_pms( ssl,
ssl->handshake->premaster + 2,
p, end - p, &n ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
p += n;
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
/*
* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
*/
((void) end);
n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
if( buflen < n + 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity or DHM size too long"
" or SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
p[0] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
p[1] = (unsigned char)( n );
p += 2;
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
p, n, mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += n;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
/*
* ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
*/
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &n,
p, buflen,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q );
p += n;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_rsa_encrypt_partial_pms( ssl, ssl->handshake->premaster,
p, end - p, &n ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
p += n;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p, &n,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += n;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
{
((void) ciphersuite_info);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
*olen = p - buf;
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_build_pms( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_build_pms", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
return( 0 );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
2014-10-20 20:33:10 +02:00
int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
2014-10-20 20:33:10 +02:00
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
2014-10-20 20:33:10 +02:00
return( ret );
}
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
2012-04-11 14:09:53 +02:00
size_t n = 0, offset = 0;
unsigned char hash[48];
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
size_t hashlen;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign )
{
goto sign;
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
2014-10-20 20:33:10 +02:00
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
2014-10-20 20:33:10 +02:00
return( ret );
}
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( ssl->client_auth == 0 || mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL )
{
2015-07-07 11:41:21 +02:00
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for certificate" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
/*
* Make a signature of the handshake digests
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign;
sign:
#endif
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
2012-04-11 14:09:53 +02:00
{
/*
* digitally-signed struct {
* opaque md5_hash[16];
* opaque sha_hash[20];
* };
*
* md5_hash
* MD5(handshake_messages);
*
* sha_hash
* SHA(handshake_messages);
*/
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
/*
* For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only
*/
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) )
{
hash_start += 16;
hashlen -= 16;
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
/*
* digitally-signed struct {
* opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
* };
*
* Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the
* PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature
* algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message.
*
* Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this
* shortcut.
*
* Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and SHA224
* in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server side.
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_mac(
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake ) )
== MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
{
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384;
}
else
{
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256;
}
ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
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/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
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offset = 2;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
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ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n,
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
ssl->out_msg[4 + offset] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[5 + offset] = (unsigned char)( n );
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ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate verify" ) );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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{
int ret;
uint32_t lifetime;
size_t ticket_len;
unsigned char *ticket;
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const unsigned char *msg;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) );
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
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return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
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}
/*
* struct {
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
* } NewSessionTicket;
*
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* 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint
* 4 . 5 ticket_len (n)
* 6 . 5+n ticket content
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*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ||
ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
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}
msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
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lifetime = ( ((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) |
( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] );
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ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] );
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if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
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}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", ticket_len ) );
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/* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
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/*
* Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want
* to send a ticket after all, so just forget it
*/
if( ticket_len == 0 )
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return( 0 );
if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket,
ssl->session->ticket_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket );
ssl->session->ticket = NULL;
ssl->session->ticket_len = 0;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket );
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ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0;
if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL )
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{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
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}
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memcpy( ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len );
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ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime;
/*
* RFC 5077 section 3.4:
* "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it
* discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello."
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket in use, discarding session id" ) );
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ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse new session ticket" ) );
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return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
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/*
* SSL handshake -- client side -- single step
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client state: %d", ssl->state ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Use new macros for all TLS/DTLS tests sed -i -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( \1 )/' -e 's/\([^ ]*transport\) \(!= MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM\|== MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM\)/MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( \1 )/' library/ssl_*.c New sizes (see 2nd-previous commit for measuring script): ``` both text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17156 0 0 17156 4304 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17649 0 0 17649 44f1 ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 39286 60 0 39346 99b2 ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 88874 60 600 89534 15dbe (TOTALS) DTLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 16948 0 0 16948 4234 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 17437 0 0 17437 441d ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 38147 60 0 38207 953f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 87315 60 600 87975 157a7 (TOTALS) TLS-only text data bss dec hex filename 1820 0 4 1824 720 debug.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 0 0 0 0 0 net_sockets.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 548 0 0 548 224 ssl_cache.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 11155 0 596 11751 2de7 ssl_ciphersuites.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 14912 0 0 14912 3a40 ssl_cli.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 460 0 0 460 1cc ssl_cookie.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 15868 0 0 15868 3dfc ssl_srv.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 800 0 0 800 320 ssl_ticket.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 27619 60 0 27679 6c1f ssl_tls.o (ex library/libmbedtls.a) 73182 60 600 73842 12072 (TOTALS) ```
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if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
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{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
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return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
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/* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used
* by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
{
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
}
#endif
switch( ssl->state )
{
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
break;
/*
* ==> ClientHello
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
ret = ssl_write_client_hello( ssl );
break;
/*
* <== ServerHello
* Certificate
* ( ServerKeyExchange )
* ( CertificateRequest )
* ServerHelloDone
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
ret = ssl_parse_server_hello( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
ret = ssl_process_in_server_key_exchange( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl );
break;
/*
* ==> ( Certificate/Alert )
* ClientKeyExchange
* ( CertificateVerify )
* ChangeCipherSpec
* Finished
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
ret = ssl_process_out_client_key_exchange( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl );
break;
/*
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* <== ( NewSessionTicket )
* ChangeCipherSpec
* Finished
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( ssl );
break;
#endif
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) );
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
break;
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */