mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c

3057 lines
100 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* SSL client with certificate authentication
*
2015-07-27 11:11:48 +02:00
* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
2010-07-18 22:36:00 +02:00
*
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
2009-01-04 17:27:10 +01:00
*
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
2015-03-09 18:05:11 +01:00
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
2015-03-09 18:05:11 +01:00
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_time time
#define mbedtls_time_t time_t
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf
#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf
#define mbedtls_exit exit
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS
#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) )
int main( void )
{
mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or "
"MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C and/or MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C and/or "
"MBEDTLS_NET_C not defined, or "
"neither MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C nor MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C defined.\n");
return( 0 );
}
#else
#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
2015-03-09 18:05:11 +01:00
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h"
2015-03-09 18:05:11 +01:00
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
2015-03-09 18:05:11 +01:00
#include "mbedtls/certs.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
#define MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 20000
#define MAX_REQUEST_SIZE_STR "20000"
#define DFL_SERVER_NAME "localhost"
#define DFL_SERVER_ADDR NULL
#define DFL_SERVER_PORT "4433"
#define DFL_REQUEST_PAGE "/"
#define DFL_REQUEST_SIZE -1
#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0
#define DFL_NBIO 0
#define DFL_EVENT 0
#define DFL_READ_TIMEOUT 0
#define DFL_MAX_RESEND 0
#define DFL_CA_FILE ""
2012-06-04 14:46:42 +02:00
#define DFL_CA_PATH ""
2010-07-18 10:28:20 +02:00
#define DFL_CRT_FILE ""
#define DFL_KEY_FILE ""
#define DFL_PSK ""
#define DFL_PSK_IDENTITY "Client_identity"
#define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW NULL
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
#define DFL_EC_MAX_OPS -1
#define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER 0
#define DFL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
#define DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY -2
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
#define DFL_RENEGOTIATE 0
#define DFL_EXCHANGES 1
#define DFL_MIN_VERSION -1
#define DFL_MAX_VERSION -1
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
#define DFL_ARC4 -1
#define DFL_SHA1 -1
#define DFL_AUTH_MODE -1
#define DFL_MFL_CODE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE
#define DFL_TRUNC_HMAC -1
#define DFL_RECSPLIT -1
2015-06-11 17:02:29 +02:00
#define DFL_DHMLEN -1
#define DFL_RECONNECT 0
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
#define DFL_RECO_DELAY 0
#define DFL_RECO_MODE 1
#define DFL_CID_ENABLED 0
#define DFL_CID_VALUE ""
#define DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO -1
#define DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO NULL
#define DFL_RECONNECT_HARD 0
#define DFL_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED
#define DFL_ALPN_STRING NULL
#define DFL_CURVES NULL
#define DFL_TRANSPORT MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM
#define DFL_HS_TO_MIN 0
#define DFL_HS_TO_MAX 0
#define DFL_DTLS_MTU -1
#define DFL_DGRAM_PACKING 1
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
#define DFL_FALLBACK -1
#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS -1
#define DFL_ETM -1
#define DFL_SERIALIZE 0
#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE -1
#define GET_REQUEST "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\nExtra-header: "
#define GET_REQUEST_END "\r\n\r\n"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
#define USAGE_IO \
" ca_file=%%s The single file containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \
" default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \
" use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \
" ca_path=%%s The path containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \
" default: \"\" (pre-loaded) (overrides ca_file)\n" \
" use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \
" crt_file=%%s Your own cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted)\n" \
" default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \
" key_file=%%s default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_IO \
" No file operations available (MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined)\n"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#else
#define USAGE_IO ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define USAGE_CID \
" cid=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension.\n" \
" default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" cid_renego=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension during renegotiation.\n" \
" default: same as 'cid' parameter\n" \
" cid_val=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x).\n" \
" default: \"\"\n" \
" cid_val_renego=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x) after renegotiation.\n" \
" default: same as 'cid_val' parameter\n"
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#define USAGE_CID ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
#define USAGE_PSK \
" psk=%%s default: \"\" (in hex, without 0x)\n" \
" psk_identity=%%s default: \"Client_identity\"\n"
#else
#define USAGE_PSK ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
#define USAGE_TICKETS \
" tickets=%%d default: 1 (enabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_TICKETS ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \
" trunc_hmac=%%d default: library default\n"
#else
#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \
" max_frag_len=%%d default: 16384 (tls default)\n" \
" options: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096\n"
#else
#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
#define USAGE_RECSPLIT \
2015-06-11 17:02:10 +02:00
" recsplit=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_RECSPLIT
#endif
2015-06-11 17:02:29 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
#define USAGE_DHMLEN \
" dhmlen=%%d default: (library default: 1024 bits)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_DHMLEN
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
#define USAGE_ALPN \
" alpn=%%s default: \"\" (disabled)\n" \
" example: spdy/1,http/1.1\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ALPN ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
#define USAGE_CURVES \
" curves=a,b,c,d default: \"default\" (library default)\n" \
" example: \"secp521r1,brainpoolP512r1\"\n" \
" - use \"none\" for empty list\n" \
" - see mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()\n" \
" for acceptable curve names\n"
#else
#define USAGE_CURVES ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
#define USAGE_DTLS \
" dtls=%%d default: 0 (TLS) (if both enabled)\n" \
" hs_timeout=%%d-%%d default: (library default: 1000-60000)\n" \
" range of DTLS handshake timeouts in millisecs\n" \
" mtu=%%d default: (library default: unlimited)\n" \
" dgram_packing=%%d default: 1 (allowed)\n" \
" allow or forbid packing of multiple\n" \
" records within a single datgram.\n"
#else
#define USAGE_DTLS ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
#define USAGE_FALLBACK \
" fallback=0/1 default: (library default: off)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_FALLBACK ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ENFORCE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
#define USAGE_EMS \
" extended_ms=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n" \
" enforce_extended_master_secret=0/1 default: (library default: off)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_EMS ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
#define USAGE_ETM \
" etm=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ETM ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
#define USAGE_RENEGO \
" renegotiation=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" renegotiate=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_RENEGO ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
#define USAGE_ECJPAKE \
" ecjpake_pw=%%s default: none (disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ECJPAKE ""
#endif
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
#define USAGE_ECRESTART \
" ec_max_ops=%%s default: library default (restart disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ECRESTART ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION \
" serialize=%%d default: 0 (do not serialize/deserialize)\n" \
2019-06-07 07:39:24 +02:00
" options: 1 (serialize)\n" \
" 2 (serialize with re-initialization)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE)
#define USAGE_AUTH_MODE \
" auth_mode=%%s default: (library default: none)\n" \
" options: none, optional, required\n"
#else
#define USAGE_AUTH_MODE ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
#define USAGE_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGO " allow_legacy=%%d default: (library default: no)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGO ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_READ_TIMEOUT)
#define USAGE_READ_TIMEOUT \
" read_timeout=%%d default: 0 ms (no timeout)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_READ_TIMEOUT ""
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MAJOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MAJOR_VER)
#define USAGE_MAX_VERSION " max_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1_2)\n"
#define USAGE_MIN_VERSION " min_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1)\n"
#define USAGE_FORCE_VERSION " force_version=%%s default: \"\" (none)\n" \
" options: ssl3, tls1, tls1_1, tls1_2, dtls1, dtls1_2\n"
#else
#define USAGE_MAX_VERSION ""
#define USAGE_MIN_VERSION ""
#define USAGE_FORCE_VERSION ""
#endif
#define USAGE \
2010-07-18 10:28:20 +02:00
"\n usage: ssl_client2 param=<>...\n" \
"\n acceptable parameters:\n" \
" server_name=%%s default: localhost\n" \
" server_addr=%%s default: given by name\n" \
2010-07-18 10:28:20 +02:00
" server_port=%%d default: 4433\n" \
" request_page=%%s default: \".\"\n" \
" request_size=%%d default: about 34 (basic request)\n" \
" (minimum: 0, max: " MAX_REQUEST_SIZE_STR ")\n" \
" If 0, in the first exchange only an empty\n" \
" application data message is sent followed by\n" \
" a second non-empty message before attempting\n" \
" to read a response from the server\n" \
" debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" nbio=%%d default: 0 (blocking I/O)\n" \
" options: 1 (non-blocking), 2 (added delays)\n" \
" event=%%d default: 0 (loop)\n" \
" options: 1 (level-triggered, implies nbio=1),\n" \
USAGE_READ_TIMEOUT \
" max_resend=%%d default: 0 (no resend on timeout)\n" \
"\n" \
USAGE_DTLS \
USAGE_CID \
"\n" \
USAGE_AUTH_MODE \
USAGE_IO \
"\n" \
USAGE_PSK \
USAGE_ECJPAKE \
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
USAGE_ECRESTART \
"\n" \
USAGE_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGO \
USAGE_RENEGO \
" exchanges=%%d default: 1\n" \
" reconnect=%%d number of reconnections using session resumption\n" \
" default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" reco_delay=%%d default: 0 seconds\n" \
" reco_mode=%%d 0: copy session, 1: serialize session\n" \
" default: 1\n" \
" reconnect_hard=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
USAGE_TICKETS \
USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \
USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \
USAGE_ALPN \
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
USAGE_FALLBACK \
USAGE_EMS \
USAGE_ETM \
USAGE_CURVES \
USAGE_RECSPLIT \
2015-06-11 17:02:29 +02:00
USAGE_DHMLEN \
"\n" \
" arc4=%%d default: (library default: 0)\n" \
" allow_sha1=%%d default: 0\n" \
USAGE_MIN_VERSION \
USAGE_MAX_VERSION \
USAGE_FORCE_VERSION \
"\n" \
" force_ciphersuite=<name> default: all enabled\n"\
" query_config=<name> return 0 if the specified\n" \
" configuration macro is defined and 1\n" \
" otherwise. The expansion of the macro\n" \
" is printed if it is defined\n" \
USAGE_SERIALIZATION \
" acceptable ciphersuite names:\n"
#define ALPN_LIST_SIZE 10
#define CURVE_LIST_SIZE 20
/*
* global options
*/
struct options
{
const char *server_name; /* hostname of the server (client only) */
const char *server_addr; /* address of the server (client only) */
const char *server_port; /* port on which the ssl service runs */
int debug_level; /* level of debugging */
int nbio; /* should I/O be blocking? */
int event; /* loop or event-driven IO? level or edge triggered? */
uint32_t read_timeout; /* timeout on mbedtls_ssl_read() in milliseconds */
int max_resend; /* DTLS times to resend on read timeout */
const char *request_page; /* page on server to request */
int request_size; /* pad request with header to requested size */
const char *ca_file; /* the file with the CA certificate(s) */
const char *ca_path; /* the path with the CA certificate(s) reside */
const char *crt_file; /* the file with the client certificate */
const char *key_file; /* the file with the client key */
const char *psk; /* the pre-shared key */
const char *psk_identity; /* the pre-shared key identity */
const char *ecjpake_pw; /* the EC J-PAKE password */
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
int ec_max_ops; /* EC consecutive operations limit */
int force_ciphersuite[2]; /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all */
int renegotiation; /* enable / disable renegotiation */
int allow_legacy; /* allow legacy renegotiation */
int renegotiate; /* attempt renegotiation? */
int renego_delay; /* delay before enforcing renegotiation */
int exchanges; /* number of data exchanges */
int min_version; /* minimum protocol version accepted */
int max_version; /* maximum protocol version accepted */
int arc4; /* flag for arc4 suites support */
int allow_sha1; /* flag for SHA-1 support */
int auth_mode; /* verify mode for connection */
unsigned char mfl_code; /* code for maximum fragment length */
int trunc_hmac; /* negotiate truncated hmac or not */
int recsplit; /* enable record splitting? */
2015-06-11 17:02:29 +02:00
int dhmlen; /* minimum DHM params len in bits */
int reconnect; /* attempt to resume session */
int reco_delay; /* delay in seconds before resuming session */
int reco_mode; /* how to keep the session around */
int reconnect_hard; /* unexpectedly reconnect from the same port */
int tickets; /* enable / disable session tickets */
const char *curves; /* list of supported elliptic curves */
const char *alpn_string; /* ALPN supported protocols */
int transport; /* TLS or DTLS? */
uint32_t hs_to_min; /* Initial value of DTLS handshake timer */
uint32_t hs_to_max; /* Max value of DTLS handshake timer */
int dtls_mtu; /* UDP Maximum tranport unit for DTLS */
int fallback; /* is this a fallback connection? */
int dgram_packing; /* allow/forbid datagram packing */
int extended_ms; /* negotiate extended master secret? */
int enforce_extended_master_secret; /* Enforce the usage of extended
* master secret */
int etm; /* negotiate encrypt then mac? */
int cid_enabled; /* whether to use the CID extension or not */
int cid_enabled_renego; /* whether to use the CID extension or not
* during renegotiation */
const char *cid_val; /* the CID to use for incoming messages */
int serialize; /* serialize/deserialize connection */
const char *cid_val_renego; /* the CID to use for incoming messages
* after renegotiation */
} opt;
int query_config( const char *config );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
2015-06-23 17:35:03 +02:00
static void my_debug( void *ctx, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *str )
{
const char *p, *basename;
/* Extract basename from file */
for( p = basename = file; *p != '\0'; p++ )
if( *p == '/' || *p == '\\' )
basename = p + 1;
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_fprintf( (FILE *) ctx, "%s:%04d: |%d| %s",
basename, line, level, str );
fflush( (FILE *) ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT)
/*
* Test recv/send functions that make sure each try returns
* WANT_READ/WANT_WRITE at least once before sucesseding
*/
static int delayed_recv( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
static int first_try = 1;
int ret;
if( first_try )
{
first_try = 0;
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
}
ret = mbedtls_net_recv( ctx, buf, len );
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ )
first_try = 1; /* Next call will be a new operation */
return( ret );
}
static int delayed_send( void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
static int first_try = 1;
int ret;
if( first_try )
{
first_try = 0;
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE );
}
ret = mbedtls_net_send( ctx, buf, len );
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
first_try = 1; /* Next call will be a new operation */
return( ret );
}
typedef struct
{
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl;
mbedtls_net_context *net;
} io_ctx_t;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
static int ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char const *buf, size_t len )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *tmp_buf;
tmp_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len );
if( tmp_buf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( tmp_buf, buf, len );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_check_record( ssl, tmp_buf, len );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )
{
int ret_repeated;
/* Test-only: Make sure that mbedtls_ssl_check_record()
* doesn't alter state. */
memcpy( tmp_buf, buf, len ); /* Restore buffer */
ret_repeated = mbedtls_ssl_check_record( ssl, tmp_buf, len );
if( ret != ret_repeated )
{
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() returned inconsistent results.\n" );
return( -1 );
}
switch( ret )
{
case 0:
break;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD:
if( opt.debug_level > 1 )
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected invalid record.\n" );
break;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC:
if( opt.debug_level > 1 )
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected unauthentic record.\n" );
break;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD:
if( opt.debug_level > 1 )
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() detected unexpected record.\n" );
break;
default:
mbedtls_printf( "mbedtls_ssl_check_record() failed fatally with -%#04x.\n", -ret );
return( -1 );
}
/* Regardless of the outcome, forward the record to the stack. */
}
mbedtls_free( tmp_buf );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */
static int recv_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx;
size_t recv_len;
int ret;
if( opt.nbio == 2 )
ret = delayed_recv( io_ctx->net, buf, len );
else
ret = mbedtls_net_recv( io_ctx->net, buf, len );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
recv_len = (size_t) ret;
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Here's the place to do any datagram/record checking
* in between receiving the packet from the underlying
* transport and passing it on to the TLS stack. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
if( ssl_check_record( io_ctx->ssl, buf, recv_len ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */
}
return( (int) recv_len );
}
static int recv_timeout_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
uint32_t timeout )
{
io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx;
int ret;
size_t recv_len;
ret = mbedtls_net_recv_timeout( io_ctx->net, buf, len, timeout );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
recv_len = (size_t) ret;
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Here's the place to do any datagram/record checking
* in between receiving the packet from the underlying
* transport and passing it on to the TLS stack. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
if( ssl_check_record( io_ctx->ssl, buf, recv_len ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */
}
return( (int) recv_len );
}
static int send_cb( void *ctx, unsigned char const *buf, size_t len )
{
io_ctx_t *io_ctx = (io_ctx_t*) ctx;
if( opt.nbio == 2 )
return( delayed_send( io_ctx->net, buf, len ) );
return( mbedtls_net_send( io_ctx->net, buf, len ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK)
static unsigned char peer_crt_info[1024];
/*
* Enabled if debug_level > 1 in code below
*/
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
static int my_verify( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
int depth, uint32_t *flags )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
char buf[1024];
#endif
((void) data);
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
mbedtls_x509_crt_info( buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, "", crt );
if( depth == 0 )
memcpy( peer_crt_info, buf, sizeof( buf ) );
if( opt.debug_level == 0 )
return( 0 );
mbedtls_printf( "\nVerify requested for (Depth %d):\n", depth );
mbedtls_printf( "%s", buf );
#else
((void) crt);
((void) depth);
#endif
if ( ( *flags ) == 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " This certificate has no flags\n" );
else
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( buf, sizeof( buf ), " ! ", *flags );
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf );
#endif
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_HASH) ) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
static int available_hashes[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
/* Allow SHA-1 as we use it extensively in tests. */
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
#endif
MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
};
#endif /* ( MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_HASH ) ||
!MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
/*
* Wait for an event from the underlying transport or the timer
* (Used in event-driven IO mode).
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
int idle( mbedtls_net_context *fd,
int idle_reason )
#else
int idle( mbedtls_net_context *fd,
mbedtls_timing_delay_context *timer,
int idle_reason )
#endif
{
int ret;
int poll_type = 0;
if( idle_reason == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
poll_type = MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE;
else if( idle_reason == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ )
poll_type = MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
else
return( 0 );
#endif
while( 1 )
{
/* Check if timer has expired */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
if( timer != NULL &&
mbedtls_timing_get_delay( timer ) == 2 )
{
break;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */
/* Check if underlying transport became available */
if( poll_type != 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_net_poll( fd, poll_type, 0 );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
if( ret == poll_type )
break;
}
}
return( 0 );
}
/* Unhexify `hex` into `dst`. `dst` must have
* size at least `strlen( hex ) / 2`. */
int unhexify( char const *hex, unsigned char *dst )
{
unsigned char c;
size_t j;
size_t len = strlen( hex );
if( len % 2 != 0 )
return( -1 );
for( j = 0; j < len; j += 2 )
{
c = hex[j];
if( c >= '0' && c <= '9' )
c -= '0';
else if( c >= 'a' && c <= 'f' )
c -= 'a' - 10;
else if( c >= 'A' && c <= 'F' )
c -= 'A' - 10;
else
return( -1 );
dst[ j / 2 ] = c << 4;
c = hex[j + 1];
if( c >= '0' && c <= '9' )
c -= '0';
else if( c >= 'a' && c <= 'f' )
c -= 'a' - 10;
else if( c >= 'A' && c <= 'F' )
c -= 'A' - 10;
else
return( -1 );
dst[ j / 2 ] |= c;
}
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
int report_cid_usage( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const char *additional_description )
{
int ret;
unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
size_t peer_cid_len;
int cid_negotiated;
if( opt.transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
return( 0 );
/* Check if the use of a CID has been negotiated,
* but don't ask for the CID value and length.
*
* Note: Here and below, we're demonstrating the various ways
* in which mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() can be called,
* depending on whether or not the length/value of the
* peer's CID is needed.
*
* An actual application, however, should use
* just one call to mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(). */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated,
NULL, NULL );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
return( ret );
}
if( cid_negotiated == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
{
if( opt.cid_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED )
{
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID was rejected by the server.\n",
additional_description );
}
}
else
{
size_t idx=0;
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated.\n",
additional_description );
/* Ask for just the length of the peer's CID. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated,
NULL, &peer_cid_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
return( ret );
}
/* Ask for just length + value of the peer's CID. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated,
peer_cid, &peer_cid_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
return( ret );
}
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Peer CID (length %u Bytes): ",
additional_description,
(unsigned) peer_cid_len );
while( idx < peer_cid_len )
{
mbedtls_printf( "%02x ", peer_cid[ idx ] );
idx++;
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RNG)
int rng_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *dst, size_t len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *rng_ctx_global = NULL;
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *rng_ctx_global = NULL;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
int rng_wrap( void *ctx, unsigned char *dst, size_t len )
{
/* We expect the NULL parameter here. */
if( ctx != NULL )
return( -1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( rng_ctx_global, dst, len ) );
#else
return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( rng_ctx_global, dst, len ) );
#endif
2019-07-23 14:47:53 +02:00
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
int mbedtls_hardware_poll( void *data, unsigned char *output,
size_t len, size_t *olen )
{
size_t i;
(void) data;
for( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
output[i] = rand();
*olen = len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
int ret = 0, len, tail_len, i, written, frags, retry_left;
mbedtls_net_context server_fd;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT)
io_ctx_t io_ctx;
#endif
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
unsigned int main_buf_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char psk[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN];
size_t psk_len = 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
unsigned char cid_renego[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
size_t cid_len = 0;
size_t cid_renego_len = 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
const char *alpn_list[ALPN_LIST_SIZE];
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE];
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_cur;
#endif
const char *pers = "ssl_client2";
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_profile crt_profile_for_test = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
#endif
mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctr_drbg = NULL;
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *hmac_drbg = NULL;
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl;
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf;
mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session;
unsigned char *session_data = NULL;
size_t session_data_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
uint32_t flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt *cacert = NULL;
mbedtls_x509_crt *clicert = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_context *pkey = NULL;
#endif
char *p, *q;
const int *list;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
unsigned char *context_buf = NULL;
size_t context_buf_len;
#endif
ssl = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ssl ) );
conf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *conf ) );
entropy = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *entropy ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
ctr_drbg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *ctr_drbg ) );
#else
hmac_drbg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *hmac_drbg ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
cacert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *cacert ) );
clicert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *clicert ) );
pkey = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *pkey ) );
#endif
if( ssl == NULL || entropy == NULL ||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
cacert == NULL ||
clicert== NULL || pkey == NULL ||
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
ctr_drbg == NULL ||
#else
hmac_drbg == NULL ||
#endif
conf == NULL)
{
goto exit;
}
/*
* Make sure memory references are valid.
*/
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd );
mbedtls_ssl_init( ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_config_init( conf );
memset( &saved_session, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctr_drbg );
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( cacert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( clicert );
mbedtls_pk_init( pkey );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
memset( (void * ) alpn_list, 0, sizeof( alpn_list ) );
#endif
if( argc == 0 )
{
usage:
if( ret == 0 )
ret = 1;
mbedtls_printf( USAGE );
list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites();
while( *list )
{
mbedtls_printf(" %-42s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) );
list++;
if( !*list )
break;
mbedtls_printf(" %s\n", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) );
list++;
}
mbedtls_printf("\n");
goto exit;
}
opt.server_name = DFL_SERVER_NAME;
opt.server_addr = DFL_SERVER_ADDR;
opt.server_port = DFL_SERVER_PORT;
opt.debug_level = DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL;
opt.cid_enabled = DFL_CID_ENABLED;
opt.cid_val = DFL_CID_VALUE;
opt.cid_enabled_renego = DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO;
opt.cid_val_renego = DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO;
opt.nbio = DFL_NBIO;
opt.event = DFL_EVENT;
opt.read_timeout = DFL_READ_TIMEOUT;
opt.max_resend = DFL_MAX_RESEND;
opt.request_page = DFL_REQUEST_PAGE;
opt.request_size = DFL_REQUEST_SIZE;
opt.ca_file = DFL_CA_FILE;
2012-06-04 14:46:42 +02:00
opt.ca_path = DFL_CA_PATH;
2010-07-18 10:28:20 +02:00
opt.crt_file = DFL_CRT_FILE;
opt.key_file = DFL_KEY_FILE;
opt.psk = DFL_PSK;
opt.psk_identity = DFL_PSK_IDENTITY;
opt.ecjpake_pw = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW;
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
opt.ec_max_ops = DFL_EC_MAX_OPS;
opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER;
opt.renegotiation = DFL_RENEGOTIATION;
opt.allow_legacy = DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY;
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
opt.renegotiate = DFL_RENEGOTIATE;
opt.exchanges = DFL_EXCHANGES;
opt.min_version = DFL_MIN_VERSION;
opt.max_version = DFL_MAX_VERSION;
opt.arc4 = DFL_ARC4;
opt.allow_sha1 = DFL_SHA1;
opt.auth_mode = DFL_AUTH_MODE;
2013-07-16 13:39:57 +02:00
opt.mfl_code = DFL_MFL_CODE;
2013-07-19 11:08:52 +02:00
opt.trunc_hmac = DFL_TRUNC_HMAC;
opt.recsplit = DFL_RECSPLIT;
2015-06-11 17:02:29 +02:00
opt.dhmlen = DFL_DHMLEN;
opt.reconnect = DFL_RECONNECT;
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
opt.reco_delay = DFL_RECO_DELAY;
opt.reco_mode = DFL_RECO_MODE;
opt.reconnect_hard = DFL_RECONNECT_HARD;
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
opt.tickets = DFL_TICKETS;
opt.alpn_string = DFL_ALPN_STRING;
opt.curves = DFL_CURVES;
opt.transport = DFL_TRANSPORT;
opt.hs_to_min = DFL_HS_TO_MIN;
opt.hs_to_max = DFL_HS_TO_MAX;
opt.dtls_mtu = DFL_DTLS_MTU;
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
opt.fallback = DFL_FALLBACK;
opt.extended_ms = DFL_EXTENDED_MS;
opt.enforce_extended_master_secret = DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE;
opt.etm = DFL_ETM;
opt.dgram_packing = DFL_DGRAM_PACKING;
opt.serialize = DFL_SERIALIZE;
for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ )
{
p = argv[i];
if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL )
goto usage;
*q++ = '\0';
if( strcmp( p, "server_name" ) == 0 )
opt.server_name = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "server_addr" ) == 0 )
opt.server_addr = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "server_port" ) == 0 )
opt.server_port = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "dtls" ) == 0 )
{
int t = atoi( q );
if( t == 0 )
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM;
else if( t == 1 )
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "debug_level" ) == 0 )
{
opt.debug_level = atoi( q );
if( opt.debug_level < 0 || opt.debug_level > 65535 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "nbio" ) == 0 )
{
opt.nbio = atoi( q );
if( opt.nbio < 0 || opt.nbio > 2 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "event" ) == 0 )
{
opt.event = atoi( q );
if( opt.event < 0 || opt.event > 2 )
goto usage;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_READ_TIMEOUT)
else if( strcmp( p, "read_timeout" ) == 0 )
opt.read_timeout = atoi( q );
#endif
else if( strcmp( p, "max_resend" ) == 0 )
{
opt.max_resend = atoi( q );
if( opt.max_resend < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "request_page" ) == 0 )
opt.request_page = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "request_size" ) == 0 )
{
opt.request_size = atoi( q );
if( opt.request_size < 0 ||
opt.request_size > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "ca_file" ) == 0 )
opt.ca_file = q;
2012-06-04 14:46:42 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "ca_path" ) == 0 )
opt.ca_path = q;
2010-07-18 10:28:20 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file" ) == 0 )
opt.crt_file = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "key_file" ) == 0 )
opt.key_file = q;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
else if( strcmp( p, "cid" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_enabled = atoi( q );
if( opt.cid_enabled != 0 && opt.cid_enabled != 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_renego" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_enabled_renego = atoi( q );
if( opt.cid_enabled_renego != 0 && opt.cid_enabled_renego != 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_val = q;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val_renego" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_val_renego = q;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
else if( strcmp( p, "psk" ) == 0 )
opt.psk = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_identity" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_identity = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "ecjpake_pw" ) == 0 )
opt.ecjpake_pw = q;
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "ec_max_ops" ) == 0 )
opt.ec_max_ops = atoi( q );
else if( strcmp( p, "force_ciphersuite" ) == 0 )
{
opt.force_ciphersuite[0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( q );
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] == 0 )
{
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.force_ciphersuite[1] = 0;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiation" ) == 0 )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
opt.renegotiation = (atoi( q )) ?
MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED :
MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( strcmp( p, "allow_legacy" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
case -1:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE;
break;
case 0:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
break;
case 1:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION;
break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION */
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiate" ) == 0 )
{
opt.renegotiate = atoi( q );
if( opt.renegotiate < 0 || opt.renegotiate > 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "exchanges" ) == 0 )
{
opt.exchanges = atoi( q );
if( opt.exchanges < 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "reconnect" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reconnect = atoi( q );
2013-08-02 15:04:36 +02:00
if( opt.reconnect < 0 || opt.reconnect > 2 )
goto usage;
}
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
else if( strcmp( p, "reco_delay" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reco_delay = atoi( q );
if( opt.reco_delay < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "reco_mode" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reco_mode = atoi( q );
if( opt.reco_mode < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "reconnect_hard" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reconnect_hard = atoi( q );
if( opt.reconnect_hard < 0 || opt.reconnect_hard > 1 )
goto usage;
}
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "tickets" ) == 0 )
{
opt.tickets = atoi( q );
if( opt.tickets < 0 || opt.tickets > 2 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "alpn" ) == 0 )
{
opt.alpn_string = q;
}
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "fallback" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.fallback = MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK; break;
case 1: opt.fallback = MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK; break;
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "extended_ms" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
case 0:
opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED;
break;
case 1:
opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "enforce_extended_master_secret" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0:
opt.enforce_extended_master_secret =
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE_DISABLED;
break;
case 1:
opt.enforce_extended_master_secret =
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE_ENABLED;
break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
else if( strcmp( p, "curves" ) == 0 )
opt.curves = q;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC */
else if( strcmp( p, "etm" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MAJOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MAJOR_VER)
else if( strcmp( p, "min_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "max_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "force_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
}
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
}
2014-03-26 12:16:44 +01:00
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
}
2014-03-26 12:16:44 +01:00
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
2014-03-26 12:16:44 +01:00
}
else if( strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
2014-03-26 12:16:44 +01:00
}
else if( strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
}
else
goto usage;
}
#endif
else if( strcmp( p, "arc4" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "allow_sha1" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.allow_sha1 = 0; break;
case 1: opt.allow_sha1 = 1; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_AUTHMODE)
else if( strcmp( p, "auth_mode" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "none" ) == 0 )
opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
else if( strcmp( q, "optional" ) == 0 )
opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL;
else if( strcmp( q, "required" ) == 0 )
opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
else
goto usage;
}
#endif
2013-07-16 13:39:57 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "max_frag_len" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "512" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512;
2013-07-16 13:39:57 +02:00
else if( strcmp( q, "1024" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024;
2013-07-16 13:39:57 +02:00
else if( strcmp( q, "2048" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048;
2013-07-16 13:39:57 +02:00
else if( strcmp( q, "4096" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096;
2013-07-16 13:39:57 +02:00
else
goto usage;
}
2013-07-19 11:08:52 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "trunc_hmac" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
2013-07-19 11:08:52 +02:00
}
else if( strcmp( p, "hs_timeout" ) == 0 )
{
if( ( p = strchr( q, '-' ) ) == NULL )
goto usage;
*p++ = '\0';
opt.hs_to_min = atoi( q );
opt.hs_to_max = atoi( p );
if( opt.hs_to_min == 0 || opt.hs_to_max < opt.hs_to_min )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "mtu" ) == 0 )
{
opt.dtls_mtu = atoi( q );
if( opt.dtls_mtu < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "dgram_packing" ) == 0 )
{
opt.dgram_packing = atoi( q );
if( opt.dgram_packing != 0 &&
opt.dgram_packing != 1 )
{
goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "recsplit" ) == 0 )
{
opt.recsplit = atoi( q );
if( opt.recsplit < 0 || opt.recsplit > 1 )
goto usage;
}
2015-06-11 17:02:29 +02:00
else if( strcmp( p, "dhmlen" ) == 0 )
{
opt.dhmlen = atoi( q );
if( opt.dhmlen < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "query_config" ) == 0 )
{
return query_config( q );
}
else if( strcmp( p, "serialize") == 0 )
{
opt.serialize = atoi( q );
if( opt.serialize < 0 || opt.serialize > 2)
goto usage;
}
else
goto usage;
}
/* try to use as small buf from the heap as possible */
if( opt.request_size <= 0 )
{
main_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 1;
}
else if( opt.request_size < (int)sizeof(GET_REQUEST) )
{
main_buf_len = sizeof(GET_REQUEST) + 1;
}
else
{
main_buf_len = opt.request_size + 1;
}
buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, main_buf_len );
if( buf == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( "buf allocation failed!\n" );
goto exit;
}
/* Event-driven IO is incompatible with the above custom
* receive and send functions, as the polling builds on
* refers to the underlying net_context. */
if( opt.event == 1 && opt.nbio != 1 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "Warning: event-driven IO mandates nbio=1 - overwrite\n" );
opt.nbio = 1;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( opt.debug_level );
#endif
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] > 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info;
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] );
if( opt.max_version != -1 &&
mbedtls_ssl_ver_gt(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info ),
opt.max_version ) )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.min_version != -1 &&
mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt(
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info ),
opt.min_version ) )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
/* If the server selects a version that's not supported by
* this suite, then there will be no common ciphersuite... */
if( opt.max_version == -1 ||
mbedtls_ssl_ver_gt(
opt.max_version,
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info ) ) )
{
opt.max_version = mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info );
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt(
opt.min_version,
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info ) ) )
{
opt.min_version = mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( ciphersuite_info );
/* DTLS starts with TLS 1.1 */
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
mbedtls_ssl_ver_lt( opt.min_version,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ) )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
}
}
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
/* Enable RC4 if needed and not explicitly disabled */
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_cipher( ciphersuite_info ) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
{
if( opt.arc4 == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED )
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "forced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabled\n" );
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED;
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
cid_len = strlen( opt.cid_val ) / 2;
if( cid_len > sizeof( cid ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID too long\n" );
goto exit;
}
if( unhexify( opt.cid_val, cid ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid hex\n" );
goto exit;
}
/* Keep CID settings for renegotiation unless
* specified otherwise. */
if( opt.cid_enabled_renego == DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO )
opt.cid_enabled_renego = opt.cid_enabled;
if( opt.cid_val_renego == DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO )
opt.cid_val_renego = opt.cid_val;
cid_renego_len = strlen( opt.cid_val_renego ) / 2;
if( cid_renego_len > sizeof( cid_renego ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID too long\n" );
goto exit;
}
if( unhexify( opt.cid_val_renego, cid_renego ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid hex\n" );
goto exit;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
/*
* Unhexify the pre-shared key if any is given
*/
if( strlen( opt.psk ) )
{
psk_len = strlen( opt.psk ) / 2;
if( psk_len > sizeof( psk ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( "pre-shared key too long\n" );
goto exit;
}
if( unhexify( opt.psk, psk ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "pre-shared key not valid hex\n" );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
if( opt.curves != NULL )
{
p = (char *) opt.curves;
i = 0;
if( strcmp( p, "none" ) == 0 )
{
curve_list[0] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "default" ) != 0 )
{
/* Leave room for a final NULL in curve list */
while( i < CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
q = p;
/* Terminate the current string */
while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' )
p++;
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
if( ( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) != NULL )
{
curve_list[i++] = curve_cur->grp_id;
}
else
{
mbedtls_printf( "unknown curve %s\n", q );
mbedtls_printf( "supported curves: " );
for( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
curve_cur->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
curve_cur++ )
{
mbedtls_printf( "%s ", curve_cur->name );
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf("Number of curves: %d\n", i );
if( i == CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
mbedtls_printf( "curves list too long, maximum %d",
CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 );
goto exit;
}
curve_list[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
{
p = (char *) opt.alpn_string;
i = 0;
/* Leave room for a final NULL in alpn_list */
while( i < ALPN_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
alpn_list[i++] = p;
/* Terminate the current string and move on to next one */
while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' )
p++;
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
/*
* 0. Initialize the RNG and the session data
*/
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." );
fflush( stdout );
mbedtls_entropy_init( entropy );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func,
entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers,
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%x\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( hmac_drbg,
mbedtls_md_info_from_type(
available_hashes[0] ),
mbedtls_entropy_func,
entropy, (const unsigned char *) pers,
strlen( pers ) ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed returned -0x%x\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG */
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* 1.1. Load the trusted CA
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) == 0 )
{
ret = 0;
}
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
2012-06-04 14:46:42 +02:00
if( strlen( opt.ca_path ) )
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( cacert, opt.ca_path );
2012-06-04 14:46:42 +02:00
else if( strlen( opt.ca_file ) )
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( cacert, opt.ca_file );
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas[i] != NULL; i++ )
{
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( cacert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas[i],
mbedtls_test_cas_len[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
break;
}
if( ret == 0 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas_der[i] != NULL; i++ )
{
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( cacert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_der[i],
mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
break;
}
}
#else
{
ret = 1;
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */
if( ret < 0 )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret );
/*
* 1.2. Load own certificate and private key
*
* (can be skipped if client authentication is not required)
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the client cert. and key..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) == 0 )
ret = 0;
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
2010-07-18 10:28:20 +02:00
if( strlen( opt.crt_file ) )
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( clicert, opt.crt_file );
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( clicert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt,
mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len );
#else
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( clicert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt,
mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len );
#endif
#else
{
ret = 1;
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." );
}
#endif
if( ret != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
if( strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) == 0 )
ret = 0;
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
2010-07-18 10:28:20 +02:00
if( strlen( opt.key_file ) )
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( pkey, opt.key_file, "" );
2010-07-18 10:28:20 +02:00
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C)
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( pkey,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key,
mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0 );
#else
{
ret = 1;
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." );
}
#endif
if( ret != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/*
* 2. Start the connection
*/
if( opt.server_addr == NULL)
opt.server_addr = opt.server_name;
mbedtls_printf( " . Connecting to %s/%s/%s...",
opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ? "tcp" : "udp",
opt.server_addr, opt.server_port );
fflush( stdout );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd,
opt.server_addr, opt.server_port,
opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ?
MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP : MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.nbio > 0 )
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
ret = mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( &server_fd );
else
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
ret = mbedtls_net_set_block( &server_fd );
if( ret != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
* 3. Setup stuff
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( conf,
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
opt.transport,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 )
2015-05-04 14:56:36 +02:00
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
2015-05-04 14:56:36 +02:00
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/* The default algorithms profile disables SHA-1, but our tests still
rely on it heavily. */
if( opt.allow_sha1 > 0 )
{
crt_profile_for_test.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 );
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( conf, &crt_profile_for_test );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_HASH)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( conf, available_hashes );
#endif
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( conf, my_verify, NULL );
memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_CID_LEN) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_CID)
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 || opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 )
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 14:06:44 +02:00
{
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 &&
opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 &&
cid_len != cid_renego_len )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID length must not change during renegotiation\n" );
goto usage;
}
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 )
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( conf, cid_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE );
else
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( conf, cid_renego_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE );
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 14:06:44 +02:00
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len returned -%#04x\n\n",
-ret );
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 14:06:44 +02:00
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_CID_LEN &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_CID */
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 14:06:44 +02:00
if( opt.auth_mode != DFL_AUTH_MODE )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( conf, opt.auth_mode );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.hs_to_min != DFL_HS_TO_MIN || opt.hs_to_max != DFL_HS_TO_MAX )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( conf, opt.hs_to_min,
opt.hs_to_max );
if( opt.dgram_packing != DFL_DGRAM_PACKING )
mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( ssl, opt.dgram_packing );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( conf, opt.mfl_code ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
2013-07-16 13:39:57 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
if( opt.trunc_hmac != DFL_TRUNC_HMAC )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( conf, opt.trunc_hmac );
#endif
2013-07-19 11:08:52 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ENFORCE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
if( opt.extended_ms != DFL_EXTENDED_MS )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( conf, opt.extended_ms );
if( opt.enforce_extended_master_secret != DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret_enforce( conf,
opt.enforce_extended_master_secret );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
if( opt.etm != DFL_ETM )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( conf, opt.etm );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
if( opt.recsplit != DFL_RECSPLIT )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( conf, opt.recsplit
? MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED
: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED );
#endif
2015-06-11 17:02:29 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
if( opt.dhmlen != DFL_DHMLEN )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( conf, opt.dhmlen );
2015-06-11 17:02:29 +02:00
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( conf, alpn_list ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RNG)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, ctr_drbg );
#else
rng_ctx_global = ctr_drbg;
#endif
#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RNG)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( conf, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, hmac_drbg );
#else
rng_ctx_global = hmac_drbg;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( conf, my_debug, stdout );
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_READ_TIMEOUT)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( conf, opt.read_timeout );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( conf, opt.tickets );
#endif
2013-08-03 13:02:31 +02:00
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( conf, opt.force_ciphersuite );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE */
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C)
2015-03-20 20:44:04 +01:00
if( opt.arc4 != DFL_ARC4 )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( conf, opt.arc4 );
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
if( opt.allow_legacy != DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( conf, opt.allow_legacy );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( conf, opt.renegotiation );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) != 0 &&
strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( conf, cacert, NULL );
}
if( strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) != 0 &&
strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) != 0 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( conf, clicert, pkey ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC)
if( opt.curves != NULL &&
strcmp( opt.curves, "default" ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( conf, curve_list );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_EC */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( conf, psk, psk_len,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MIN_MAJOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MINOR_VER) || \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_MAX_MAJOR_VER)
if( opt.min_version != DFL_MIN_VERSION )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
opt.min_version );
if( opt.max_version != DFL_MAX_VERSION )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
opt.max_version );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
if( opt.fallback != DFL_FALLBACK )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( conf, opt.fallback );
2014-10-20 13:34:59 +02:00
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( ssl, conf ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_HOSTNAME_VERIFICATION)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( ssl, opt.server_name ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( opt.ecjpake_pw != DFL_ECJPAKE_PW )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( ssl,
(const unsigned char *) opt.ecjpake_pw,
strlen( opt.ecjpake_pw ) ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT)
io_ctx.ssl = ssl;
io_ctx.net = &server_fd;
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( ssl, &io_ctx, send_cb, recv_cb,
opt.nbio == 0 ? recv_timeout_cb : NULL );
#else
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio_ctx( ssl, &server_fd );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( ssl, opt.cid_enabled,
cid, cid_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.dtls_mtu != DFL_DTLS_MTU )
mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( ssl, opt.dtls_mtu );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SET_TIMER) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_GET_TIMER)
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( ssl, &timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay,
mbedtls_timing_get_delay );
#else
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb_ctx( ssl, &timer );
#endif
#endif
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( opt.ec_max_ops != DFL_EC_MAX_OPS )
mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( opt.ec_max_ops );
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
* 4. Handshake
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." );
fflush( stdout );
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n",
-ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED )
mbedtls_printf(
" Unable to verify the server's certificate. "
"Either it is invalid,\n"
" or you didn't set ca_file or ca_path "
"to an appropriate value.\n"
" Alternatively, you may want to use "
"auth_mode=optional for testing purposes.\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
goto exit;
}
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
continue;
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
#endif
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
ret = idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
ret = idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n [ Protocol is %s ]\n [ Ciphersuite is %s ]\n",
mbedtls_ssl_get_version( ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( ssl ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl ) ) >= 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is %d ]\n", ret );
2014-10-14 17:47:31 +02:00
else
mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is unknown (compression) ]\n" );
2014-10-14 17:47:31 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
mbedtls_printf( " [ Maximum fragment length is %u ]\n",
(unsigned int) mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
{
const char *alp = mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( ssl );
mbedtls_printf( " [ Application Layer Protocol is %s ]\n",
alp ? alp : "(none)" );
}
#endif
if( opt.reconnect != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf(" . Saving session for reuse..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( opt.reco_mode == 1 )
{
/* free any previously saved data */
if( session_data != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_data, session_data_len );
mbedtls_free( session_data );
session_data = NULL;
}
/* get size of the buffer needed */
mbedtls_ssl_session_save( mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( ssl ),
NULL, 0, &session_data_len );
session_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session_data_len );
if( session_data == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! alloc %u bytes for session data\n",
(unsigned) session_data_len );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
/* actually save session data */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( ssl ),
session_data, session_data_len,
&session_data_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_saved returned -0x%04x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
else
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session( ssl, &saved_session ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_session returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
if( opt.reco_mode == 1 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " [ Saved %u bytes of session data]\n",
(unsigned) session_data_len );
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* 5. Verify the server certificate
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying peer X.509 certificate..." );
if( ( flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
char vrfy_buf[512];
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ),
" ! ", flags );
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf );
#endif
}
else
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK)
mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ...\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", peer_crt_info );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO && !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ret = report_cid_usage( ssl, "initial handshake" );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( ssl, opt.cid_enabled_renego,
cid_renego,
cid_renego_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n",
ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
if( opt.renegotiate )
{
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
/*
* Perform renegotiation (this must be done when the server is waiting
* for input from our side).
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Performing renegotiation..." );
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
fflush( stdout );
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate returned %d\n\n",
ret );
2014-02-20 17:19:59 +01:00
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
continue;
#endif
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ret = report_cid_usage( ssl, "after renegotiation" );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
/*
* 6. Write the GET request
*/
2014-10-14 11:47:21 +02:00
retry_left = opt.max_resend;
send_request:
mbedtls_printf( " > Write to server:" );
fflush( stdout );
len = mbedtls_snprintf( (char *) buf, main_buf_len - 1, GET_REQUEST,
opt.request_page );
tail_len = (int) strlen( GET_REQUEST_END );
/* Add padding to GET request to reach opt.request_size in length */
if( opt.request_size != DFL_REQUEST_SIZE &&
len + tail_len < opt.request_size )
{
memset( buf + len, 'A', opt.request_size - len - tail_len );
len += opt.request_size - len - tail_len;
}
strncpy( (char *) buf + len, GET_REQUEST_END, main_buf_len - len - 1 );
len += tail_len;
/* Truncate if request size is smaller than the "natural" size */
if( opt.request_size != DFL_REQUEST_SIZE &&
len > opt.request_size )
{
len = opt.request_size;
/* Still end with \r\n unless that's really not possible */
if( len >= 2 ) buf[len - 2] = '\r';
if( len >= 1 ) buf[len - 1] = '\n';
}
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM )
{
written = 0;
frags = 0;
do
{
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( ssl, buf + written,
len - written ) ) < 0 )
{
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
frags++;
written += ret;
}
while( written < len );
}
else /* Not stream, so datagram */
{
while( 1 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( ssl, buf, len );
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
continue;
#endif
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
break;
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
if( ret < 0 )
{
2017-10-27 14:43:58 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
frags = 1;
written = ret;
if( written < len )
{
mbedtls_printf( " warning\n ! request didn't fit into single datagram and "
"was truncated to size %u", (unsigned) written );
}
}
buf[written] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes written in %d fragments\n\n%s\n",
written, frags, (char *) buf );
/* Send a non-empty request if request_size == 0 */
if ( len == 0 )
{
opt.request_size = DFL_REQUEST_SIZE;
goto send_request;
}
/*
* 7. Read the HTTP response
*/
mbedtls_printf( " < Read from server:" );
fflush( stdout );
/*
* TLS and DTLS need different reading styles (stream vs datagram)
*/
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM )
{
do
{
len = main_buf_len - 1;
memset( buf, 0, main_buf_len );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( ssl, buf, len );
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
continue;
#endif
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ||
ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
{
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
continue;
}
if( ret <= 0 )
{
switch( ret )
{
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" );
ret = 0;
goto close_notify;
case 0:
case MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was reset by peer\n" );
ret = 0;
goto reconnect;
default:
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
len = ret;
buf[len] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf );
/* End of message should be detected according to the syntax of the
* application protocol (eg HTTP), just use a dummy test here. */
if( ret > 0 && buf[len-1] == '\n' )
{
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
while( 1 );
}
else /* Not stream, so datagram */
{
len = main_buf_len - 1;
memset( buf, 0, main_buf_len );
while( 1 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( ssl, buf, len );
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 12:40:54 +02:00
continue;
#endif
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
break;
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
if( ret <= 0 )
{
switch( ret )
{
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT:
mbedtls_printf( " timeout\n" );
2014-10-14 11:47:21 +02:00
if( retry_left-- > 0 )
goto send_request;
goto exit;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" );
ret = 0;
goto close_notify;
default:
mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
len = ret;
buf[len] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf );
ret = 0;
}
/*
* 7b. Simulate hard reset and reconnect from same port?
*/
if( opt.reconnect_hard != 0 )
{
opt.reconnect_hard = 0;
mbedtls_printf( " . Restarting connection from same port..." );
fflush( stdout );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK)
memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_reset returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
goto send_request;
}
/*
* 7c. Simulate serialize/deserialize and go back to data exchange
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
if( opt.serialize != 0 )
{
2019-06-06 14:10:07 +02:00
size_t buf_len;
mbedtls_printf( " . Serializing live connection..." );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( ssl, NULL, 0, &buf_len );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
2019-06-06 14:10:07 +02:00
if( ( context_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buf_len ) ) == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Couldn't allocate buffer for "
"serialized context" );
goto exit;
}
context_buf_len = buf_len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( ssl, context_buf,
2019-06-13 11:22:50 +02:00
buf_len, &buf_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
if( opt.serialize == 1 )
{
/* nothing to do here, done by context_save() already */
mbedtls_printf( " . Context has been reset... ok" );
}
if( opt.serialize == 2 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " . Freeing and reinitializing context..." );
mbedtls_ssl_free( ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_init( ssl );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( ssl, conf ) ) != 0 )
{
2019-06-13 11:22:50 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SEND) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_RECV_TIMEOUT)
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( ssl, &io_ctx, send_cb, recv_cb,
opt.nbio == 0 ? recv_timeout_cb : NULL );
#else
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio_ctx( ssl, &server_fd );
#endif
2019-06-13 10:45:06 +02:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SET_TIMER) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_GET_TIMER)
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( ssl, &timer,
mbedtls_timing_set_delay,
mbedtls_timing_get_delay );
#else
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb_ctx( ssl, &timer );
#endif
2019-06-13 10:45:06 +02:00
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
}
mbedtls_printf( " . Deserializing connection..." );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_load( ssl, context_buf,
2019-06-13 11:22:50 +02:00
buf_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_load returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_free( context_buf );
context_buf = NULL;
context_buf_len = 0;
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
/*
* 7d. Continue doing data exchanges?
*/
if( --opt.exchanges > 0 )
goto send_request;
/*
* 8. Done, cleanly close the connection
*/
close_notify:
mbedtls_printf( " . Closing the connection..." );
fflush( stdout );
2014-10-09 19:56:44 +02:00
/* No error checking, the connection might be closed already */
do ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( ssl );
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE );
2014-10-09 19:56:44 +02:00
ret = 0;
mbedtls_printf( " done\n" );
/*
* 9. Reconnect?
*/
reconnect:
if( opt.reconnect != 0 )
{
2013-08-02 15:04:36 +02:00
--opt.reconnect;
mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
2014-02-20 22:50:56 +01:00
if( opt.reco_delay > 0 )
mbedtls_net_usleep( 1000000 * opt.reco_delay );
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " . Reconnecting with saved session..." );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK)
memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_VERIFY_CALLBACK */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_reset returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.reco_mode == 1 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( &saved_session,
session_data,
session_data_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_load returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session( ssl, &saved_session ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_session returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
2019-06-20 14:31:52 +02:00
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION */
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd,
opt.server_addr, opt.server_port,
opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ?
MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP : MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.nbio > 0 )
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
ret = mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( &server_fd );
else
2015-06-30 15:40:39 +02:00
ret = mbedtls_net_set_block( &server_fd );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x\n\n",
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
-ret );
goto exit;
}
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-06 17:19:31 +02:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
2017-05-16 08:50:24 +02:00
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
{
2017-10-10 16:59:57 +02:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n",
-ret );
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
goto send_request;
}
/*
* Cleanup and exit
*/
exit:
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
if( ret != 0 )
{
char error_buf[100];
mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 );
mbedtls_printf("Last error was: -0x%X - %s\n\n", -ret, error_buf );
}
#endif
mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( clicert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( cacert );
mbedtls_pk_free( pkey );
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &saved_session );
mbedtls_ssl_free( ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_config_free( conf );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctr_drbg );
#else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( hmac_drbg );
#endif
mbedtls_entropy_free( entropy );
if( session_data != NULL )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_data, session_data_len );
mbedtls_free( session_data );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
if( context_buf != NULL )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len );
mbedtls_free( context_buf );
#endif
mbedtls_free( ssl );
mbedtls_free( conf );
mbedtls_free( entropy );
mbedtls_free( buf );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
mbedtls_free( ctr_drbg );
#else
mbedtls_free( hmac_drbg );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_free( cacert );
mbedtls_free( clicert );
mbedtls_free( pkey );
#endif
#if defined(_WIN32)
mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" );
fflush( stdout ); getchar();
#endif
// Shell can not handle large exit numbers -> 1 for errors
if( ret < 0 )
ret = 1;
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C &&
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_NET_C && MBEDTLS_RSA_C &&
( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C || MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C ) && MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */