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No memmove: certificate_request + server_hello_done

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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2014-09-10 19:25:43 +02:00 committed by Paul Bakker
parent f4830b5092
commit 04c1b4ece1
1 changed files with 19 additions and 28 deletions
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47
library/ssl_cli.c
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@ -1791,7 +1791,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( ssl_context *ssl )
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{ {
ssl_hs_rm_dtls_hdr( ssl );
ssl->record_read = 1; ssl->record_read = 1;
goto exit; goto exit;
} }
@ -2082,18 +2081,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl_context *ssl )
return( 0 ); return( 0 );
} }
/*
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
* 4 . 4 cert type count
* 5 .. m-1 cert types
* m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only)
* m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only)
* n .. n+1 length of all DNs
* n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1
* n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1
* ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc.
*/
if( ssl->record_read == 0 ) if( ssl->record_read == 0 )
{ {
if( ( ret = ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) if( ( ret = ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
@ -2102,8 +2089,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret ); return( ret );
} }
ssl_hs_rm_dtls_hdr( ssl );
if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{ {
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
@ -2130,20 +2115,28 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl_context *ssl )
// TODO: handshake_failure alert for an anonymous server to request // TODO: handshake_failure alert for an anonymous server to request
// client authentication // client authentication
/*
* struct {
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
* supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateRequest;
*/
buf = ssl->in_msg; buf = ssl->in_msg;
// Retrieve cert types // Retrieve cert types
// //
cert_type_len = buf[4]; cert_type_len = buf[ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )];
n = cert_type_len; n = cert_type_len;
if( ssl->in_hslen < 6 + n ) if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
{ {
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
} }
p = buf + 5; p = buf + ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1;
while( cert_type_len > 0 ) while( cert_type_len > 0 )
{ {
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C) #if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
@ -2177,14 +2170,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl_context *ssl )
{ {
/* Ignored, see comments about hash in write_certificate_verify */ /* Ignored, see comments about hash in write_certificate_verify */
// TODO: should check the signature part against our pk_key though // TODO: should check the signature part against our pk_key though
size_t sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[5 + n] << 8 ) size_t sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[6 + n] ) ); | ( buf[ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
p = buf + 7 + n; p = buf + ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n;
m += 2; m += 2;
n += sig_alg_len; n += sig_alg_len;
if( ssl->in_hslen < 6 + n ) if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
{ {
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
@ -2194,11 +2187,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl_context *ssl )
/* Ignore certificate_authorities, we only have one cert anyway */ /* Ignore certificate_authorities, we only have one cert anyway */
// TODO: should not send cert if no CA matches // TODO: should not send cert if no CA matches
dn_len = ( ( buf[5 + m + n] << 8 ) dn_len = ( ( buf[ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + m + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[6 + m + n] ) ); | ( buf[ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + m + n] ) );
n += dn_len; n += dn_len;
if( ssl->in_hslen != 7 + m + n ) if( ssl->in_hslen != ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + m + n )
{ {
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) ); SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST ); return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
@ -2228,8 +2221,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret ); return( ret );
} }
ssl_hs_rm_dtls_hdr( ssl );
if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{ {
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
@ -2238,7 +2229,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl_context *ssl )
} }
ssl->record_read = 0; ssl->record_read = 0;
if( ssl->in_hslen != 4 || if( ssl->in_hslen != ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE ) ssl->in_msg[0] != SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE )
{ {
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) ); SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );