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Merge branch 'mbedtls-1.3' into development

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* mbedtls-1.3:
  Mark unused constant as such
  Update ChangeLog for recent external bugfix
  Serious bug fix in entropy.c
  Fix memleak with repeated [gc]cm_setkey()
  fix minor bug in path_cnt checks

Conflicts:
	include/mbedtls/cipher.h
	library/ccm.c
	library/entropy.c
	library/gcm.c
	library/x509_crt.c
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2015-06-02 09:59:29 +01:00
commit 0574bb0bdb
3 changed files with 7 additions and 3 deletions
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2
ChangeLog
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@ -279,6 +279,8 @@ Features
ciphersuite/certificate.
Bugfix
* Fix bug in entropy.c when THREADING_C is also enabled that caused
entropy_free() to crash (found and fixed by ptahpeteh).
* Stack buffer overflow if ctr_drbg_update() is called with too large
add_len (found by Jean-Philippe Aumasson) (not triggerable remotely).
* Possible buffer overflow of length at most POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE

2
library/entropy.c
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@ -94,10 +94,10 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_free( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C)
mbedtls_havege_free( &ctx->havege_data );
#endif
mbedtls_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_entropy_context ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex );
#endif
mbedtls_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_entropy_context ) );
}
int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx,

6
library/x509_crt.c
View File

@ -1770,7 +1770,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_top(
{
int ret;
uint32_t ca_flags = 0;
int check_path_cnt = path_cnt + 1;
int check_path_cnt;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
@ -1801,8 +1801,10 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_top(
if( x509_crt_check_parent( child, trust_ca, 1, path_cnt == 0 ) != 0 )
continue;
check_path_cnt = path_cnt + 1;
/*
* Reduce path_len to check against if top of the chain is
* Reduce check_path_cnt to check against if top of the chain is
* the same as the trusted CA
*/
if( child->subject_raw.len == trust_ca->subject_raw.len &&