diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9f0bb400a..de3b8ad98 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ API Changes
* Deprecate the Blowfish error MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH
in favour of a new generic error MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
* Add validation checks for input parameters to functions in the CCM module.
+ * Add validation checks for input parameters to functions in the GCM module.
New deprecations
* Deprecate mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update
diff --git a/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
index 93d15ee80..fccabb0d9 100644
--- a/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
+++ b/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ mbedtls_gcm_context;
* cipher, nor set the key. For this purpose, use
* mbedtls_gcm_setkey().
*
- * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize.
+ * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
*/
void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx );
@@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx );
* \brief This function associates a GCM context with a
* cipher algorithm and a key.
*
- * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize.
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
* \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use.
- * \param key The encryption key.
+ * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of at
+ * least \p keybits bits.
* \param keybits The key size in bits. Valid options are:
*
- 128 bits
* - 192 bits
@@ -122,7 +123,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* authentic. You should use this function to perform encryption
* only. For decryption, use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead.
*
- * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption. This
+ * must be initialized.
* \param mode The operation to perform:
* - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT to perform authenticated encryption.
* The ciphertext is written to \p output and the
@@ -136,21 +138,27 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* calling this function in decryption mode.
* \param length The length of the input data, which is equal to the length
* of the output data.
- * \param iv The initialization vector.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * at least \p iv_len Bytes.
* \param iv_len The length of the IV.
- * \param add The buffer holding the additional data.
+ * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at
+ * least that size in Bytes.
* \param add_len The length of the additional data.
- * \param input The buffer holding the input data. Its size is \b length.
- * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. It must have room
- * for \b length bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that
+ * size in Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least that
+ * size in Bytes.
* \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate.
- * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag.
+ * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed
* successfully. Note that in #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT mode,
* this does not indicate that the data is authentic.
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths are not valid or
- * a cipher-specific error code if the encryption
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are
+ * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the encryption
* or decryption failed.
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
@@ -173,23 +181,30 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer
* must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
*
- * \param ctx The GCM context.
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
* \param length The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also
* the length of the decrypted plaintext.
- * \param iv The initialization vector.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
* \param iv_len The length of the IV.
- * \param add The buffer holding the additional data.
+ * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at
+ * least that size in Bytes.
* \param add_len The length of the additional data.
- * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify.
+ * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
* \param tag_len The length of the tag to verify.
- * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. Its size is \b length.
- * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. It must
- * have room for \b length bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that
+ * size.
+ * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. If \p length
+ * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at
+ * least that size.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful and authenticated.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match.
- * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths are not valid or
- * a cipher-specific error code if the decryption failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are
+ * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the decryption
+ * failed.
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
size_t length,
@@ -206,15 +221,16 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* \brief This function starts a GCM encryption or decryption
* operation.
*
- * \param ctx The GCM context.
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
* \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or
* #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT.
- * \param iv The initialization vector.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * at least \p iv_len Bytes.
* \param iv_len The length of the IV.
- * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or NULL
- * if \p add_len is 0.
- * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If 0,
- * \p add is NULL.
+ * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL
+ * if \p add_len is \c 0.
+ * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0,
+ * \p add may be \c NULL.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
*/
@@ -237,11 +253,15 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer
* must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer.
*
- * \param ctx The GCM context.
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
* \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of
* 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish().
- * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
- * \param output The buffer for holding the output data.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that
+ * size in Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is
+ * greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at
+ * least that size in Bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure.
@@ -258,9 +278,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* It wraps up the GCM stream, and generates the
* tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes.
*
- * \param ctx The GCM context.
- * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag.
- * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. Must be at least four.
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least
+ * four.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure.
@@ -273,7 +295,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying
* cipher sub-context.
*
- * \param ctx The GCM context to clear.
+ * \param ctx The GCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the call has
+ * no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized.
*/
void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx );
diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c
index c486ef765..675926a51 100644
--- a/library/gcm.c
+++ b/library/gcm.c
@@ -57,6 +57,12 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT)
+/* Parameter validation macros */
+#define GCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \
+ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT )
+#define GCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \
+ MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
+
/*
* 32-bit integer manipulation macros (big endian)
*/
@@ -85,6 +91,7 @@
*/
void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx )
{
+ GCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) );
}
@@ -164,6 +171,10 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
int ret;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256 );
+
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
@@ -274,6 +285,10 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *p;
size_t use_len, olen = 0;
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
+
/* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
/* IV is not allowed to be zero length */
if( iv_len == 0 ||
@@ -356,6 +371,10 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *out_p = output;
size_t use_len, olen = 0;
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
+
if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < length )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
@@ -409,8 +428,14 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
{
unsigned char work_buf[16];
size_t i;
- uint64_t orig_len = ctx->len * 8;
- uint64_t orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8;
+ uint64_t orig_len;
+ uint64_t orig_add_len;
+
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL );
+
+ orig_len = ctx->len * 8;
+ orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8;
if( tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
@@ -452,6 +477,13 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
{
int ret;
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL );
+
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -480,6 +512,13 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
size_t i;
int diff;
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
+ GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
+
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length,
iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
input, output, tag_len, check_tag ) ) != 0 )
@@ -502,6 +541,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
void mbedtls_gcm_free( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx )
{
+ if( ctx == NULL )
+ return;
mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) );
}
diff --git a/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index 58126bedc..9e15249ea 100644
--- a/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ add_test_suite(gcm gcm.aes128_de)
add_test_suite(gcm gcm.aes192_de)
add_test_suite(gcm gcm.aes256_de)
add_test_suite(gcm gcm.camellia)
+add_test_suite(gcm gcm.misc)
add_test_suite(hkdf)
add_test_suite(hmac_drbg hmac_drbg.misc)
add_test_suite(hmac_drbg hmac_drbg.no_reseed)
diff --git a/tests/suites/helpers.function b/tests/suites/helpers.function
index 3aa5cd6d0..2e227f02c 100644
--- a/tests/suites/helpers.function
+++ b/tests/suites/helpers.function
@@ -632,4 +632,3 @@ int hexcmp( uint8_t * a, uint8_t * b, uint32_t a_len, uint32_t b_len )
}
return ret;
}
-
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
index 4d3bba161..1fcb681b9 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function
@@ -103,6 +103,175 @@ exit:
}
/* END_CASE */
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS:!MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT */
+void gcm_invalid_param( )
+{
+ mbedtls_gcm_context ctx;
+ unsigned char valid_buffer[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06 };
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t valid_cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES;
+ int valid_mode = MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT;
+ int valid_len = sizeof(valid_buffer);
+ int valid_bitlen = 128, invalid_bitlen = 1;
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_init( &ctx );
+
+ /* mbedtls_gcm_init() */
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM( mbedtls_gcm_init( NULL ) );
+
+ /* mbedtls_gcm_setkey */
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_setkey( NULL, valid_cipher, valid_buffer, valid_bitlen ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, valid_cipher, NULL, valid_bitlen ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_setkey( &ctx, valid_cipher, valid_buffer, invalid_bitlen ) );
+
+ /* mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag() */
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( NULL, valid_mode, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer,
+ valid_len, valid_buffer ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer,
+ valid_len, valid_buffer ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer,
+ valid_len, valid_buffer ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_buffer,
+ valid_len, valid_buffer ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, NULL,
+ valid_len, valid_buffer ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, valid_mode, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer,
+ valid_len, NULL ) );
+
+ /* mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() */
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( NULL, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_buffer) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, NULL) );
+
+ /* mbedtls_gcm_starts() */
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_starts( NULL, valid_mode,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len ) );
+
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, valid_mode,
+ NULL, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len ) );
+
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_starts( &ctx, valid_mode,
+ valid_buffer, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_len ) );
+
+ /* mbedtls_gcm_update() */
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_update( NULL, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, valid_buffer ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, valid_len,
+ NULL, valid_buffer ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_update( &ctx, valid_len,
+ valid_buffer, NULL ) );
+
+ /* mbedtls_gcm_finish() */
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_finish( NULL, valid_buffer, valid_len ) );
+ TEST_INVALID_PARAM_RET(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT,
+ mbedtls_gcm_finish( &ctx, NULL, valid_len ) );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_gcm_free( &ctx );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void gcm_valid_param( )
+{
+ TEST_VALID_PARAM( mbedtls_gcm_free( NULL ) );
+exit:
+ return;
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
void gcm_selftest( )
{
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf0152653
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+GCM - Invalid parameters
+gcm_invalid_param:
+
+GCM - Valid parameters
+gcm_valid_param: