Merge pull request #742 from mpg/cf-varpos-copy-2.7-restricted

[backport 2.7] Constant-flow copy of HMAC from variable position
This commit is contained in:
Janos Follath 2020-08-25 14:35:36 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit 117587d544
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
9 changed files with 177 additions and 33 deletions

View File

@ -447,9 +447,10 @@
* *
* Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with
* clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test
* non-functional properties of the code under test. * this non-functional property of the code under test.
* *
* This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test
* suites can then be run normally.
* *
* \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered
* part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time. * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time.
@ -458,6 +459,25 @@
*/ */
//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN //#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
*
* Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with
* valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test
* this non-functional property of the code under test.
*
* This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for
* testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be
* done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when
* using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'.
*
* \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered
* part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time.
*
* Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
/** /**
* \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
* *

View File

@ -788,6 +788,30 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len, size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
unsigned char *output ); unsigned char *output );
/** \brief Copy data from a secret position with constant flow.
*
* This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p
* dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p
* offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len.
*
* \param dst The destination buffer. This must point to a writable
* buffer of at least \p len bytes.
* \param src_base The base of the source buffer. This must point to a
* readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len
* bytes.
* \param offset_secret The offset in the source buffer from which to copy.
* This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater
* than \p offset_max.
* \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset_secret.
* \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset_secret.
* \param len The number of bytes to copy.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
const unsigned char *src_base,
size_t offset_secret,
size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
size_t len );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
#ifdef __cplusplus #ifdef __cplusplus

View File

@ -1303,27 +1303,6 @@ static void ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx,
#define SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC #define SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC
#endif #endif
/* The function below is only used in the Lucky 13 counter-measure in
* ssl_decrypt_buf(). These are the defines that guard the call site. */
#if defined(SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) )
/* This function makes sure every byte in the memory region is accessed
* (in ascending addresses order) */
static void ssl_read_memory( const unsigned char *p, size_t len )
{
unsigned char acc = 0;
volatile unsigned char force;
for( ; len != 0; p++, len-- )
acc ^= *p;
force = acc;
(void) force;
}
#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC && ( TLS1 || TLS1_1 || TLS1_2 ) */
/* /*
* Encryption/decryption functions * Encryption/decryption functions
*/ */
@ -1785,6 +1764,26 @@ cleanup:
mbedtls_md_free( &aux ); mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
return( ret ); return( ret );
} }
/*
* Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer.
* - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)
* - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
const unsigned char *src_base,
size_t offset_secret,
size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
size_t len )
{
size_t offset;
for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
{
mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
offset, offset_secret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
@ -2142,6 +2141,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( auth_done == 0 ) if( auth_done == 0 )
{ {
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen; ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
@ -2156,6 +2156,8 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype, ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype,
mac_expect ); mac_expect );
memcpy( mac_peer, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
ssl->transform_in->maclen );
} }
else else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
@ -2194,12 +2196,10 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( ret ); return( ret );
} }
/* Make sure we access all the memory that could contain the MAC, mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, ssl->in_msg,
* before we check it in the next code block. This makes the ssl->in_msglen,
* synchronisation requirements for just-in-time Prime+Probe min_len, max_len,
* attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */ ssl->transform_in->maclen );
ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + min_len,
max_len - min_len + ssl->transform_in->maclen );
} }
else else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
@ -2211,11 +2211,10 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
ssl->transform_in->maclen );
#endif #endif
if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect, if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 ) ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
{ {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)

View File

@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN)
"MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND)
"MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY)
"MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */

View File

@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES
MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL
MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY
MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT

View File

@ -979,6 +979,28 @@ component_test_memsan_constant_flow () {
make test make test
} }
component_test_valgrind_constant_flow () {
# This tests both (1) everything that valgrind's memcheck usually checks
# (heap buffer overflows, use of uninitialized memory, use-after-free,
# etc.) and (2) branches or memory access depending on secret values,
# which will be reported as uninitialized memory. To distinguish between
# secret and actually uninitialized:
# - unset MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND - does the failure persist?
# - or alternatively, build with debug info and manually run the offending
# test suite with valgrind --track-origins=yes, then check if the origin
# was TEST_CF_SECRET() or something else.
msg "build: cmake release GCC, full config with constant flow testing"
scripts/config.pl full
scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Release .
make
# this only shows a summary of the results (how many of each type)
# details are left in Testing/<date>/DynamicAnalysis.xml
msg "test: main suites (valgrind + constant flow)"
make memcheck
}
component_test_default_no_deprecated () { component_test_default_no_deprecated () {
# Test that removing the deprecated features from the default # Test that removing the deprecated features from the default
# configuration leaves something consistent. # configuration leaves something consistent.

View File

@ -38,6 +38,27 @@ typedef UINT32 uint32_t;
#include <unistd.h> #include <unistd.h>
#endif #endif
/*
* Define the two macros
*
* #define TEST_CF_SECRET(ptr, size)
* #define TEST_CF_PUBLIC(ptr, size)
*
* that can be used in tests to mark a memory area as secret (no branch or
* memory access should depend on it) or public (default, only needs to be
* marked explicitly when it was derived from secret data).
*
* Arguments:
* - ptr: a pointer to the memory area to be marked
* - size: the size in bytes of the memory area
*
* Implementation:
* The basic idea is that of ctgrind <https://github.com/agl/ctgrind>: we can
* re-use tools that were designed for checking use of uninitialized memory.
* This file contains two implementations: one based on MemorySanitizer, the
* other on valgrind's memcheck. If none of them is enabled, dummy macros that
* do nothing are defined for convenience.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN)
#include <sanitizer/msan_interface.h> #include <sanitizer/msan_interface.h>
@ -47,7 +68,16 @@ typedef UINT32 uint32_t;
#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC __msan_unpoison #define TEST_CF_PUBLIC __msan_unpoison
// void __msan_unpoison(const volatile void *a, size_t size); // void __msan_unpoison(const volatile void *a, size_t size);
#else /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ #elif defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND)
#include <valgrind/memcheck.h>
#define TEST_CF_SECRET VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED
// VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(_qzz_addr, _qzz_len)
#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED
// VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(_qzz_addr, _qzz_len)
#else /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN ||
MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */
#define TEST_CF_SECRET(ptr, size) #define TEST_CF_SECRET(ptr, size)
#define TEST_CF_PUBLIC(ptr, size) #define TEST_CF_PUBLIC(ptr, size)

View File

@ -73,3 +73,15 @@ ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
Constant-flow HMAC: SHA384 Constant-flow HMAC: SHA384
depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SHA512_C:!MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384
ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ssl_cf_hmac:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
# these are the numbers we'd get with an empty plaintext and truncated HMAC
Constant-flow memcpy from offset: small
ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:5:10
# we could get this with 255-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-256
Constant-flow memcpy from offset: medium
ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:0:255:32
# we could get this with 355-bytes plaintext and untruncated SHA-384
Constant-flow memcpy from offset: large
ssl_cf_memcpy_offset:100:339:48

View File

@ -145,3 +145,36 @@ exit:
mbedtls_free( out ); mbedtls_free( out );
} }
/* END_CASE */ /* END_CASE */
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
void ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( int offset_min, int offset_max, int len )
{
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
unsigned char *src = NULL;
size_t src_len = offset_max + len;
size_t secret;
dst = mbedtls_calloc( 1, len );
TEST_ASSERT( dst != NULL );
src = mbedtls_calloc( 1, src_len );
TEST_ASSERT( src != NULL );
/* Fill src in a way that we can detect if we copied the right bytes */
rnd_std_rand( NULL, src, src_len );
for( secret = offset_min; secret <= (size_t) offset_max; secret++ )
{
TEST_CF_SECRET( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( dst, src, secret,
offset_min, offset_max, len );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( &secret, sizeof( secret ) );
TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst, len );
TEST_ASSERT( memcmp( dst, src + secret, len ) == 0 );
}
exit:
mbedtls_free( dst );
mbedtls_free( src );
}
/* END_CASE */