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Clean up psa_mac_setup now that we have an output length calculator

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Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
This commit is contained in:
Steven Cooreman 2021-03-02 16:16:22 +01:00
parent 5ad4bf75e3
commit 15472f8c70
1 changed files with 37 additions and 60 deletions
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97
library/psa_crypto.c
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@ -2762,7 +2762,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_init( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
operation->alg = alg;
operation->alg = PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg );
operation->key_set = 0;
operation->iv_set = 0;
operation->iv_required = 0;
@ -2770,7 +2770,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_init( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
operation->is_sign = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
if( alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
{
operation->iv_required = 0;
mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cmac );
@ -2854,23 +2854,26 @@ bad_state:
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
static int psa_cmac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
size_t key_bits,
psa_key_slot_t *slot,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info )
static psa_status_t psa_cmac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t *slot )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
operation->mac_size = cipher_info->block_size;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info =
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( PSA_ALG_CMAC,
slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits,
NULL );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
goto exit;
ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &operation->ctx.cmac,
slot->key.data,
key_bits );
return( ret );
slot->attr.bits );
exit:
return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
@ -2946,11 +2949,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
size_t key_bits;
size_t output_length = 0;
psa_key_usage_t usage =
is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH;
uint8_t truncated = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( alg );
psa_algorithm_t full_length_alg = PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg );
/* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
if( operation->alg != 0 )
@ -2958,7 +2959,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
status = psa_mac_init( operation, full_length_alg );
status = psa_mac_init( operation, alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
if( is_sign )
@ -2968,37 +2969,34 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
key, &slot, usage, alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
key_bits = psa_get_key_slot_bits( slot );
status = psa_get_mac_output_length( alg, slot->attr.type,
&output_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
operation->mac_size = (uint8_t) output_length;
if( operation->mac_size < 4 )
{
/* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be
* brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist,
* so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still
* too small for security. */
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
if( full_length_alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
{
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info =
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( full_length_alg,
slot->attr.type, key_bits, NULL );
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( cipher_info == NULL )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
}
operation->mac_size = cipher_info->block_size;
ret = psa_cmac_setup( operation, key_bits, slot, cipher_info );
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
status = psa_cmac_setup( operation, slot );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( full_length_alg ) )
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) )
{
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg );
if( hash_alg == 0 )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
}
operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
/* Sanity check. This shouldn't fail on a valid configuration. */
if( operation->mac_size == 0 ||
operation->mac_size > sizeof( operation->ctx.hmac.opad ) )
@ -3016,35 +3014,14 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac,
slot->key.data,
slot->key.bytes,
hash_alg );
PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
{
(void) key_bits;
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if( truncated == 0 )
{
/* The "normal" case: untruncated algorithm. Nothing to do. */
}
else if( truncated < 4 )
{
/* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be
* brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist,
* so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still
* too small for security. */
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
else if( truncated > operation->mac_size )
{
/* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length. */
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
else
operation->mac_size = truncated;
exit:
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{