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Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/422' into mbedtls-2.1-restricted

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Resolved simple conflicts caused by the independent addition of
calls to mbedtls_zeroize with sometimes whitespace or comment
differences.
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2017-11-28 16:21:07 +01:00
commit 1b8822e9b3
4 changed files with 22 additions and 10 deletions
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7
ChangeLog
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@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ Security
being leaked to memory after release.
* Fix dhm_check_range() failing to detect trivial subgroups and potentially
leaking 1 bit of the private key. Reported by prashantkspatil.
* Make mbedtls_mpi_read_binary constant-time with respect to
the input data. Previously, trailing zero bytes were detected
and omitted for the sake of saving memory, but potentially
leading to slight timing differences.
Reported by Marco Macchetti, Kudelski Group.
* Wipe stack buffer temporarily holding EC private exponent
after keypair generation.
Bugfix
* Fix some invalid RSA-PSS signatures with keys of size 8N+1 that were

4
include/mbedtls/bignum.h
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@ -648,6 +648,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
*
* \return 0 if successful,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
*
* \note The bytes obtained from the PRNG are interpreted
* as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can
* be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA.
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),

17
library/bignum.c
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@ -672,16 +672,20 @@ cleanup:
int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
int ret;
size_t i, j, n;
size_t i, j;
size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen );
for( n = 0; n < buflen; n++ )
if( buf[n] != 0 )
break;
/* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
if( X->n != limbs )
{
mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen - n ) ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > n; i--, j++ )
for( i = buflen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++ )
X->p[j / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i - 1]) << ((j % ciL) << 3);
cleanup:
@ -1878,7 +1882,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
cleanup:
mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
return( ret );
}

4
library/ecp.c
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@ -1830,7 +1830,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp
{
/* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */
int count = 0;
unsigned char rnd[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
/*
* Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 (deterministic ECDSA):
@ -1841,8 +1840,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp
*/
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, rnd, n_size ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( d, rnd, n_size ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
/*