Fix heap-buffer overread in ALPN ext parsing

This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2018-01-09 10:43:43 +01:00
parent 3366d373f8
commit 239987fd31
2 changed files with 28 additions and 17 deletions

View File

@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ Security
corrupt 6 bytes on the peer's heap, potentially leading to crash or
remote code execution. This can be triggered remotely from either
side in both TLS and DTLS.
* Fix a potential heap buffer overread in ALPN extension parsing
(server-side). Could result in application crash, but only if an ALPN
name larger than 16 bytes had been configured on the server.
Features
* Allow comments in test data files.

View File

@ -603,25 +603,22 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
}
/*
* Use our order of preference
* Validate peer's list (lengths)
*/
start = buf + 2;
end = buf + len;
for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ )
{
ours_len = strlen( *ours );
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
{
/* If the list is well formed, we should get equality first */
if( theirs > end )
cur_len = *theirs++;
/* Current identifier must fit in list */
if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
cur_len = *theirs++;
/* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
if( cur_len == 0 )
{
@ -629,6 +626,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
}
/*
* Use our order of preference
*/
for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ )
{
ours_len = strlen( *ours );
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
{
cur_len = *theirs++;
if( cur_len == ours_len &&
memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )