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Merge pull request #3145 from mpg/fix-reconnect-2.7
[backport 2.7] Fix issues in handling of client reconnecting from the same port
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commit
29b7b9585b
@ -2,6 +2,15 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
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= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
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Security
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* Fix bug in DTLS handling of new associations with the same parameters
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(RFC 6347 section 4.2.8): after sending its HelloVerifyRequest, the
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server would end up with corrupted state and only send invalid records to
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the client. An attacker able to send forged UDP packets to the server
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could use that to obtain a Denial of Service. This could only happen when
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE was enabled in config.h (which it is
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by default).
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Bugfix
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* Fix compilation failure when both MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and
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MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL are enabled.
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@ -3598,29 +3598,38 @@ static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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int ret;
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size_t len;
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/* Use out_msg as temporary buffer for writing out HelloVerifyRequest,
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* because the output buffer's already around. Don't use out_buf though,
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* as we don't want to overwrite out_ctr. */
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ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
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ssl->conf->f_cookie_write,
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ssl->conf->f_cookie_check,
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ssl->conf->p_cookie,
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ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len,
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ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left,
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ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN, &len );
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ssl->out_msg, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN, &len );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret );
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if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
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{
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int send_ret;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network",
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ssl->out_msg, len );
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/* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here.
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* If the error is permanent we'll catch it later,
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* if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */
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(void) ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len );
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send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_msg, len );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret );
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(void) send_ret;
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
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}
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if( ret == 0 )
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{
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/* Got a valid cookie, partially reset context */
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) );
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if( ( ret = ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret );
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@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ int main( void )
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" drop packets larger than N bytes\n" \
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" bad_ad=0/1 default: 0 (don't add bad ApplicationData)\n" \
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" protect_hvr=0/1 default: 0 (don't protect HelloVerifyRequest)\n" \
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" protect_len=%%d default: (don't protect packets of this size)\n" \
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" protect_len=%%d default: (don't protect packets of this size)\n" \
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" inject_clihlo=0/1 default: 0 (don't inject fake ClientHello)\n" \
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"\n" \
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" seed=%%d default: (use current time)\n" \
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"\n"
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@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ static struct options
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int bad_ad; /* inject corrupted ApplicationData record */
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int protect_hvr; /* never drop or delay HelloVerifyRequest */
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int protect_len; /* never drop/delay packet of the given size*/
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int inject_clihlo; /* inject fake ClientHello after handshake */
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unsigned int seed; /* seed for "random" events */
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} opt;
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@ -219,6 +220,12 @@ static void get_options( int argc, char *argv[] )
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if( opt.protect_len < 0 )
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exit_usage( p, q );
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}
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else if( strcmp( p, "inject_clihlo" ) == 0 )
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{
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opt.inject_clihlo = atoi( q );
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if( opt.inject_clihlo < 0 || opt.inject_clihlo > 1 )
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exit_usage( p, q );
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}
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else if( strcmp( p, "seed" ) == 0 )
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{
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opt.seed = atoi( q );
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@ -311,11 +318,41 @@ void print_packet( const packet *p, const char *why )
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fflush( stdout );
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}
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/*
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* In order to test the server's behaviour when receiving a ClientHello after
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* the connection is established (this could be a hard reset from the client,
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* but the server must not drop the existing connection before establishing
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* client reachability, see RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8), we memorize the first
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* ClientHello we see (which can't have a cookie), then replay it after the
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* first ApplicationData record - then we're done.
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*
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* This is controlled by the inject_clihlo option.
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*
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* We want an explicit state and a place to store the packet.
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*/
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typedef enum {
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ICH_INIT, /* haven't seen the first ClientHello yet */
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ICH_CACHED, /* cached the initial ClientHello */
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ICH_INJECTED, /* ClientHello already injected, done */
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} inject_clihlo_state_t;
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static inject_clihlo_state_t inject_clihlo_state;
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static packet initial_clihlo;
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int send_packet( const packet *p, const char *why )
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{
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int ret;
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mbedtls_net_context *dst = p->dst;
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/* save initial ClientHello? */
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if( opt.inject_clihlo != 0 &&
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inject_clihlo_state == ICH_INIT &&
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strcmp( p->type, "ClientHello" ) == 0 )
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{
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memcpy( &initial_clihlo, p, sizeof( packet ) );
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inject_clihlo_state = ICH_CACHED;
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}
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/* insert corrupted ApplicationData record? */
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if( opt.bad_ad &&
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strcmp( p->type, "ApplicationData" ) == 0 )
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@ -353,6 +390,23 @@ int send_packet( const packet *p, const char *why )
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}
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}
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/* Inject ClientHello after first ApplicationData */
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if( opt.inject_clihlo != 0 &&
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inject_clihlo_state == ICH_CACHED &&
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strcmp( p->type, "ApplicationData" ) == 0 )
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{
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print_packet( &initial_clihlo, "injected" );
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_send( dst, initial_clihlo.buf,
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initial_clihlo.len ) ) <= 0 )
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{
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mbedtls_printf( " ! mbedtls_net_send returned %d\n", ret );
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return( ret );
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}
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inject_clihlo_state = ICH_INJECTED;
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}
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return( 0 );
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}
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@ -4972,8 +4972,8 @@ run_test "DTLS cookie: enabled, nbio" \
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not_with_valgrind # spurious resend
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run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reference" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=1000" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=500-1000" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=20000 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \
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0 \
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-C "resend" \
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-S "The operation timed out" \
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@ -4981,8 +4981,8 @@ run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reference" \
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not_with_valgrind # spurious resend
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run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: reconnect" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=1000" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=500-1000 reconnect_hard=1" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 read_timeout=20000 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000 reconnect_hard=1" \
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0 \
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-C "resend" \
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-S "The operation timed out" \
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@ -5011,6 +5011,14 @@ run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: no cookies" \
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-s "The operation timed out" \
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-S "Client initiated reconnection from same port"
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run_test "DTLS client reconnect from same port: attacker-injected" \
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-p "$P_PXY inject_clihlo=1" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 exchanges=2 debug_level=1" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 exchanges=2" \
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0 \
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-s "possible client reconnect from the same port" \
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-S "Client initiated reconnection from same port"
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# Tests for various cases of client authentication with DTLS
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# (focused on handshake flows and message parsing)
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@ -5135,8 +5143,8 @@ run_test "DTLS reassembly: fragmentation, nbio (openssl server)" \
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not_with_valgrind # spurious resend due to timeout
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run_test "DTLS proxy: reference" \
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-p "$P_PXY" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \
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0 \
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-C "replayed record" \
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-S "replayed record" \
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@ -5151,8 +5159,8 @@ run_test "DTLS proxy: reference" \
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not_with_valgrind # spurious resend due to timeout
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run_test "DTLS proxy: duplicate every packet" \
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-p "$P_PXY duplicate=1" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2" \
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"$P_SRV dtls=1 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \
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"$P_CLI dtls=1 debug_level=2 hs_timeout=10000-20000" \
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0 \
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-c "replayed record" \
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-s "replayed record" \
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