mirror of
https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
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Provide standalone version of ssl_decrypt_buf
Analogous to the previous commit, but concerning the record decryption
routine `ssl_decrypt_buf`.
An important change regards the checking of CBC padding:
Prior to this commit, the CBC padding check always read 256 bytes at
the end of the internal record buffer, almost always going past the
boundaries of the record under consideration. In order to stay within
the bounds of the given record, this commit changes this behavior by
always reading the last min(256, plaintext_len) bytes of the record
plaintext buffer and taking into consideration the last `padlen` of
these for the padding check. With this change, the memory access
pattern and runtime of the padding check is entirely determined by
the size of the encrypted record, in particular not giving away
any information on the validity of the padding.
The following depicts the different behaviors:
1) Previous CBC padding check
1.a) Claimed padding length <= plaintext length
+----------------------------------------+----+
| Record plaintext buffer | | PL |
+----------------------------------------+----+
\__ PL __/
+------------------------------------...
| read for padding check ...
+------------------------------------...
|
contents discarded
from here
1.b) Claimed padding length > plaintext length
+----------------------------------------+----+
| Record plaintext buffer | PL |
+----------------------------------------+----+
+-------------------------...
| read for padding check ...
+-------------------------...
|
contents discarded
from here
2) New CBC padding check
+----------------------------------------+----+
| Record plaintext buffer | | PL |
+----------------------------------------+----+
\__ PL __/
+---------------------------------------+
| read for padding check |
+---------------------------------------+
|
contents discarded
until here
This commit is contained in:
Hanno Becker
parent
9eddaebda5
commit
2e24c3b672
@ -74,6 +74,12 @@ typedef enum {
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#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 or less */
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
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#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128
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#else
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#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64
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#endif
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/**
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* Opaque struct defined in md_internal.h.
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*/
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@ -1897,6 +1897,7 @@ static int ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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}
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else
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
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@ -2140,50 +2141,56 @@ static int ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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return( 0 );
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}
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static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
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mbedtls_record *rec )
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{
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size_t olen;
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mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
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int auth_done = 0;
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int ret, auth_done = 0;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
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size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1;
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#endif
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unsigned char* data;
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unsigned char add_data[13];
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_C)
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((void) ssl);
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#endif
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) );
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if( ssl->session_in == NULL || ssl->transform_in == NULL )
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if( transform == NULL )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no transform provided to decrypt_buf" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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}
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if( rec == NULL ||
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rec->buf == NULL ||
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rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset ||
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rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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}
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mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec );
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if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->minlen )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "in_msglen (%d) < minlen (%d)",
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ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->minlen ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
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}
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data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset;
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mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
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if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
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{
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int ret;
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size_t olen = 0;
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padlen = 0;
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec,
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ssl->transform_in->iv_dec,
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ssl->transform_in->ivlen,
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ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
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ssl->in_msg, &olen ) ) != 0 )
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
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transform->iv_dec,
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transform->ivlen,
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data, rec->data_len,
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data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
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return( ret );
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}
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if( ssl->in_msglen != olen )
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if( rec->data_len != olen )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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@ -2198,42 +2205,19 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
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mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
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{
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int ret;
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size_t dec_msglen, olen;
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unsigned char *dec_msg;
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unsigned char *dec_msg_result;
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unsigned char add_data[13];
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unsigned char iv[12];
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mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_in;
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size_t explicit_iv_len = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen;
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/*
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* Compute and update sizes
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*/
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if( ssl->in_msglen < explicit_iv_len + transform->taglen )
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if( rec->data_len < explicit_iv_len + transform->taglen )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < explicit_iv_len (%d) "
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"+ taglen (%d)", ssl->in_msglen,
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explicit_iv_len, ssl->transform_in->taglen ) );
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"+ taglen (%d)", rec->data_len,
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explicit_iv_len, transform->taglen ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
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}
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dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen - explicit_iv_len - transform->taglen;
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dec_msg = ssl->in_msg;
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dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg;
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ssl->in_msglen = dec_msglen;
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/*
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* Prepare additional authenticated data
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*/
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memcpy( add_data, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
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add_data[8] = ssl->in_msgtype;
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mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
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ssl->conf->transport, add_data + 9 );
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add_data[11] = ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF;
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add_data[12] = ssl->in_msglen & 0xFF;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data for AEAD", add_data, 13 );
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/*
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* Prepare IV
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@ -2242,7 +2226,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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{
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/* GCM and CCM: fixed || explicit (transmitted) */
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memcpy( iv, transform->iv_dec, transform->fixed_ivlen );
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memcpy( iv + transform->fixed_ivlen, ssl->in_iv, 8 );
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memcpy( iv + transform->fixed_ivlen, data, 8 );
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}
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else if( transform->ivlen == 12 && transform->fixed_ivlen == 12 )
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@ -2253,7 +2237,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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memcpy( iv, transform->iv_dec, transform->fixed_ivlen );
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for( i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
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iv[i+4] ^= ssl->in_ctr[i];
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iv[i+4] ^= rec->ctr[i];
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}
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else
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{
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@ -2262,20 +2246,32 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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}
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data += explicit_iv_len;
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rec->data_offset += explicit_iv_len;
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rec->data_len -= explicit_iv_len + transform->taglen;
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ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, rec );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD",
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add_data, 13 );
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memcpy( transform->iv_dec + transform->fixed_ivlen,
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data - explicit_iv_len, explicit_iv_len );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", dec_msg + dec_msglen,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len,
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transform->taglen );
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/*
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* Decrypt and authenticate
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*/
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec,
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iv, transform->ivlen,
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add_data, 13,
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dec_msg, dec_msglen,
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dec_msg_result, &olen,
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dec_msg + dec_msglen,
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ssl->transform_in->taglen ) ) != 0 )
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
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iv, transform->ivlen,
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add_data, 13,
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data, rec->data_len,
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data, &olen,
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data + rec->data_len,
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transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret );
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@ -2286,7 +2282,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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}
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auth_done++;
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if( olen != dec_msglen )
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if( olen != rec->data_len )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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@ -2298,75 +2294,81 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
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if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
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{
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/*
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* Decrypt and check the padding
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*/
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int ret;
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unsigned char *dec_msg;
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unsigned char *dec_msg_result;
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size_t dec_msglen;
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size_t minlen = 0;
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size_t olen = 0;
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/*
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* Check immediate ciphertext sanity
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*/
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
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if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
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minlen += ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
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if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
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{
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/* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */
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minlen += transform->ivlen;
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}
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#endif
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if( ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->ivlen ||
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ssl->in_msglen < minlen + ssl->transform_in->maclen + 1 )
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/* Size considerations:
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*
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* - The CBC cipher text must not be empty and hence
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* at least of size transform->ivlen.
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*
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* Together with the potential IV-prefix, this explains
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* the first of the two checks below.
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*
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* - The record must contain a MAC, either in plain or
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* encrypted, depending on whether Encrypt-then-MAC
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* is used or not.
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* - If it is, the message contains the IV-prefix,
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* the CBC ciphertext, and the MAC.
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* - If it is not, the padded plaintext, and hence
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* the CBC ciphertext, has at least length maclen + 1
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* because there is at least the padding length byte.
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*
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* As the CBC ciphertext is not empty, both cases give the
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* lower bound minlen + maclen + 1 on the record size, which
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* we test for in the second check below.
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*/
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if( rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen ||
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rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < max( ivlen(%d), maclen (%d) "
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"+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", ssl->in_msglen,
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ssl->transform_in->ivlen,
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ssl->transform_in->maclen ) );
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"+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", rec->data_len,
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transform->ivlen,
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transform->maclen ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
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}
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dec_msglen = ssl->in_msglen;
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dec_msg = ssl->in_msg;
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dec_msg_result = ssl->in_msg;
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/*
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* Authenticate before decrypt if enabled
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*/
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
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if( ssl->session_in->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
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if( transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
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{
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unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
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unsigned char pseudo_hdr[13];
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
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dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
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ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
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/* Safe due to the check data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1 above. */
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rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
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memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 0, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
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memcpy( pseudo_hdr + 8, ssl->in_hdr, 3 );
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pseudo_hdr[11] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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pseudo_hdr[12] = (unsigned char)( ( ssl->in_msglen ) & 0xFF );
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ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, rec );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", pseudo_hdr, 13 );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, 13 );
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mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, 13 );
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mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
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data, rec->data_len );
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mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
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mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
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mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, pseudo_hdr, 13 );
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mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
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ssl->in_iv, ssl->in_msglen );
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mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
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mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen,
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ssl->transform_in->maclen );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len,
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transform->maclen );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect,
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ssl->transform_in->maclen );
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transform->maclen );
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if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_iv + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
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ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
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if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
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transform->maclen ) != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
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}
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auth_done++;
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@ -2376,10 +2378,10 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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/*
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* Check length sanity
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*/
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if( ssl->in_msglen % ssl->transform_in->ivlen != 0 )
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if( rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) %% ivlen (%d) != 0",
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ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) );
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rec->data_len, transform->ivlen ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
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}
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@ -2387,67 +2389,84 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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/*
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* Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up
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*/
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if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
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if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
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{
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unsigned char i;
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dec_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
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ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->ivlen;
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/* This is safe because data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1 initially,
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* and at this point we have at most subtracted maclen (note that
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* minlen == transform->ivlen here). */
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memcpy( transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen );
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for( i = 0; i < ssl->transform_in->ivlen; i++ )
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ssl->transform_in->iv_dec[i] = ssl->in_iv[i];
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data += transform->ivlen;
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rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen;
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rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen;
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec,
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ssl->transform_in->iv_dec,
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ssl->transform_in->ivlen,
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dec_msg, dec_msglen,
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dec_msg_result, &olen ) ) != 0 )
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
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transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen,
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data, rec->data_len, data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
|
||||
return( ret );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( dec_msglen != olen )
|
||||
if( rec->data_len != olen )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
|
||||
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
|
||||
if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1
|
||||
*/
|
||||
memcpy( ssl->transform_in->iv_dec,
|
||||
ssl->transform_in->cipher_ctx_dec.iv,
|
||||
ssl->transform_in->ivlen );
|
||||
memcpy( transform->iv_dec, transform->cipher_ctx_dec.iv,
|
||||
transform->ivlen );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
padlen = 1 + ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen - 1];
|
||||
/* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having
|
||||
* subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point,
|
||||
* data_len > 0. */
|
||||
padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1];
|
||||
|
||||
if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->transform_in->maclen + padlen &&
|
||||
auth_done == 0 )
|
||||
if( auth_done == 1 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
correct *= ( rec->data_len >= padlen + 1 );
|
||||
padlen *= ( rec->data_len >= padlen + 1 );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < maclen (%d) + padlen (%d)",
|
||||
ssl->in_msglen, ssl->transform_in->maclen, padlen ) );
|
||||
if( rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%d) < maclen (%d) + padlen (%d)",
|
||||
rec->data_len,
|
||||
transform->maclen,
|
||||
padlen + 1 ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
padlen = 0;
|
||||
correct = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
correct *= ( rec->data_len >= transform->maclen + padlen + 1 );
|
||||
padlen *= ( rec->data_len >= transform->maclen + padlen + 1 );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
padlen++;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Regardless of the validity of the padding,
|
||||
* we have data_len >= padlen here. */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
|
||||
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
||||
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
if( padlen > ssl->transform_in->ivlen )
|
||||
if( padlen > transform->ivlen )
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %d, "
|
||||
"should be no more than %d",
|
||||
padlen, ssl->transform_in->ivlen ) );
|
||||
"should be no more than %d",
|
||||
padlen, transform->ivlen ) );
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
correct = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -2456,40 +2475,31 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
|
||||
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
||||
if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
||||
if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* TLSv1+: always check the padding up to the first failure
|
||||
* and fake check up to 256 bytes of padding
|
||||
*/
|
||||
size_t pad_count = 0, real_count = 1;
|
||||
size_t padding_idx = ssl->in_msglen - padlen;
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
/* The padding check involves a series of up to 256
|
||||
* consecutive memory reads at the end of the record
|
||||
* plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and
|
||||
* validity of the padding, always perform exactly
|
||||
* `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account
|
||||
* only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */
|
||||
size_t pad_count = 0;
|
||||
size_t real_count = 0;
|
||||
volatile unsigned char* const check = data;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Padding is guaranteed to be incorrect if:
|
||||
* 1. padlen > ssl->in_msglen
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 2. padding_idx > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN +
|
||||
* ssl->transform_in->maclen
|
||||
*
|
||||
* In both cases we reset padding_idx to a safe value (0) to
|
||||
* prevent out-of-buffer reads.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
correct &= ( padlen <= ssl->in_msglen );
|
||||
correct &= ( padding_idx <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN +
|
||||
ssl->transform_in->maclen );
|
||||
/* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above
|
||||
* that the subtraction is safe. */
|
||||
size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen;
|
||||
size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256;
|
||||
size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks;
|
||||
size_t idx;
|
||||
|
||||
padding_idx *= correct;
|
||||
|
||||
for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ )
|
||||
for( idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++ )
|
||||
{
|
||||
real_count &= ( i < padlen );
|
||||
pad_count += real_count *
|
||||
( ssl->in_msg[padding_idx + i] == padlen - 1 );
|
||||
real_count |= ( idx >= padding_idx );
|
||||
pad_count += real_count * ( check[idx] == padlen - 1 );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
correct &= ( pad_count == padlen ); /* Only 1 on correct padding */
|
||||
correct &= ( pad_count == padlen );
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
|
||||
if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 )
|
||||
@ -2505,7 +2515,11 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->in_msglen -= padlen;
|
||||
/* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0
|
||||
* and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid,
|
||||
* padlen hasn't been changed and the previous assertion
|
||||
* data_len >= padlen still holds. */
|
||||
rec->data_len -= padlen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
|
||||
@ -2517,7 +2531,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption",
|
||||
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
|
||||
data, rec->data_len );
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -2529,25 +2543,37 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->transform_in->maclen;
|
||||
/* If the initial value of padlen was such that
|
||||
* data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen
|
||||
* got reset to 1, and the initial check
|
||||
* data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1
|
||||
* guarantees that at this point we still
|
||||
* have at least data_len >= maclen.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If the initial value of padlen was such that
|
||||
* data_len >= maclen + padlen + 1, then we have
|
||||
* subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct)
|
||||
* or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then,
|
||||
* hence data_len >= maclen in any case.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen >> 8 );
|
||||
ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( ssl->in_msglen );
|
||||
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, rec );
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
|
||||
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
||||
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
ssl_mac( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec,
|
||||
ssl->transform_in->mac_dec,
|
||||
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen,
|
||||
ssl->in_ctr, ssl->in_msgtype,
|
||||
mac_expect );
|
||||
ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
|
||||
transform->mac_dec,
|
||||
data, rec->data_len,
|
||||
rec->ctr, rec->type,
|
||||
mac_expect );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
|
||||
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
||||
if( ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
||||
if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Process MAC and always update for padlen afterwards to make
|
||||
@ -2577,6 +2603,7 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
* linking an extra division function in some builds).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
size_t j, extra_run = 0;
|
||||
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of
|
||||
@ -2588,10 +2615,12 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
* Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer
|
||||
* length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const size_t max_len = ssl->in_msglen + padlen;
|
||||
const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen;
|
||||
const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
|
||||
|
||||
switch( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac )
|
||||
memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) );
|
||||
|
||||
switch( mbedtls_md_get_type( transform->md_ctx_dec.md_info ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) || \
|
||||
defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
|
||||
@ -2599,15 +2628,15 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
|
||||
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
|
||||
/* 8 bytes of message size, 64-byte compression blocks */
|
||||
extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 8 ) / 64 -
|
||||
( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 8 ) / 64;
|
||||
extra_run = ( 13 + rec->data_len + padlen + 8 ) / 64 -
|
||||
( 13 + rec->data_len + 8 ) / 64;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
|
||||
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
|
||||
/* 16 bytes of message size, 128-byte compression blocks */
|
||||
extra_run = ( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + padlen + 16 ) / 128 -
|
||||
( 13 + ssl->in_msglen + 16 ) / 128;
|
||||
extra_run = ( 13 + rec->data_len + padlen + 16 ) / 128 -
|
||||
( 13 + rec->data_len + 16 ) / 128;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
default:
|
||||
@ -2617,30 +2646,28 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
|
||||
extra_run &= correct * 0xFF;
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_hdr, 3 );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_len, 2 );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg,
|
||||
ssl->in_msglen );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, 13 );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, data,
|
||||
rec->data_len );
|
||||
/* Make sure we access everything even when padlen > 0. This
|
||||
* makes the synchronisation requirements for just-in-time
|
||||
* Prime+Probe attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */
|
||||
ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, padlen );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
|
||||
ssl_read_memory( data + rec->data_len, padlen );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
|
||||
|
||||
/* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks
|
||||
* that observe whether md_process() was called of not */
|
||||
for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ )
|
||||
mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_process( &transform->md_ctx_dec, tmp );
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
|
||||
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
|
||||
|
||||
/* Make sure we access all the memory that could contain the MAC,
|
||||
* before we check it in the next code block. This makes the
|
||||
* synchronisation requirements for just-in-time Prime+Probe
|
||||
* attacks much tighter and hopefully impractical. */
|
||||
ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + min_len,
|
||||
max_len - min_len + ssl->transform_in->maclen );
|
||||
ssl_read_memory( data + min_len,
|
||||
max_len - min_len + transform->maclen );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
|
||||
@ -2651,13 +2678,12 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, ssl->transform_in->maclen );
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen,
|
||||
ssl->transform_in->maclen );
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen );
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen );
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, mac_expect,
|
||||
ssl->transform_in->maclen ) != 0 )
|
||||
if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
|
||||
transform->maclen ) != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
|
||||
@ -2681,55 +2707,6 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
||||
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
|
||||
&& ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) );
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->nb_zero++;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack
|
||||
* (excessive CPU consumption).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty "
|
||||
"messages, possible DoS attack" ) );
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
ssl->nb_zero = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||||
{
|
||||
; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char i;
|
||||
for( i = 8; i > ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
|
||||
if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
|
||||
if( i == ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) );
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) );
|
||||
|
||||
return( 0 );
|
||||
@ -4627,7 +4604,19 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
|
||||
if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL )
|
||||
{
|
||||
if( ( ret = ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
mbedtls_record rec;
|
||||
|
||||
rec.buf = ssl->in_iv;
|
||||
rec.buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN
|
||||
- ( ssl->in_iv - ssl->in_buf );
|
||||
rec.data_len = ssl->in_msglen;
|
||||
rec.data_offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, 8 );
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
|
||||
ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver );
|
||||
rec.type = ssl->in_msgtype;
|
||||
if( ( ret = ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec ) ) != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret );
|
||||
return( ret );
|
||||
@ -4636,11 +4625,65 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt",
|
||||
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len;
|
||||
ssl->in_len[0] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len >> 8 );
|
||||
ssl->in_len[1] = (unsigned char)( rec.data_len );
|
||||
|
||||
if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
||||
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
|
||||
&& ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) );
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
||||
|
||||
ssl->nb_zero++;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack
|
||||
* (excessive CPU consumption).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty "
|
||||
"messages, possible DoS attack" ) );
|
||||
/* Q: Is that the right error code? */
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
ssl->nb_zero = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
||||
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
||||
{
|
||||
; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned i;
|
||||
for( i = 8; i > ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
|
||||
if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
|
||||
if( i == ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) );
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user