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Fix invalid data being accepted in RSA-decryption-based ciphersuites
In the refactoring of ssl_parse_encrypted_pms, I advertently broke the case when decryption signalled an error, with the variable ret getting overwritten before calculating diff. Move the calculation of diff immediately after getting the return code to make the connection more obvious. Also move the calculation of mask immediately after the calculation of diff, which doesn't change the behavior, because I find the code clearer that way.
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@ -3508,6 +3508,30 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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return( ret );
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return( ret );
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
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mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver,
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ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver,
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ssl->conf->transport, ver );
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/* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid
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* padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type
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* attacks. */
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diff = (unsigned int) ret;
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diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48;
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diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0];
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diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1];
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/* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */
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/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
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* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
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#if defined(_MSC_VER)
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#pragma warning( push )
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#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
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#endif
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mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) );
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#if defined(_MSC_VER)
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#pragma warning( pop )
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#endif
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/*
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/*
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* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
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* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
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* must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
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* must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
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@ -3524,18 +3548,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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return( ret );
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return( ret );
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}
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}
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mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver,
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ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver,
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ssl->conf->transport, ver );
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/* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid
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* padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type
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* attacks. */
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diff = (unsigned int) ret;
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diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48;
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diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0];
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diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1];
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
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if( diff != 0 )
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if( diff != 0 )
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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@ -3549,18 +3561,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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}
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}
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
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/* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */
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/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
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* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
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#if defined(_MSC_VER)
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#pragma warning( push )
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#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
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#endif
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mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) );
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#if defined(_MSC_VER)
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#pragma warning( pop )
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#endif
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/* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without
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/* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without
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* data-dependent branches. */
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* data-dependent branches. */
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for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ )
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for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ )
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