diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 1b6a3542d..da0755ad5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ Bugfix
      that triggered the alert.
    * In SSLv3, if refusing a renegotiation attempt, don't process any further
      data.
+   * Accept empty trusted CA chain in authentication mode
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL.
+     Fixes #864. Found by jethrogb.
+   * Fix implementation of mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate
+     to not annihilate fatal errors in authentication mode
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL and to reflect bad EC curves
+     within verification result.
 
 Changes
    * Send fatal alerts in many more cases instead of dropping the connection.
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 1e5f8e493..ff951a536 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -4472,14 +4472,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
             ca_crl   = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
         }
 
-        if( ca_chain == NULL )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
-            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
-                                            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT );
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED );
-        }
-
         /*
          * Main check: verify certificate
          */
@@ -4508,6 +4500,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
             if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) &&
                 mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 )
             {
+                ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+
                 MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) );
                 if( ret == 0 )
                     ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
@@ -4516,8 +4510,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
 
         if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
-                                  ciphersuite_info,
-                                  ! ssl->conf->endpoint,
+                                 ciphersuite_info,
+                                 ! ssl->conf->endpoint,
                                  &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) );
@@ -4525,8 +4519,24 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
                 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
         }
 
-        if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
+        /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
+         * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
+         * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
+         * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
+         * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
+         * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
+        if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
+            ( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+              ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) )
+        {
             ret = 0;
+        }
+
+        if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
+        }
 
         if( ret != 0 )
         {
@@ -4558,6 +4568,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
             mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
                                             alert );
         }
+
     }
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );