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Merge pull request #706 from mpg/ecp-mul-null-rng-2.7-restricted

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[Backport 2.7] Use internal RNG in ecp_mul when none was provided
This commit is contained in:
Janos Follath 2020-06-22 15:06:44 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit 3f44eb5ac5
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GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
9 changed files with 477 additions and 9 deletions
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16
ChangeLog.d/ecp-internal-rng.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
Changes
* The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on
`MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_SHA512_C` or
`MBEDTLS_SHA256_C` for some side-channel coutermeasures. If side channels
are not a concern, this dependency can be avoided by enabling the new
option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`.
Security
* Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and
mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a
private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as
mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL
f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and
memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system
attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key.
Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley.

10
include/mbedtls/check_config.h
View File

@ -123,6 +123,16 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !( \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG))
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C requires a DRBG or SHA-2 module unless MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined or an alternative implementation is used"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequesites"
#endif

22
include/mbedtls/config.h
View File

@ -618,6 +618,28 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
*
* When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an
* internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect
* against some side-channel attacks.
*
* This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the
* DRBG or SHA modules (HMAC-DRBG, CTR-DRBG, SHA-512 or SHA-256.) For very
* constrained applications that don't require this protection (for example,
* because you're only doing signature verification, so not manipulating any
* secret, or because local/physical side-channel attacks are outside your
* threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of that dependency.
*
* \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some
* side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for
* your use case.
*
* Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
*

11
include/mbedtls/ecp.h
View File

@ -518,10 +518,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen,
* operations for any valid m. It avoids any if-branch or
* array index depending on the value of m.
*
* \note If f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize intermediate
* results in order to prevent potential timing attacks
* targeting these results. It is recommended to always
* provide a non-NULL f_rng (the overhead is negligible).
* \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize
* intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks
* targeting these results. We recommend always providing
* a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible.
* Note: unless #MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined, when
* \p f_rng is NULL, an internal RNG (seeded from the value
* of \p m) will be used instead.
*
* \param grp ECP group
* \param R Destination point

2
include/mbedtls/md.h
View File

@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ typedef struct {
* \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the
* generic digest module.
*
* \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes.
*
* \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element
* in the returned list is an integer belonging to the
* message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t.

366
library/ecp.c
View File

@ -67,6 +67,20 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#else
#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid."
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
!defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
#define inline __inline
@ -85,6 +99,233 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count;
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
/*
* Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for
* side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was
* that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but
* unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with
* no opportunity for the user to do anything about it.
*
* The obvious strategies for addressing that include:
* - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments;
* - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules.
*
* Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is
* have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar.
*
* The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with
* HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
/* DRBG context type */
typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context;
/* DRBG context init */
static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( ctx );
}
/* DRBG context free */
static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( ctx );
}
/* DRBG function */
static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) );
}
/* DRBG context seeding */
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
int ret;
unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
/* The list starts with strong hashes */
const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len );
cleanup:
mbedtls_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
return( ret );
}
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
/* DRBG context type */
typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context;
/* DRBG context init */
static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctx );
}
/* DRBG context free */
static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctx );
}
/* DRBG function */
static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) );
}
/*
* Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does,
* we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy
* function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string.
* (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are
* concatenated before being used to update the secret state.)
*/
static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len)
{
(void) ctx;
memset( out, 0, len );
return( 0 );
}
/* DRBG context seeding */
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
int ret;
unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL,
secret_bytes, secret_len );
cleanup:
mbedtls_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
return( ret );
}
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
/* This will be used in the self-test function */
#define ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF
/*
* We need to expand secret data (the scalar) into a longer stream of bytes.
*
* We'll use the One-Step KDF from NIST SP 800-56C, with option 1 (H is a hash
* function) and empty FixedInfo. (Though we'll make it fit the DRBG API for
* convenience, this is not a full-fledged DRBG, but we don't need one here.)
*
* We need a basic hash abstraction layer to use whatever SHA-2 is available.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha512_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 );
#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 512 / 8 )
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha256_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 );
#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 256 / 8 )
#endif /* SHA512/SHA256 abstraction */
/*
* State consists of a 32-bit counter plus the secret value.
*
* We stored them concatenated in a single buffer as that's what will get
* passed to the hash function.
*/
typedef struct {
size_t total_len;
uint8_t buf[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
} ecp_drbg_context;
static void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) );
}
static void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) );
}
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
ctx->total_len = 4 + secret_len;
memset( ctx->buf, 0, 4);
return( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, ctx->buf + 4, secret_len ) );
}
static int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
ecp_drbg_context *ctx = p_rng;
int ret;
size_t len_done = 0;
uint8_t tmp[HASH_BLOCK_BYTES];
while( len_done < output_len )
{
uint8_t use_len;
/* This function is only called for coordinate randomisation, which
* happens only twice in a scalar multiplication. Each time needs a
* random value in the range [2, p-1], and gets it by drawing len(p)
* bytes from this function, and retrying up to 10 times if unlucky.
*
* So for the largest curve, each scalar multiplication draws at most
* 20 * 66 bytes. The minimum block size is 32 (SHA-256), so with
* rounding that means a most 20 * 3 blocks.
*
* Since we don't need to draw more that 255 blocks, don't bother
* with carry propagation and just return an error instead. We can
* change that it we even need to draw more blinding values.
*/
ctx->buf[3] += 1;
if( ctx->buf[3] == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
ret = HASH_FUNC( ctx->buf, ctx->total_len, tmp );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( output_len - len_done > HASH_BLOCK_BYTES )
use_len = HASH_BLOCK_BYTES;
else
use_len = output_len - len_done;
memcpy( output + len_done, tmp, use_len );
len_done += use_len;
}
mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
return( 0 );
}
#else /* DRBG/SHA modules */
#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid."
#endif /* DRBG/SHA modules */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
@ -1330,7 +1571,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R
i = d;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, t_len, x[i] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != 0 )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
while( i-- != 0 )
@ -1459,7 +1702,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != 0 )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, R ) );
@ -1662,7 +1907,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
MOD_ADD( RP.X );
/* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != NULL )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */
@ -1695,7 +1942,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != NULL )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) );
@ -1719,6 +1968,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
char is_grp_capable = 0;
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx;
ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
/* Common sanity checks */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 1 ) != 0 )
@ -1728,32 +1982,46 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng == NULL )
{
const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m, m_len ) );
f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random;
p_rng = &drbg_ctx;
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
if ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
ret = ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng );
#endif
#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
ret = ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
cleanup:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
cleanup:
if ( is_grp_capable )
{
mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx );
#endif
return( ret );
}
@ -2118,6 +2386,76 @@ cleanup:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
#if defined(ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF)
/*
* There are no test vectors from NIST for the One-Step KDF in SP 800-56C,
* but unofficial ones can be found at:
* https://github.com/patrickfav/singlestep-kdf/wiki/NIST-SP-800-56C-Rev1:-Non-Official-Test-Vectors
*
* We only use the ones with empty fixedInfo, and for brevity's sake, only
* 40-bytes output (with SHA-256 that's more than one block, and with SHA-512
* less than one block).
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
static const uint8_t test_kdf_z[16] = {
0x3b, 0xa9, 0x79, 0xe9, 0xbc, 0x5e, 0x3e, 0xc7,
0x61, 0x30, 0x36, 0xb6, 0xf5, 0x1c, 0xd5, 0xaa,
};
static const uint8_t test_kdf_out[40] = {
0x3e, 0xf6, 0xda, 0xf9, 0x51, 0x60, 0x70, 0x5f,
0xdf, 0x21, 0xcd, 0xab, 0xac, 0x25, 0x7b, 0x05,
0xfe, 0xc1, 0xab, 0x7c, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x43, 0x25,
0x8a, 0xfc, 0x40, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0xf7, 0x98, 0x27,
0x10, 0xfa, 0x7b, 0x93, 0x52, 0xd4, 0x16, 0xaa,
};
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
static const uint8_t test_kdf_z[16] = {
0xc8, 0x3e, 0x35, 0x8e, 0x99, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xc6,
0x7d, 0xb4, 0xfe, 0x39, 0xcf, 0x8f, 0x26, 0xe1,
};
static const uint8_t test_kdf_out[40] = {
0x7d, 0xf6, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x3c, 0x47, 0xdc, 0x28,
0x5f, 0x7f, 0xaa, 0xde, 0x05, 0x64, 0xd6, 0x25,
0x00, 0x6a, 0x47, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0xa0, 0x8c,
0xd7, 0xf7, 0x0c, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x66,
0x69, 0x0e, 0x25, 0xaa, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x14, 0x79,
};
#endif
static int ecp_kdf_self_test( void )
{
int ret;
ecp_drbg_context kdf_ctx;
mbedtls_mpi scalar;
uint8_t out[sizeof( test_kdf_out )];
ecp_drbg_init( &kdf_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &scalar );
memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &scalar,
test_kdf_z, sizeof( test_kdf_z ) ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &kdf_ctx,
&scalar, sizeof( test_kdf_z ) ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_random( &kdf_ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) );
if( memcmp( out, test_kdf_out, sizeof( out ) ) != 0 )
ret = -1;
cleanup:
ecp_drbg_free( &kdf_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &scalar );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF */
/*
* Checkup routine
*/
@ -2229,6 +2567,24 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose )
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
#if defined(ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF)
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #3 (internal KDF): " );
ret = ecp_kdf_self_test();
if( ret != 0 )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
#endif /* ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF */
cleanup:
if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 )

3
library/version_features.c
View File

@ -312,6 +312,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
"MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */

1
scripts/config.pl
View File

@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ EOU
my @excluded = qw(
MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING
MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2
MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE
MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C

55
tests/scripts/all.sh
View File

@ -814,6 +814,61 @@ component_test_no_hmac_drbg () {
# so there's little value in running those lengthy tests here.
}
component_test_no_drbg_all_hashes () {
# this tests the internal ECP DRBG using a KDF based on SHA-512
msg "build: Default minus DRBGs"
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C # requires a DRBG
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C # requires PSA Crypto
CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
make
msg "test: Default minus DRBGs"
make test
# no SSL tests as they all depend on having a DRBG
}
component_test_no_drbg_no_sha512 () {
# this tests the internal ECP DRBG using a KDF based on SHA-256
msg "build: Default minus DRBGs minus SHA-512"
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C # requires a DRBG
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C # requires PSA Crypto
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
make
msg "test: Default minus DRBGs minus SHA-512"
make test
# no SSL tests as they all depend on having a DRBG
}
component_test_ecp_no_internal_rng () {
msg "build: Default plus ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG minus DRBG modules"
scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C # requires a DRBG
scripts/config.pl unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C # requires PSA Crypto
CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
make
msg "test: ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG, no DRBG module"
make test
# no SSL tests as they all depend on having a DRBG
}
component_test_full_cmake_clang () {
msg "build: cmake, full config, clang" # ~ 50s
scripts/config.pl full