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ssl_parse_encrypted_pms refactor: prepare for remote private key

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Use the public key to extract metadata rather than the public key.
Don't abort early if there is no private key.

This is in preparation for allowing the private key operation to be
offloaded to an external cryptographic module.
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2018-01-11 18:29:01 +01:00
parent d9bfcabcb9
commit 422ccabe29
1 changed files with 22 additions and 11 deletions
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33
library/ssl_srv.c
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@ -3422,7 +3422,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t pms_offset )
{
int ret;
size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl );
mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl )->pk;
size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( public_key );
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
unsigned char ver[2];
unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
@ -3430,14 +3432,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t i, peer_pmslen;
unsigned int diff;
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
/*
* Decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
* Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
@ -3466,18 +3462,31 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
* must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
* bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
* Also, avoid data-dependant branches here to protect against
* timing-based variants.
* To protect against timing-based variants, always generate the fake
* premaster secret, so as to avoid data-dependant branches.
*/
ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), p, len,
/*
* Decrypt the premaster secret
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
{
/* */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( private_key, p, len,
peer_pms, &peer_pmslen,
sizeof( peer_pms ),
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
/* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid
* padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type
* attacks. */
diff = (unsigned int) ret;
diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48;
diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0];
@ -3508,6 +3517,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
/* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without
* data-dependent branches. */
for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ )
pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] );