Assemble ChangeLog

Executed scripts/assemble_changelog.py.

Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Janos Follath 2020-06-26 11:33:34 +01:00
parent f69b919844
commit 49e6caf12e
10 changed files with 52 additions and 56 deletions

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mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
Security
* Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could
reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. Noticed by Sangho Lee,
Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim and Hyesoon Kim (Georgia Institute
of Technology); and Marcus Peinado (Microsoft Research). Reported by Raoul
Strackx (Fortanix) in #3394.
* Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and
mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a
private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as
mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL
f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and
memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system
attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key.
Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley.
* Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when
hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT
macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 attack to be possible in
those configurations, allowing an active network attacker to recover
plaintext after repeated timing measurements under some conditions.
Reported and fix suggested by Luc Perneel in #3246.
Bugfix
* Fix the Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration for mbedtls itself.
Completes a previous fix in Mbed TLS 2.16.3 that only fixed the build for
the example programs. Reported in #1430 and fix contributed by irwir.
* Fix undefined behavior in X.509 certificate parsing if the
pathLenConstraint basic constraint value is equal to INT_MAX.
The actual effect with almost every compiler is the intended
behavior, so this is unlikely to be exploitable anywhere. #3197
* Include asn1.h in error.c. Fixes #3328 reported by David Hu.
* Fix potential memory leaks in ecp_randomize_jac() and ecp_randomize_mxz()
when PRNG function fails. Contributed by Jonas Lejeune in #3318.
* Add additional bounds checks in ssl_write_client_hello() preventing
output buffer overflow if the configuration declared a buffer that was
too small.
Changes
* Unify the example programs termination to call mbedtls_exit() instead of
using a return command. This has been done to enable customization of the
behavior in bare metal environments.
* Abort the ClientHello writing function as soon as some extension doesn't
fit into the record buffer. Previously, such extensions were silently
dropped. As a consequence, the TLS handshake now fails when the output
buffer is not large enough to hold the ClientHello.
* The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on
`MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_SHA512_C` or
`MBEDTLS_SHA256_C` for some side-channel coutermeasures. If side channels
are not a concern, this dependency can be avoided by enabling the new
option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`.
= mbed TLS 2.16.6 branch released 2020-04-14
Security

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Bugfix
* Fix the Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration for mbedtls itself.
Completes a previous fix in Mbed TLS 2.16.3 that only fixed the build for
the example programs. Reported in #1430 and fix contributed by irwir.

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Changes
* The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on
`MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_SHA512_C` or
`MBEDTLS_SHA256_C` for some side-channel coutermeasures. If side channels
are not a concern, this dependency can be avoided by enabling the new
option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`.
Security
* Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and
mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a
private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as
mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL
f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and
memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system
attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key.
Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley.

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Bugfix
* Include asn1.h in error.c. Fixes #3328 reported by David Hu.

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Bugfix
* Fix potential memory leaks in ecp_randomize_jac() and ecp_randomize_mxz()
when PRNG function fails. Contributed by Jonas Lejeune in #3318.

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Security
* Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when
hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT
macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 attack to be possible in
those configurations, allowing an active network attacker to recover
plaintext after repeated timing measurements under some conditions.
Reported and fix suggested by Luc Perneel in #3246.

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Bugfix
* Fix undefined behavior in X.509 certificate parsing if the
pathLenConstraint basic constraint value is equal to INT_MAX.
The actual effect with almost every compiler is the intended
behavior, so this is unlikely to be exploitable anywhere. #3197

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Security
* Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could
reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. Noticed by Sangho Lee,
Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim and Hyesoon Kim (Georgia Institute
of Technology); and Marcus Peinado (Microsoft Research). Reported by Raoul
Strackx (Fortanix) in #3394.

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Changes
* Unify the example programs termination to call mbedtls_exit() instead of
using a return command. This has been done to enable customization of the
behavior in bare metal environments.

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Bugfix
* Add additional bounds checks in ssl_write_client_hello() preventing
output buffer overflow if the configuration declared a buffer that was
too small.
Changes
* Abort the ClientHello writing function as soon as some extension doesn't
fit into the record buffer. Previously, such extensions were silently
dropped. As a consequence, the TLS handshake now fails when the output
buffer is not large enough to hold the ClientHello.