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Assemble ChangeLog
Executed scripts/assemble_changelog.py. Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
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ChangeLog
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ChangeLog
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mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
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mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
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= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
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Security
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* Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could
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reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. Noticed by Sangho Lee,
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Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim and Hyesoon Kim (Georgia Institute
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of Technology); and Marcus Peinado (Microsoft Research). Reported by Raoul
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Strackx (Fortanix) in #3394.
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* Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and
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mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a
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private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as
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mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL
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f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and
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memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system
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attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key.
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Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley.
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* Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when
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hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT
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macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 attack to be possible in
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those configurations, allowing an active network attacker to recover
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plaintext after repeated timing measurements under some conditions.
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Reported and fix suggested by Luc Perneel in #3246.
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Bugfix
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* Fix the Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration for mbedtls itself.
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Completes a previous fix in Mbed TLS 2.16.3 that only fixed the build for
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the example programs. Reported in #1430 and fix contributed by irwir.
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* Fix undefined behavior in X.509 certificate parsing if the
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pathLenConstraint basic constraint value is equal to INT_MAX.
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The actual effect with almost every compiler is the intended
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behavior, so this is unlikely to be exploitable anywhere. #3197
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* Include asn1.h in error.c. Fixes #3328 reported by David Hu.
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* Fix potential memory leaks in ecp_randomize_jac() and ecp_randomize_mxz()
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when PRNG function fails. Contributed by Jonas Lejeune in #3318.
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* Add additional bounds checks in ssl_write_client_hello() preventing
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output buffer overflow if the configuration declared a buffer that was
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too small.
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Changes
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* Unify the example programs termination to call mbedtls_exit() instead of
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using a return command. This has been done to enable customization of the
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behavior in bare metal environments.
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* Abort the ClientHello writing function as soon as some extension doesn't
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fit into the record buffer. Previously, such extensions were silently
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dropped. As a consequence, the TLS handshake now fails when the output
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buffer is not large enough to hold the ClientHello.
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* The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on
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`MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_SHA512_C` or
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`MBEDTLS_SHA256_C` for some side-channel coutermeasures. If side channels
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are not a concern, this dependency can be avoided by enabling the new
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option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`.
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= mbed TLS 2.16.6 branch released 2020-04-14
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= mbed TLS 2.16.6 branch released 2020-04-14
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Security
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Security
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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
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Bugfix
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* Fix the Visual Studio Release x64 build configuration for mbedtls itself.
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Completes a previous fix in Mbed TLS 2.16.3 that only fixed the build for
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the example programs. Reported in #1430 and fix contributed by irwir.
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@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
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Changes
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* The ECP module, enabled by `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`, now depends on
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`MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C`, `MBEDTLS_SHA512_C` or
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`MBEDTLS_SHA256_C` for some side-channel coutermeasures. If side channels
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are not a concern, this dependency can be avoided by enabling the new
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option `MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG`.
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Security
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* Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and
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mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a
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private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well as
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mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with a NULL
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f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough timing and
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memory access information (typically an untrusted operating system
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attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private key.
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Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Brumley.
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@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
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Bugfix
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* Include asn1.h in error.c. Fixes #3328 reported by David Hu.
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@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
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Bugfix
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* Fix potential memory leaks in ecp_randomize_jac() and ecp_randomize_mxz()
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when PRNG function fails. Contributed by Jonas Lejeune in #3318.
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@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
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Security
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* Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective when
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hardware accelerators were used (using one of the MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT
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macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 attack to be possible in
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those configurations, allowing an active network attacker to recover
|
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plaintext after repeated timing measurements under some conditions.
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Reported and fix suggested by Luc Perneel in #3246.
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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
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Bugfix
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* Fix undefined behavior in X.509 certificate parsing if the
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pathLenConstraint basic constraint value is equal to INT_MAX.
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The actual effect with almost every compiler is the intended
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behavior, so this is unlikely to be exploitable anywhere. #3197
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@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
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Security
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* Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could
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reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. Noticed by Sangho Lee,
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Ming-Wei Shih, Prasun Gera, Taesoo Kim and Hyesoon Kim (Georgia Institute
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of Technology); and Marcus Peinado (Microsoft Research). Reported by Raoul
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Strackx (Fortanix) in #3394.
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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
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Changes
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* Unify the example programs termination to call mbedtls_exit() instead of
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using a return command. This has been done to enable customization of the
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behavior in bare metal environments.
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@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
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Bugfix
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* Add additional bounds checks in ssl_write_client_hello() preventing
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output buffer overflow if the configuration declared a buffer that was
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too small.
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Changes
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* Abort the ClientHello writing function as soon as some extension doesn't
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fit into the record buffer. Previously, such extensions were silently
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dropped. As a consequence, the TLS handshake now fails when the output
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buffer is not large enough to hold the ClientHello.
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