diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index d2c5f6b36..9b3dc5c18 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Security * Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the hash is too large for the key size. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm Product Security Initiative, Qualcomm Technologies Inc. + * Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the unmasked + data is all zeros. = mbed TLS 1.3.21 branch released 2017-08-10 diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index d531c2607..56fd7920f 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -1325,10 +1325,11 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx, size_t siglen; unsigned char *p; unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *hash_start; unsigned char result[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char zeros[8]; unsigned int hlen; - size_t slen, msb; + size_t observed_salt_len, msb; const md_info_t *md_info; md_context_t md_ctx; @@ -1370,7 +1371,7 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx, hlen = md_get_size( md_info ); if( siglen < hlen + 2 ) return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); - slen = siglen - hlen - 1; /* Currently length of salt + padding */ + hash_start = buf + siglen - hlen - 1; memset( zeros, 0, 8 ); @@ -1385,6 +1386,7 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx, p++; siglen -= 1; } + else if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) ) return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); @@ -1395,25 +1397,24 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx, return( ret ); } - mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, p + siglen - hlen - 1, hlen, &md_ctx ); + mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx ); buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb ); - while( p < buf + siglen && *p == 0 ) + while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 ) p++; - if( p == buf + siglen || + if( p == hash_start || *p++ != 0x01 ) { md_free( &md_ctx ); return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); } - /* Actual salt len */ - slen -= p - buf; + observed_salt_len = hash_start - p; if( expected_salt_len != RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && - slen != (size_t) expected_salt_len ) + observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len ) { md_free( &md_ctx ); return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); @@ -1424,12 +1425,12 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx, md_starts( &md_ctx ); md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 ); md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ); - md_update( &md_ctx, p, slen ); + md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len ); md_finish( &md_ctx, result ); md_free( &md_ctx ); - if( memcmp( p + slen, result, hlen ) == 0 ) + if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) == 0 ) return( 0 ); else return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED ); diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data index 5a66bda09..b396c642a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.data @@ -819,3 +819,7 @@ RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, bad signature depends_on:POLARSSL_SHA512_C pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:16:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":16:"010001":POLARSSL_MD_SHA512:POLARSSL_MD_SHA512:POLARSSL_MD_SHA512:0:"":"00471794655837da498cbf27242807b40593a353c707eb22fd2cc5a3259e728ac4f1df676043eeec8e16c1175b3d9ac8cae72ec1d5772dd69de71c5677f19031568e":POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING +RSASSA-PSS verify ext, all-zero padding, automatic salt length +depends_on:POLARSSL_SHA256_C +pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":POLARSSL_MD_NONE:POLARSSL_MD_SHA256:POLARSSL_MD_SHA256:RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"":"63a35294577c7e593170378175b7df27c293dae583ec2a971426eb2d66f2af483e897bfae5dc20300a9d61a3644e08c3aee61a463690a3498901563c46041056":POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING +