Add X.509 CRT verification API using trusted CA callbacks

This commit is contained in:
Hanno Becker 2019-03-27 11:01:17 +00:00
parent 288dedcc72
commit 5c8df78feb

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@ -501,6 +501,70 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
void *p_vrfy,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
/**
* \brief The type of trusted certificate callbacks.
*
* Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the CRT
* verification routine mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_cb()
* when looking for trusted signers of a given certificate.
*
* On success, the callback returns a list of trusted
* certificates to be considered as potential signers
* for the input certificate.
*
* \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
* \param child The certificate for which to search a potential signer.
* This must point to a readable certificate.
* \param candidate_cas The address at which to store the address of the first
* entry in the generated linked list of candidate signers.
* This must not be \c NULL.
*
* \note The callback must only return a non-zero value on a
* fatal error. If, in contrast, the search for a potential
* signer completes without a single candidate, the
* callback must return \c 0 and get \c *candidate_cas
* to \c NULL.
*
* \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *candidate_cas points
* to a heap-allocated linked list of instances of
* ::mbedtls_x509_crt, and ownership of this list is passed
* to the caller.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t)( void *p_ctx,
mbedtls_x509_crt const *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt **candidate_cas );
/**
* \brief Version of \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() which
* uses a callback to acquire the list of trusted CA
* certificates.
*
* \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
* \param f_ca_cb The callback to be used to query for potential signers
* of a given child certificate. See the documentation of
* ::mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t for more information.
* \param p_ca_cb The opaque context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb.
* \param profile The security profile for the verification.
* \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
* CN need not be verified.
* \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
* \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
* of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
* \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
*
* \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile().
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
void *p_ca_cb,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
/**
* \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension.