Fix other int casts in bounds checking

Not a security issue as here we know the buffer is large enough (unless
something else if badly wrong in the code), and the value cast to int is less
than 2^16 (again, unless issues elsewhere).

Still changing to a more correct check as a matter of principle

backport of bc5e508
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2015-10-21 12:35:29 +02:00
parent 8abc22dde5
commit 5ca3640fa7

View File

@ -949,11 +949,16 @@ int ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl_context *ssl, key_exchange_type_t key_ex )
#if defined(POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( key_ex == POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
{
if( end - p < 2 + (int) ssl->psk_len )
if( end - p < 2 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
*(p++) = (unsigned char)( ssl->psk_len >> 8 );
*(p++) = (unsigned char)( ssl->psk_len );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->psk_len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
memset( p, 0, ssl->psk_len );
p += ssl->psk_len;
}
else
@ -1021,11 +1026,15 @@ int ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl_context *ssl, key_exchange_type_t key_ex )
}
/* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */
if( end - p < 2 + (int) ssl->psk_len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( end - p < 2 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
*(p++) = (unsigned char)( ssl->psk_len >> 8 );
*(p++) = (unsigned char)( ssl->psk_len );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < ssl->psk_len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
memcpy( p, ssl->psk, ssl->psk_len );
p += ssl->psk_len;