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Add counter-measure against RSA-CRT attack
https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/09/02/factoring-rsa-keys-with-tls-perfect-forward-secrecy/
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@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
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= mbed TLS 2.1.0 released 2015-09-04
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= mbed TLS 2.1.0 released 2015-09-04
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Security
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* Add countermeasure against Lenstra's RSA-CRT attack for PKCS#1 v1.5
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signatures. (Found by Florian Weimer, Red Hat.)
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https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/09/02/factoring-rsa-keys-with-tls-perfect-forward-secrecy/
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Features
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Features
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* Added support for yotta as a build system.
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* Added support for yotta as a build system.
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* Primary open source license changed to Apache 2.0 license.
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* Primary open source license changed to Apache 2.0 license.
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@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
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#else
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#else
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#define mbedtls_printf printf
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#define mbedtls_printf printf
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#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
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#define mbedtls_free free
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#endif
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#endif
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/*
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/*
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@ -1005,6 +1007,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0;
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size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0;
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unsigned char *p = sig;
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unsigned char *p = sig;
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const char *oid = NULL;
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const char *oid = NULL;
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unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
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size_t i;
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unsigned char diff;
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volatile unsigned char diff_no_optimize;
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int ret;
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if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
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if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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@ -1067,9 +1074,39 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
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memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
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}
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}
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return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
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if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
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? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig )
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return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) );
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: mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
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/*
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* In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
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* temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
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*/
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sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
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verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
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if( sig_try == NULL || verif == NULL )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
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/* Compare in constant time just in case */
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for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < ctx->len; i++ )
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diff |= verif[i] ^ sig[i];
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diff_no_optimize = diff;
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if( diff_no_optimize != 0 )
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{
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len );
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_free( sig_try );
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mbedtls_free( verif );
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return( ret );
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}
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
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