From 6b1e207081bce5a71d456fd2fbe031cb324b7529 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 10:14:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Fix verion-major intolerance --- ChangeLog | 1 + library/ssl_srv.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index e44674294..4c374a496 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ Bugfix statistics * Fix buf in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 "reversed" operations * Fixed testing with out-of-source builds using cmake + * Fixed version-major intolerance in server = PolarSSL 1.3.4 released on 2014-01-27 Features diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c index f484cf6a4..54c931aee 100644 --- a/library/ssl_srv.c +++ b/library/ssl_srv.c @@ -1071,15 +1071,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl_context *ssl ) buf[1], buf[2] ) ); /* - * SSLv3 Client Hello + * SSLv3/TLS Client Hello * * Record layer: * 0 . 0 message type * 1 . 2 protocol version * 3 . 4 message length */ + + /* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically + * "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the + * value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here + * is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */ if( buf[0] != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || - buf[1] != SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + buf[1] < SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) { SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); @@ -1134,21 +1139,24 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl_context *ssl ) /* * Check the handshake type and protocol version */ - if( buf[0] != SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || - buf[4] != SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) + if( buf[0] != SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) { SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); } - ssl->major_ver = SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - ssl->minor_ver = ( buf[5] <= ssl->max_minor_ver ) - ? buf[5] : ssl->max_minor_ver; + ssl->major_ver = buf[4]; + ssl->minor_ver = buf[5]; - if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->min_minor_ver ) + ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver; + ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver; + + if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->min_major_ver || + ssl->minor_ver < ssl->min_minor_ver ) { SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" - " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, + " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", + ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, ssl->min_major_ver, ssl->min_minor_ver ) ); ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, @@ -1157,8 +1165,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl_context *ssl ) return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); } - ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[4]; - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[5]; + if( ssl->major_ver > ssl->max_major_ver ) + { + ssl->major_ver = ssl->max_major_ver; + ssl->minor_ver = ssl->max_minor_ver; + } + else if( ssl->minor_ver > ssl->max_minor_ver ) + ssl->minor_ver = ssl->max_minor_ver; memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 6, 32 );