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https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
synced 2024-11-29 08:04:24 +01:00
Split parts of ssl_parse_client_key_exchange() into separate functions
Made ssl_parse_client_dh_public(), ssl_parse_cient_ecdh_public() and ssl_parse_encrypted_pms_secret() in preparation for PSK-related code
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@ -1382,14 +1382,166 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( ssl_context *ssl )
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return( 0 );
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}
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static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl_context *ssl )
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{
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int ret = POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
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#if defined(POLARSSL_DHM_C)
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size_t n;
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/*
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* Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P
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*/
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n = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
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if( n < 1 || n > ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len ||
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n + 6 != ssl->in_hslen )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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if( ( ret = dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
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ssl->in_msg + 6, n ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "dhm_read_public", ret );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
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}
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SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
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if( ( ret = dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
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ssl->handshake->premaster,
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&ssl->handshake->pmslen ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "dhm_calc_secret", ret );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS );
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}
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SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
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#endif /* POLARSSL_DHM_C */
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return( ret );
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}
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static int ssl_parse_client_ecdh_public( ssl_context *ssl )
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{
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int ret = POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
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#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDH_C)
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size_t n;
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/*
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* Receive client public key and calculate premaster
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*/
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n = ssl->in_msg[3];
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if( n < 1 || n > mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.P ) * 2 + 2 ||
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n + 4 != ssl->in_hslen )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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if( ( ret = ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
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ssl->in_msg + 4, n ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ecdh_read_public", ret );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
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}
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SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp );
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if( ( ret = ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
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&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
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ssl->handshake->premaster,
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POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS );
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}
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SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "ECDH: z ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.z );
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#endif /* POLARSSL_ECDH_C */
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return( ret );
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}
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static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms_secret( ssl_context *ssl )
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{
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int ret = POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
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size_t i, n = 0;
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if( ssl->rsa_key == NULL )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
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}
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/*
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* Decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
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*/
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i = 4;
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if( ssl->rsa_key )
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n = ssl->rsa_key_len( ssl->rsa_key );
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
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if( ssl->minor_ver != SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
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{
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i += 2;
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if( ssl->in_msg[4] != ( ( n >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ||
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ssl->in_msg[5] != ( ( n ) & 0xFF ) )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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}
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if( ssl->in_hslen != i + n )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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if( ssl->rsa_key ) {
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ret = ssl->rsa_decrypt( ssl->rsa_key, RSA_PRIVATE,
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&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
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ssl->in_msg + i,
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ssl->handshake->premaster,
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sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) );
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}
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if( ret != 0 || ssl->handshake->pmslen != 48 ||
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ssl->handshake->premaster[0] != ssl->max_major_ver ||
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ssl->handshake->premaster[1] != ssl->max_minor_ver )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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/*
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* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack:
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* invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding must not cause
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* the connection to end immediately; instead,
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* send a bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
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*/
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
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ret = ssl->f_rng( ssl->p_rng, ssl->handshake->premaster,
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ssl->handshake->pmslen );
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if( ret != 0 )
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return( ret );
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( ssl_context *ssl )
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{
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int ret;
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size_t i, n = 0;
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#if defined(POLARSSL_DHM_C) || defined(POLARSSL_ECDH_C)
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const ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
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ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
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#endif
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client key exchange" ) );
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@ -1411,139 +1563,28 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( ssl_context *ssl )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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#if defined(POLARSSL_DHM_C)
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if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
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{
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/*
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* Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P
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*/
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n = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
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if( n < 1 || n > ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len ||
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n + 6 != ssl->in_hslen )
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if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret );
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return( ret );
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}
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if( ( ret = dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
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ssl->in_msg + 6, n ) ) != 0 )
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}
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else if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA )
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{
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if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_ecdh_public( ssl ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "dhm_read_public", ret );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_ecdh_public" ), ret );
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return( ret );
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}
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SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
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if( ( ret = dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
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ssl->handshake->premaster,
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&ssl->handshake->pmslen ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "dhm_calc_secret", ret );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS );
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}
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SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
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}
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else
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#endif
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#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDH_C)
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if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA )
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{
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/*
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* Receive client public key and calculate premaster
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*/
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n = ssl->in_msg[3];
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if( n < 1 || n > mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.P ) * 2 + 2 ||
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n + 4 != ssl->in_hslen )
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if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms_secret( ssl ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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if( ( ret = ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
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ssl->in_msg + 4, n ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ecdh_read_public", ret );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP );
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}
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SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp );
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if( ( ret = ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
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&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
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ssl->handshake->premaster,
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POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) ) != 0 )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS );
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}
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SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "ECDH: z ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.z );
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}
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else
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#endif
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{
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if( ssl->rsa_key == NULL )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
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}
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/*
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* Decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
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*/
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i = 4;
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if( ssl->rsa_key )
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n = ssl->rsa_key_len( ssl->rsa_key );
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
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if( ssl->minor_ver != SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
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{
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i += 2;
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if( ssl->in_msg[4] != ( ( n >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ||
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ssl->in_msg[5] != ( ( n ) & 0xFF ) )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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}
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if( ssl->in_hslen != i + n )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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if( ssl->rsa_key ) {
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ret = ssl->rsa_decrypt( ssl->rsa_key, RSA_PRIVATE,
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&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
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ssl->in_msg + i,
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ssl->handshake->premaster,
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sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) );
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}
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if( ret != 0 || ssl->handshake->pmslen != 48 ||
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ssl->handshake->premaster[0] != ssl->max_major_ver ||
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ssl->handshake->premaster[1] != ssl->max_minor_ver )
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{
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SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
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/*
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* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack:
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* invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding must not cause
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* the connection to end immediately; instead,
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* send a bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
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*/
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
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ret = ssl->f_rng( ssl->p_rng, ssl->handshake->premaster,
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ssl->handshake->pmslen );
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if( ret != 0 )
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return( ret );
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SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_ecdh_public" ), ret );
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return( ret );
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}
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}
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