mirror of
https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
synced 2024-11-22 10:45:36 +01:00
Duplicate sensitive buffer and buffer length information
Detect FI attacks on buffer pointers and buffer lengths. Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
98c847a483
commit
74f7d0f03d
@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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unsigned int flow_ctrl = 0;
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volatile unsigned int i = 0;
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volatile int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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volatile const unsigned char *key_dup = key;
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volatile unsigned int keybits_dup = keybits;
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uint32_t *RK;
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uint32_t offset = 0;
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@ -814,7 +816,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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#endif
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) )
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{
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return ret;
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if( keybits_dup == keybits && key_dup == key )
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{
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return ret;
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}
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}
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
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@ -1063,6 +1068,8 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
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aes_r_data_t *aes_data_table[2]; // pointers to real and fake data
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int round_ctrl_table_len = ctx->nr + 2 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS;
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volatile int flow_control;
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volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
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volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
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// control bytes for AES calculation rounds,
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// reserve based on max rounds + dummy rounds + 2 (for initial key addition)
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uint8_t round_ctrl_table[( 14 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS + 2 )];
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@ -1163,7 +1170,10 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
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if( flow_control == tindex + dummy_rounds + 8 )
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{
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/* Validate control path due possible fault injection */
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return 0;
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if( output_dup == output && input_dup == input )
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{
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
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@ -1342,6 +1352,8 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
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aes_r_data_t *aes_data_table[2]; // pointers to real and fake data
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int round_ctrl_table_len = ctx->nr + 2 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS;
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volatile int flow_control;
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volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
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volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
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// control bytes for AES calculation rounds,
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// reserve based on max rounds + dummy rounds + 2 (for initial key addition)
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uint8_t round_ctrl_table[( 14 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS + 2 )];
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@ -1442,7 +1454,10 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
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if( flow_control == tindex + dummy_rounds + 8 )
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{
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/* Validate control path due possible fault injection */
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return 0;
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if( output_dup == output && input_dup == input )
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{
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
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@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
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volatile const unsigned char *key_dup = key;
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volatile unsigned int keybits_dup = keybits;
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CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
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CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
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@ -99,6 +101,11 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
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return( ret );
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}
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if( keybits_dup != keybits || key_dup != key )
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{
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -165,6 +172,15 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
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unsigned char ctr[16];
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const unsigned char *src;
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unsigned char *dst;
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volatile size_t length_dup = length;
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volatile const unsigned char *iv_dup = iv;
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volatile size_t iv_len_dup = iv_len;
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volatile const unsigned char *add_dup = add;
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volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
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volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
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volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
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volatile unsigned char *tag_dup = tag;
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volatile size_t tag_len_dup = tag_len;
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/*
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* Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
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@ -316,6 +332,13 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
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CTR_CRYPT( y, y, 16 );
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mbedtls_platform_memcpy( tag, y, tag_len );
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if( length_dup != length || iv_dup != iv || iv_len_dup != iv_len ||
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add_dup != add || add_len_dup != add_len || input_dup != input ||
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output_dup != output || tag_dup != tag || tag_len_dup != tag_len)
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{
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -370,6 +393,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
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unsigned char check_tag[16];
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unsigned char i;
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int diff;
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volatile size_t length_dup = length;
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volatile const unsigned char *iv_dup = iv;
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volatile size_t iv_len_dup = iv_len;
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volatile const unsigned char *add_dup = add;
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volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
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volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
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volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
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volatile const unsigned char *tag_dup = tag;
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volatile size_t tag_len_dup = tag_len;
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CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
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CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
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@ -395,6 +427,13 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
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}
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if( length_dup != length || iv_dup != iv || iv_len_dup != iv_len ||
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add_dup != add || add_len_dup != add_len || input_dup != input ||
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output_dup != output || tag_dup != tag || tag_len_dup != tag_len)
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{
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx,
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size_t threshold, int strong )
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{
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int idx, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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volatile mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source_dup = f_source;
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volatile void *p_source_dup = p_source;
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volatile size_t threshold_dup = threshold;
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volatile int strong_dup = strong;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
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@ -170,6 +174,11 @@ exit:
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
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#endif
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if( f_source_dup != f_source || p_source_dup != p_source ||
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threshold_dup != threshold || strong_dup != strong )
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{
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -184,7 +193,8 @@ static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id
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size_t use_len = len;
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const unsigned char *p = data;
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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volatile const unsigned char *data_dup = data;
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volatile size_t len_dup = len;
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if( use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE )
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{
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR)
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@ -229,6 +239,10 @@ static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
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if( len_dup != len || data_dup != data )
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{
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -349,6 +363,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
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int count = 0, i, done;
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mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data;
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unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
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volatile void *data_dup = data;
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volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
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volatile size_t len_dup = len;
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if( len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
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@ -456,7 +473,10 @@ exit:
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if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
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#endif
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if( data_dup != data || len_dup != len || output_dup != output )
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{
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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volatile unsigned int flow_counter = 0;
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unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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volatile const unsigned char *additional_dup = additional;
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volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
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for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ )
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{
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@ -143,7 +145,10 @@ exit:
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// Double check flow_counter
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if ( ( flow_counter == 7 ) || ( flow_counter == 16 ) )
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{
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return ret; // success, return 0 from ret
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if( additional_dup == additional && add_len_dup == add_len )
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{
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return ret; // success, return 0 from ret
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}
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}
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}
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@ -167,6 +172,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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volatile const unsigned char *data_dup = data;
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volatile size_t data_len_dup = data_len;
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
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return( ret );
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@ -183,7 +190,10 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 )
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return( ret );
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if( data_dup != data || data_len_dup != data_len )
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{
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -200,6 +210,8 @@ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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size_t seedlen = 0;
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size_t total_entropy_len;
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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volatile const unsigned char *additional_dup = additional;
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volatile size_t len_dup = len;
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if( use_nonce == HMAC_NONCE_NO )
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total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len;
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@ -264,6 +276,11 @@ exit:
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/* 4. Done */
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen );
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if( additional_dup != additional || len_dup != len )
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{
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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if ( ret != 0 )
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return ret;
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@ -299,6 +316,11 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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size_t len )
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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int (* volatile f_entropy_dup)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) = f_entropy;
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volatile void *p_entropy_dup = p_entropy;
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volatile const unsigned char *custom_dup = custom;
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volatile size_t len_dup = len;
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size_t md_size;
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
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@ -339,6 +361,11 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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return( ret );
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}
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if( f_entropy != f_entropy_dup || p_entropy != p_entropy_dup ||
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custom_dup != custom || len_dup != len )
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{
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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return( ret );
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}
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@ -310,7 +310,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
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int ret;
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size_t fill;
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uint32_t left;
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volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
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volatile size_t ilen_dup = ilen;
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size_t ilen_change;
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SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
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SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
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@ -353,7 +355,12 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
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/* Re-check ilen to protect from a FI attack */
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if( ilen < 64 )
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{
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return( 0 );
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/* Re-check that the calculated offsets are correct */
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ilen_change = ilen_dup - ilen;
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if( ( input_dup + ilen_change ) == input )
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{
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return( 0 );
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}
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}
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
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}
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@ -472,8 +479,10 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input,
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unsigned char output[32],
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int is224 )
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{
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int ret;
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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mbedtls_sha256_context ctx;
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volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
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volatile size_t ilen_dup = ilen;
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SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 );
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SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
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@ -493,7 +502,11 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input,
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exit:
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mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx );
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return( ret );
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if( input_dup == input && ilen_dup == ilen )
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{
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return( ret );
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}
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
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}
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
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@ -2796,10 +2796,14 @@ static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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volatile int ret = 0;
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unsigned char *p;
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unsigned char *end;
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volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
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volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
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mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
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mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
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((void) buf_dup);
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((void) buflen_dup);
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p = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
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end = buf + buflen;
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@ -3100,7 +3104,7 @@ static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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{
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mbedtls_platform_random_delay();
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if( ret == 0 )
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if( ret == 0 && buf_dup == buf && buflen_dup == buflen )
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{
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
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/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
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@ -3286,6 +3286,7 @@ static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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size_t *signature_len )
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{
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volatile size_t *signature_len_dup = signature_len;
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mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
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mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
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@ -3673,7 +3674,11 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
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return( 0 );
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if( signature_len_dup == signature_len )
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{
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return( 0 );
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}
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites
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@ -4218,6 +4223,8 @@ static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
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mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
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unsigned char *p, *end;
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volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
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volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
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p = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
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end = buf + buflen;
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@ -4412,8 +4419,11 @@ static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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}
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return( ret );
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if( buf_dup == buf && buflen_dup == buflen )
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{
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return( ret );
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}
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
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}
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||||
|
||||
/* Update the handshake state */
|
||||
|
@ -177,6 +177,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
|
||||
size_t buflen )
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
|
||||
volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
|
||||
mbedtls_record rec;
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen );
|
||||
@ -228,6 +230,10 @@ exit:
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( buf_dup != buf || buflen_dup != buflen )
|
||||
{
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
|
||||
return( ret );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -1234,11 +1234,13 @@ int uECC_valid_public_key(const uint8_t *public_key)
|
||||
return uECC_valid_point(_public);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key)
|
||||
int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t * private_key, uint8_t * public_key)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
|
||||
uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t * private_key_dup = private_key;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t * public_key_dup = public_key;
|
||||
|
||||
uECC_vli_bytesToNative(
|
||||
_private,
|
||||
@ -1264,5 +1266,8 @@ int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key)
|
||||
uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(
|
||||
public_key +
|
||||
NUM_ECC_BYTES, NUM_ECC_BYTES, _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
|
||||
if(private_key_dup != private_key || public_key_dup != public_key){
|
||||
return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key)
|
||||
uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
|
||||
uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
|
||||
uECC_word_t tries;
|
||||
volatile uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
|
||||
volatile uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
|
||||
|
||||
for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
|
||||
/* Generating _private uniformly at random: */
|
||||
@ -148,8 +150,12 @@ int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key)
|
||||
/* erasing temporary buffer that stored secret: */
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_memset(_private, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
|
||||
|
||||
return UECC_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if(private_key == private_key_dup &&
|
||||
public_key == public_key_dup){
|
||||
return UECC_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UECC_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -163,6 +169,10 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
|
||||
wordcount_t num_words = NUM_ECC_WORDS;
|
||||
wordcount_t num_bytes = NUM_ECC_BYTES;
|
||||
int r = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t *secret_dup = secret;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
|
||||
uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_private,
|
||||
@ -180,6 +190,10 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
|
||||
|
||||
/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(_private, sizeof(_private));
|
||||
if(public_key_dup != public_key || private_key_dup != private_key ||
|
||||
secret_dup != secret){
|
||||
return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -146,6 +146,10 @@ int uECC_sign(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
|
||||
uECC_word_t _random[2*NUM_ECC_WORDS];
|
||||
uECC_word_t k[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
|
||||
uECC_word_t tries;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t *message_hash_dup = message_hash;
|
||||
volatile unsigned hash_size_dup = hash_size;
|
||||
volatile uint8_t *signature_dup = signature;
|
||||
|
||||
for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
|
||||
/* Generating _random uniformly at random: */
|
||||
@ -164,6 +168,10 @@ int uECC_sign(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (r == UECC_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
if(private_key_dup != private_key || message_hash_dup != message_hash ||
|
||||
hash_size_dup != hash_size || signature_dup != signature){
|
||||
return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UECC_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* else keep trying */
|
||||
@ -194,6 +202,11 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
|
||||
bitcount_t i;
|
||||
bitcount_t flow_control;
|
||||
volatile uECC_word_t diff;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t *message_hash_dup = message_hash;
|
||||
volatile unsigned hash_size_dup = hash_size;
|
||||
volatile const uint8_t *signature_dup = signature;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
|
||||
uECC_word_t r[NUM_ECC_WORDS], s[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
|
||||
@ -295,6 +308,10 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
|
||||
* 1 (base value) + num_bits - 1 (from the loop) + 5 incrementations.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (diff == 0 && flow_control == (num_bits + 5)) {
|
||||
if(public_key_dup != public_key || message_hash_dup != message_hash ||
|
||||
hash_size_dup != hash_size || signature_dup != signature){
|
||||
return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return UECC_SUCCESS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user