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- Improved certificate validation and validation against the available CRLs
This commit is contained in:
Paul Bakker
parent
43ca69c38a
commit
76fd75a3de
@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ Note: Most of these features have been donated by Fox-IT
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for integration with OpenVPN
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* Added reading of DHM context from memory and file
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* Added verification callback on certificate chain
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verification to allow external blacklisting.
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verification to allow external blacklisting
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* Improved X509 certificate parsing to include extended
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certificate fields, including Key Usage.
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certificate fields, including Key Usage
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* Improved certificate verification and verification
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against the available CRLs
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* Detection for DES weak keys and parity bits added
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= Version 0.14.0 released on 2010-08-16
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@ -2626,6 +2626,69 @@ static void x509_hash( const unsigned char *in, int len, int alg,
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}
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}
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/*
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* Check that the given certificate is valid accoring to the CRL.
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*/
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static int x509parse_verifycrl(x509_cert *crt, x509_cert *ca,
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x509_crl *crl_list)
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{
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int flags = 0;
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int hash_id;
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unsigned char hash[64];
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/*
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* TODO: What happens if no CRL is present?
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* Suggestion: Revocation state should be unknown if no CRL is present.
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* For backwards compatibility this is not yet implemented.
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*/
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while( ca != NULL && crl_list != NULL && crl_list->version != 0 )
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{
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if( crl_list->issuer_raw.len != ca->subject_raw.len ||
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memcmp( crl_list->issuer_raw.p, ca->subject_raw.p,
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crl_list->issuer_raw.len ) != 0 )
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{
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crl_list = crl_list->next;
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continue;
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}
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/*
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* Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA
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*/
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hash_id = crl_list->sig_alg;
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x509_hash( crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );
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if( !rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ca->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, hash_id,
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0, hash, crl_list->sig.p ) == 0 )
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{
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/*
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* CRL is not trusted
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*/
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flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
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break;
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}
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/*
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* Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out)
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*/
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if( x509parse_time_expired( &crl_list->next_update ) )
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flags |= BADCRL_EXPIRED;
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/*
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* Check if certificate is revoked
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*/
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if( x509parse_revoked(crt, crl_list) )
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{
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flags |= BADCERT_REVOKED;
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break;
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}
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crl_list = crl_list->next;
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}
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return flags;
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}
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/*
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* Verify the certificate validity
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*/
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@ -2639,7 +2702,7 @@ int x509parse_verify( x509_cert *crt,
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int cn_len;
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int hash_id;
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int pathlen;
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x509_cert *cur;
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x509_cert *parent;
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x509_name *name;
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unsigned char hash[64];
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@ -2667,26 +2730,22 @@ int x509parse_verify( x509_cert *crt,
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*flags |= BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
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}
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*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
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/*
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* Iterate upwards in the given cert chain,
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* ignoring any upper cert with CA != TRUE.
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*/
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cur = crt->next;
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parent = crt->next;
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pathlen = 1;
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while( cur != NULL && cur->version != 0 )
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while( parent != NULL && parent->version != 0 )
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{
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int verify_ok = 1;
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if( cur->ca_istrue == 0 ||
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crt->issuer_raw.len != cur->subject_raw.len ||
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memcmp( crt->issuer_raw.p, cur->subject_raw.p,
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if( parent->ca_istrue == 0 ||
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crt->issuer_raw.len != parent->subject_raw.len ||
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memcmp( crt->issuer_raw.p, parent->subject_raw.p,
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crt->issuer_raw.len ) != 0 )
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{
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cur = cur->next;
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parent = parent->next;
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continue;
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}
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@ -2694,28 +2753,35 @@ int x509parse_verify( x509_cert *crt,
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x509_hash( crt->tbs.p, crt->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );
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if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &cur->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, hash_id,
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0, hash, crt->sig.p ) != 0 )
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verify_ok = 0;
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if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &parent->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, hash_id, 0, hash,
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crt->sig.p ) != 0 )
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*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
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/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
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*flags |= x509parse_verifycrl(crt, parent, ca_crl);
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/* crt is verified to be a child of the parent cur, call verify callback */
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if( NULL != f_vrfy )
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{
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if ( f_vrfy( p_vrfy, crt, pathlen-1, verify_ok ) != 0 )
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if( f_vrfy( p_vrfy, crt, pathlen - 1, ( *flags == 0 ) ) != 0 )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
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} else if ( verify_ok == 0 ) {
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
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else
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*flags = 0;
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}
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else if( *flags != 0 )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
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pathlen++;
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crt = cur;
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cur = crt->next;
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crt = parent;
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parent = crt->next;
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}
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/*
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* Atempt to validate topmost cert with our CA chain.
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* Attempt to validate topmost cert with our CA chain.
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*/
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*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
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while( trust_ca != NULL && trust_ca->version != 0 )
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{
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if( crt->issuer_raw.len != trust_ca->subject_raw.len ||
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@ -2747,71 +2813,19 @@ int x509parse_verify( x509_cert *crt,
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trust_ca = trust_ca->next;
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}
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/*
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* TODO: What happens if no CRL is present?
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* Suggestion: Revocation state should be unknown if no CRL is present.
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* For backwards compatibility this is not yet implemented.
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*/
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/*
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* Check if the topmost certificate is revoked if the trusted CA is
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* determined.
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*/
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while( trust_ca != NULL && ca_crl != NULL && ca_crl->version != 0 )
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{
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if( ca_crl->issuer_raw.len != trust_ca->subject_raw.len ||
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memcmp( ca_crl->issuer_raw.p, trust_ca->subject_raw.p,
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ca_crl->issuer_raw.len ) != 0 )
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{
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ca_crl = ca_crl->next;
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continue;
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}
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/*
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* Check if CRL is correctry signed by the trusted CA
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*/
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hash_id = ca_crl->sig_alg;
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x509_hash( ca_crl->tbs.p, ca_crl->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );
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if( !rsa_pkcs1_verify( &trust_ca->rsa, RSA_PUBLIC, hash_id,
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0, hash, ca_crl->sig.p ) == 0 )
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{
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/*
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* CRL is not trusted
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*/
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*flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
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break;
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}
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/*
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* Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out)
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*/
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if( x509parse_time_expired( &ca_crl->next_update ) )
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*flags |= BADCRL_EXPIRED;
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/*
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* Check if certificate is revoked
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*/
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if( x509parse_revoked(crt, ca_crl) )
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{
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*flags |= BADCERT_REVOKED;
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break;
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}
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ca_crl = ca_crl->next;
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}
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if( *flags != 0 )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
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/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
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*flags |= x509parse_verifycrl( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl );
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/* Verification succeeded, call callback on top cert */
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if( NULL != f_vrfy )
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{
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if ( f_vrfy(p_vrfy, crt, pathlen - 1, 1) != 0 )
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if( f_vrfy(p_vrfy, crt, pathlen-1, ( *flags == 0 ) ) != 0 )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
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else
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*flags = 0;
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}
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else if( *flags != 0 )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
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return( 0 );
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}
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@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ depends_on:POLARSSL_SHA4_C
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x509_verify:"data_files/cert_sha512.crt":"data_files/test-ca.crt":"data_files/crl.pem":NULL:POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:0:&verify_none
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X509 Certificate verification #20 (Not trusted Cert, allowing callback)
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x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/crl_expired.pem":NULL:POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED:&verify_all
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x509_verify:"data_files/server2.crt":"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/crl_expired.pem":NULL:0:0:&verify_all
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X509 Parse Selftest
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depends_on:POLARSSL_MD5_C
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