Avoid seemingly-possible overflow

By looking just at that test, it looks like 2 + dn_size could overflow. In
fact that can't happen as that would mean we've read a CA cert of size is too
big to be represented by a size_t.

However, it's best for code to be more obviously free of overflow without
having to reason about the bigger picture.
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2015-12-10 14:36:25 +01:00
parent 7da96958a6
commit 7f890c3e96

View File

@ -2474,7 +2474,9 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{ {
dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len;
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) if( end < p ||
(size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size ||
(size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size )
{ {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) );
break; break;