diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 7df5fa39a..3078c58e2 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ Bugfix
    * Memory leak in benchmark application
    * Fixed x509_crt_parse_path() bug on Windows platforms
 
+Security
+   * Possible remotely-triggered out-of-bounds memory access fixed (found by
+     TrustInSoft)
+
 = PolarSSL 1.3.2 released on 2013-11-04
 Features
    * PK tests added to test framework
diff --git a/include/polarssl/ssl.h b/include/polarssl/ssl.h
index 4b0c5f8bb..7e668f93b 100644
--- a/include/polarssl/ssl.h
+++ b/include/polarssl/ssl.h
@@ -237,8 +237,8 @@
 #endif /* !POLARSSL_CONFIG_OPTIONS */
 
 /*
- * Allow an extra 512 bytes for the record header
- * and encryption overhead (counter + MAC + padding)
+ * Allow an extra 301 bytes for the record header
+ * and encryption overhead: counter (8) + header (5) + MAC (32) + padding (256)
  * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if
  * enabled.
  */
@@ -248,9 +248,9 @@
 #define SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD             0
 #endif
 
-#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN (SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + 512)
+#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN (SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + 301)
 
-#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO    0xFF   /**< renegotiation info ext */ 
+#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO    0xFF   /**< renegotiation info ext */
 
 /*
  * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2)
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index 75ba9075a..6ea282180 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -1610,6 +1610,21 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl_context *ssl )
             size_t pad_count = 0, real_count = 1;
             size_t padding_idx = ssl->in_msglen - padlen - 1;
 
+            /*
+             * Padding is guaranteed to be incorrect if:
+             *   1. padlen - 1 > ssl->in_msglen
+             *
+             *   2. ssl->in_msglen + padlen >
+             *        SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 256 (max padding)
+             *
+             * In both cases we reset padding_idx to a safe value (0) to
+             * prevent out-of-buffer reads.
+             */
+            correct &= ( ssl->in_msglen >= padlen - 1 );
+            correct &= ( ssl->in_msglen + padlen <= SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 256 );
+
+            padding_idx *= correct;
+
             for( i = 1; i <= 256; i++ )
             {
                 real_count &= ( i <= padlen );