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Merge remote-tracking branch 'restricted/IOTSSL-1366/development-restricted' into development-restricted

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* restricted/IOTSSL-1366/development-restricted:
  More length checks in RSA PKCS1v15 verify
  More length checks in RSA PKCS1v15 verify
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2017-06-08 20:24:29 +02:00
commit a0bf6ecfc3
2 changed files with 19 additions and 9 deletions
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2
ChangeLog
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@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ Security
option if needed.
* Fixed offset in FALLBACK_SCSV parsing that caused TLS server to fail to
detect it sometimes. Reported by Hugo Leisink. #810
* Tighten ASN.1 parsing of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, to avoid a
potential Bleichenbacher-style attack.
Bugfix
* Remove invalid use of size zero arrays in ECJPAKE test suite.

26
library/rsa.c
View File

@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
{
int ret;
size_t len, siglen, asn1_len;
unsigned char *p, *end;
unsigned char *p, *p0, *end;
mbedtls_md_type_t msg_md_alg;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_asn1_buf oid;
@ -1519,24 +1519,29 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
end = p + len;
/*
* Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure
* Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure.
* Insist on 2-byte length tags, to protect against variants of
* Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification.
*/
p0 = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
if( asn1_len + 2 != len )
if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len + 2 != len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
p0 = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
if( asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len )
if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
p0 = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
if( p != p0 + 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
oid.p = p;
p += oid.len;
@ -1550,13 +1555,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
/*
* assume the algorithm parameters must be NULL
*/
p0 = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
if( p != p0 + 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
if( asn1_len != hashlen )
p0 = p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len != hashlen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) != 0 )