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Fix leakage of projective coordinates in ECC
See the comments in the code for how an attack would go, and the ChangeLog entry for an impact assessment. (For ECDSA, leaking a few bits of the scalar over several signatures translates to full private key recovery using a lattice attack.) Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
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@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ New deprecations
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* Deprecate MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL that enables function hooks in the
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SSL module for hardware acceleration of individual records.
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Security
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* Fix side channel in ECC code that allowed an adversary with access to
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precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an
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untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) to fully recover
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an ECDSA private key. Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya,
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Billy Brumley and Cesar Pereida Garcia. CVE-2020-10932
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Bugfix
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* Fix compilation failure when both MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and
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MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL are enabled.
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@ -2016,6 +2016,20 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
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final_norm:
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#endif
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/*
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* Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
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* scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow,
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* inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value
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* of its input via side-channels [2].
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*
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* [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191
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* [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055
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*
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* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
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*/
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if( f_rng != 0 )
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng ) );
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MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, RR ) );
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@ -2388,6 +2402,20 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) );
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}
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/*
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* Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
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* scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow,
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* inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value
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* of its input via side-channels [2].
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*
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* [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191
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* [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055
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*
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* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
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*/
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if( f_rng != NULL )
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) );
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cleanup:
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