Add comments on chain verification cases

This is the beginning of a series of commits refactoring the chain
building/verification functions in order to:
- make it simpler to understand and work with
- prepare integration of restartable ECC
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2017-06-29 10:45:25 +02:00
parent aa86a61181
commit afbbcf849c

View File

@ -1883,6 +1883,27 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
return( 0 ); return( 0 );
} }
/*
* Verify a certificate no parent inside the chain
* (either the parent is a trusted root, or there is no parent)
*
* See comments for mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile()
* (also for notation used belowe)
*
* This function is called in two cases:
* - child was found to have a parent in trusted roots, in which case we're
* called with trust_ca pointing directly to that parent (not the full list)
* - this happens in cases 1, 2 and 3 of the comment on verify()
* - case 1 is special as child and trust_ca point to copies of the same
* certificate then
* - child was found to have no parent either in the chain or in trusted CAs
* - this is cases 4 and 5 of the comment on verify()
*
* For historical reasons, the function currently does not assume that
* trust_ca points directly to the right root in the first case, and it
* doesn't know in which case it starts, so it always starts by searching for
* a parent in trust_ca.
*/
static int x509_crt_verify_top( static int x509_crt_verify_top(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
@ -2023,6 +2044,11 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_top(
return( 0 ); return( 0 );
} }
/*
* Verify a certificate with a parent inside the chain
*
* See comments for mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile()
*/
static int x509_crt_verify_child( static int x509_crt_verify_child(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
@ -2172,6 +2198,30 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
/* /*
* Verify the certificate validity, with profile * Verify the certificate validity, with profile
*
* The chain building/verification is spread accross 4 functions:
* - this one
* - x509_crt_verify_child()
* - x509_crt_verify_top()
* - x509_crt_check_parent()
*
* There are five main cases to consider. Let's introduce some notation:
* - E means the end-entity certificate
* - I and intermediate CA
* - R the trusted root CA this chain anchors to
* - T the list of trusted roots (R and possible some others)
*
* The main cases with the calling sequence of the crt_verify_xxx() are:
* 1. E = R (explicitly trusted EE cert)
* verify(E, T) -> verify_top(E, R)
* 2. E -> R (EE signed by trusted root)
* verify(E, T) -> verify_top(E, R)
* 3. E -> I -> R (EE signed by intermediate signed by trusted root)
* verify(E, T) -> verify_child(E, I, T) -> verify_top(I, R)
* 4. E -> I (EE signed by intermediate that's not trusted)
* verify(E, T) -> verify_child(E, I, T) -> verify_top(I, T)
* 5. E (EE not trusted)
* verify(E, T) -> verify_top(E, T)
*/ */
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,