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Merge remote-tracking branch 'restricted/pr/535' into development
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14
ChangeLog
14
ChangeLog
@ -5,9 +5,17 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
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Security
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* Fix timing variations and memory access variations in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
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decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle
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attack. In TLS, this affects RSA-based ciphersuites without DHE or
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ECDHE. Reported by Yuval Yarom, Eyal Ronen, Adi Shamir, David Wong and
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Daniel Genkin.
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attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on
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RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not
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(EC)DH(E)). Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, Daniel Genkin, Adi
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Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom. CVE-2018-19608
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* In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number
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via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit
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a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing
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of the decryption and not its result could nonetheless decrypt RSA
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plaintexts and forge RSA signatures. Other asymmetric algorithms may
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have been similarly vulnerable. Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham,
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Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom.
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= mbed TLS 2.14.0 branch released 2018-11-19
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@ -321,6 +321,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos )
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return( ( X->p[pos / biL] >> ( pos % biL ) ) & 0x01 );
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}
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/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */
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#define GET_BYTE( X, i ) \
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( ( ( X )->p[( i ) / ciL] >> ( ( ( i ) % ciL ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff )
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/*
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* Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1
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*/
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@ -704,19 +708,40 @@ cleanup:
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/*
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* Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian
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*/
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int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
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int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
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unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
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{
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size_t i, j, n;
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size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL;
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size_t bytes_to_copy;
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unsigned char *p;
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size_t i;
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n = mbedtls_mpi_size( X );
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if( stored_bytes < buflen )
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{
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/* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial
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* null bytes and record the position at which to start
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* writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution
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* trace of this function does not depend on the value of the
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* number. */
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bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes;
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p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes;
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memset( buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes );
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}
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else
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{
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/* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X.
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* However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */
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bytes_to_copy = buflen;
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p = buf;
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for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ )
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{
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if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
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}
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}
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if( buflen < n )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
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memset( buf, 0, buflen );
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for( i = buflen - 1, j = 0; n > 0; i--, j++, n-- )
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buf[i] = (unsigned char)( X->p[j / ciL] >> ((j % ciL) << 3) );
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for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ )
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p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE( X, i );
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return( 0 );
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}
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