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Add hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer
This commit adds a hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer triggering if both ssl->in_hslen and ssl->in_offt are not 0. This should never happen, and if it does, there's no sensible way of telling whether the previous message was a handshake or an application data message.
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@ -3777,6 +3777,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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* NOTE: This needs to be fixed, since like for
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* handshake messages it is allowed to have
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* multiple alerts witin a single record.
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* Internal reference IOTSSL-1321.
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*
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* (3) Change cipher spec:
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* Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0.
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@ -3791,6 +3792,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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/* Case (1): Handshake messages */
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if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 )
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{
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/* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data
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* is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during
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* ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */
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if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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}
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/*
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* Get next Handshake message in the current record
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*/
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@ -3808,6 +3818,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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* Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation.
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* The following check is therefore mandatory, and
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* should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion.
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* Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of
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* bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected
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* sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record.
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*/
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if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen )
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{
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