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Add hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer

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This commit adds a hard assertion to mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer
triggering if both ssl->in_hslen and ssl->in_offt are not 0. This
should never happen, and if it does, there's no sensible way of
telling whether the previous message was a handshake or an application
data message.
This commit is contained in:
Hanno Becker 2017-06-08 11:55:34 +01:00
parent 4a810fba69
commit bb9dd0c044
1 changed files with 13 additions and 0 deletions
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13
library/ssl_tls.c
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@ -3777,6 +3777,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
* NOTE: This needs to be fixed, since like for * NOTE: This needs to be fixed, since like for
* handshake messages it is allowed to have * handshake messages it is allowed to have
* multiple alerts witin a single record. * multiple alerts witin a single record.
* Internal reference IOTSSL-1321.
* *
* (3) Change cipher spec: * (3) Change cipher spec:
* Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0.
@ -3791,6 +3792,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/* Case (1): Handshake messages */ /* Case (1): Handshake messages */
if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 ) if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 )
{ {
/* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data
* is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during
* ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */
if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/* /*
* Get next Handshake message in the current record * Get next Handshake message in the current record
*/ */
@ -3808,6 +3818,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
* Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation.
* The following check is therefore mandatory, and * The following check is therefore mandatory, and
* should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion.
* Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of
* bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected
* sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record.
*/ */
if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen ) if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen )
{ {