From be16e38102859e8de927db8f64b1b2110a3e34d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Butcher Date: Sat, 1 Dec 2018 22:46:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Clarify attribution for the Bleichenbacher's Cat fix --- ChangeLog | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 61ec1a46a..48310357d 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -7,8 +7,11 @@ Security decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not - (EC)DH(E)). Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, Daniel Genkin, Adi - Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom. CVE-2018-19608 + (EC)DH(E)). Discovered by Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham + (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan), + Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom + (University of Adelaide, Data61). The attack is described in more detail + in the paper available here: http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf CVE-2018-19608 * In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing