diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c
index 57469873f..e49f74f76 100644
--- a/library/aes.c
+++ b/library/aes.c
@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
     unsigned int flow_ctrl = 0;
     volatile unsigned int i = 0;
     volatile int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile const unsigned char *key_dup = key;
+    volatile unsigned int keybits_dup = keybits;
     uint32_t *RK;
     uint32_t offset = 0;
 
@@ -814,9 +816,13 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 #endif
     ) )
     {
-        return ret;
+        if( keybits_dup == keybits && key_dup == key )
+        {
+            return ret;
+        }
     }
 
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( RK, 0, ( keybits >> 5 ) * 4 );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */
@@ -1063,6 +1069,8 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
     aes_r_data_t *aes_data_table[2];    // pointers to real and fake data
     int round_ctrl_table_len = ctx->nr + 2 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS;
     volatile int flow_control;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
     // control bytes for AES calculation rounds,
     // reserve based on max rounds + dummy rounds + 2 (for initial key addition)
     uint8_t round_ctrl_table[( 14 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS + 2 )];
@@ -1163,9 +1171,14 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
     if( flow_control == tindex + dummy_rounds + 8 )
     {
         /* Validate control path due possible fault injection */
-        return 0;
+        if( output_dup == output && input_dup == input )
+        {
+            return 0;
+        }
     }
 
+    // Clear the output in case of a FI
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 16 );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -1342,6 +1355,8 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
     aes_r_data_t *aes_data_table[2];    // pointers to real and fake data
     int round_ctrl_table_len = ctx->nr + 2 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS;
     volatile int flow_control;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
     // control bytes for AES calculation rounds,
     // reserve based on max rounds + dummy rounds + 2 (for initial key addition)
     uint8_t round_ctrl_table[( 14 + AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS + 2 )];
@@ -1442,9 +1457,14 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
     if( flow_control == tindex + dummy_rounds + 8 )
     {
         /* Validate control path due possible fault injection */
-        return 0;
+        if( output_dup == output && input_dup == input )
+        {
+            return 0;
+        }
     }
 
+    // Clear the output in case of a FI
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 16 );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
diff --git a/library/ccm.c b/library/ccm.c
index 750ec9e98..54d051e34 100644
--- a/library/ccm.c
+++ b/library/ccm.c
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
     const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+    volatile const unsigned char *key_dup = key;
+    volatile unsigned int keybits_dup = keybits;
 
     CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
@@ -99,7 +101,14 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
         return( ret );
     }
 
-    return( ret );
+    if( keybits_dup == keybits && key_dup == key )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+
+    // In case of a FI - clear the context
+    mbedtls_cipher_free( &ctx->cipher_ctx );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -165,6 +174,15 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
     unsigned char ctr[16];
     const unsigned char *src;
     unsigned char *dst;
+    volatile size_t length_dup = length;
+    volatile const unsigned char *iv_dup = iv;
+    volatile size_t iv_len_dup = iv_len;
+    volatile const unsigned char *add_dup = add;
+    volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
+    volatile unsigned char *tag_dup = tag;
+    volatile size_t tag_len_dup = tag_len;
 
     /*
      * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
@@ -316,6 +334,16 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
     CTR_CRYPT( y, y, 16 );
     mbedtls_platform_memcpy( tag, y, tag_len );
 
+    if( length_dup != length || iv_dup != iv || iv_len_dup != iv_len ||
+        add_dup != add || add_len_dup != add_len || input_dup != input ||
+        output_dup != output || tag_dup != tag || tag_len_dup != tag_len)
+    {
+
+        // In case of a FI - clear the output
+        mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, length );
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
+
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -370,6 +398,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
     unsigned char check_tag[16];
     unsigned char i;
     int diff;
+    volatile size_t length_dup = length;
+    volatile const unsigned char *iv_dup = iv;
+    volatile size_t iv_len_dup = iv_len;
+    volatile const unsigned char *add_dup = add;
+    volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
+    volatile const unsigned char *tag_dup = tag;
+    volatile size_t tag_len_dup = tag_len;
 
     CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
@@ -395,6 +432,13 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED );
     }
 
+    if( length_dup != length || iv_dup != iv || iv_len_dup != iv_len ||
+        add_dup != add || add_len_dup != add_len || input_dup != input ||
+        output_dup != output || tag_dup != tag || tag_len_dup != tag_len)
+    {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
+
     return( ret );
 }
 
diff --git a/library/entropy.c b/library/entropy.c
index f5d7d4021..8db3d94f1 100644
--- a/library/entropy.c
+++ b/library/entropy.c
@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_add_source( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx,
                         size_t threshold, int strong )
 {
     int idx, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source_dup = f_source;
+    volatile void *p_source_dup = p_source;
+    volatile size_t threshold_dup = threshold;
+    volatile int strong_dup = strong;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
@@ -170,6 +174,11 @@ exit:
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
 #endif
 
+    if( f_source_dup != f_source || p_source_dup != p_source ||
+        threshold_dup != threshold || strong_dup != strong )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -184,7 +193,8 @@ static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id
     size_t use_len = len;
     const unsigned char *p = data;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
-
+    volatile const unsigned char *data_dup = data;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
     if( use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE )
     {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR)
@@ -229,6 +239,10 @@ static int entropy_update( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id
 cleanup:
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
 
+    if( len_dup != len || data_dup != data )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -349,6 +363,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func( void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
     int count = 0, i, done;
     mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    volatile void *data_dup = data;
+    volatile unsigned char *output_dup = output;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
 
     if( len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
@@ -456,7 +473,10 @@ exit:
     if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
 #endif
-
+    if( data_dup != data || len_dup != len || output_dup != output )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 
diff --git a/library/hmac_drbg.c b/library/hmac_drbg.c
index d197f24a1..58750c8b7 100644
--- a/library/hmac_drbg.c
+++ b/library/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
     volatile unsigned int flow_counter = 0;
     unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile const unsigned char *additional_dup = additional;
+    volatile size_t add_len_dup = add_len;
 
     for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ )
     {
@@ -143,7 +145,10 @@ exit:
         // Double check flow_counter
         if ( ( flow_counter == 7 ) || ( flow_counter == 16 ) )
         {
-            return ret;   // success, return 0 from ret
+            if( additional_dup == additional && add_len_dup == add_len )
+            {
+                return ret;   // success, return 0 from ret
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -167,6 +172,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
                                 const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile const unsigned char *data_dup = data;
+    volatile size_t data_len_dup = data_len;
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
         return( ret );
@@ -183,7 +190,10 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 )
         return( ret );
-
+    if( data_dup != data || data_len_dup != data_len )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -200,6 +210,9 @@ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
     size_t seedlen = 0;
     size_t total_entropy_len;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile const unsigned char *additional_dup = additional;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
+    int reseed_counter_backup = -1;
 
     if( use_nonce == HMAC_NONCE_NO )
         total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len;
@@ -257,6 +270,7 @@ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
         goto exit;
 
     /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */
+    reseed_counter_backup = ctx->reseed_counter;
     ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
 
 exit:
@@ -264,6 +278,15 @@ exit:
     /* 4. Done */
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen );
 
+    if( additional_dup != additional || len_dup != len )
+    {
+        /* Rollback the reseed_counter in case of FI */
+        if( reseed_counter_backup != -1 )
+            ctx->reseed_counter = reseed_counter_backup;
+
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
+
     if ( ret != 0 )
         return ret;
 
@@ -273,6 +296,9 @@ exit:
         return ret;
     }
 
+    /* Rollback the reseed_counter in case of FI */
+    if( reseed_counter_backup != -1 )
+        ctx->reseed_counter = reseed_counter_backup;
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -299,6 +325,11 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
                     size_t len )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    int (* volatile f_entropy_dup)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) = f_entropy;
+    volatile void *p_entropy_dup = p_entropy;
+    volatile const unsigned char *custom_dup = custom;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
+
     size_t md_size;
 
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
@@ -339,6 +370,11 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
         return( ret );
     }
 
+    if( f_entropy != f_entropy_dup || p_entropy != p_entropy_dup ||
+        custom_dup != custom || len_dup != len )
+    {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    }
     return( ret );
 }
 
diff --git a/library/sha256.c b/library/sha256.c
index 07b899d07..493e88ed5 100644
--- a/library/sha256.c
+++ b/library/sha256.c
@@ -287,7 +287,8 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
     {
         return( 0 );
     }
-
+    /* Free the ctx upon suspected FI */
+    mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -310,7 +311,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
     int ret;
     size_t fill;
     uint32_t left;
-
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile size_t ilen_dup = ilen;
+    size_t ilen_change;
     SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
 
@@ -353,8 +356,15 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
     /* Re-check ilen to protect from a FI attack */
     if( ilen < 64 )
     {
-        return( 0 );
+        /* Re-check that the calculated offsets are correct */
+        ilen_change = ilen_dup - ilen;
+        if( ( input_dup + ilen_change ) == input )
+        {
+            return( 0 );
+        }
     }
+    /* Free the ctx upon suspected FI */
+    mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -451,6 +461,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret( mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
     {
         return( 0 );
     }
+    /* Free the ctx and clear output upon suspected FI */
+    mbedtls_sha256_free( ctx );
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 32 );
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
@@ -472,8 +485,10 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input,
                         unsigned char output[32],
                         int is224 )
 {
-    int ret;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_sha256_context ctx;
+    volatile const unsigned char *input_dup = input;
+    volatile size_t ilen_dup = ilen;
 
     SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( is224 == 0 || is224 == 1 );
     SHA256_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
@@ -493,7 +508,12 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret( const unsigned char *input,
 exit:
     mbedtls_sha256_free( &ctx );
 
-    return( ret );
+    if( input_dup == input && ilen_dup == ilen )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+    mbedtls_platform_memset( output, 0, 32 );
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c
index 5c74386e0..5b47c0a9b 100644
--- a/library/ssl_cli.c
+++ b/library/ssl_cli.c
@@ -2796,10 +2796,14 @@ static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     volatile int ret = 0;
     unsigned char *p;
     unsigned char *end;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
 
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
 
+    ((void) buf_dup);
+    ((void) buflen_dup);
     p   = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
     end = buf + buflen;
 
@@ -3100,7 +3104,7 @@ static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
         {
             mbedtls_platform_random_delay();
 
-            if( ret == 0 )
+            if( ret == 0 && buf_dup == buf && buflen_dup == buflen )
             {
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
                 /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
@@ -3583,7 +3587,10 @@ static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 {
     int ret;
     unsigned char *p, *end;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
     size_t n;
+
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
 
@@ -3866,7 +3873,12 @@ static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     }
 
     *olen = p - buf;
-    return( 0 );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( buf_dup == buf && buflen_dup == buflen )
+    {
+       return( 0 );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c
index 2cd34b21f..7094a89a1 100644
--- a/library/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/library/ssl_srv.c
@@ -3269,13 +3269,19 @@ static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                            - sig_start );
     int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume( ssl,
                                          sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len );
+    volatile size_t *signature_len_dup = signature_len;
     if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS )
     {
         ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
         mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data( ssl, NULL );
     }
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret );
-    return( ret );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( signature_len_dup == signature_len )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED) &&
           defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
@@ -3286,6 +3292,7 @@ static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                             size_t *signature_len )
 {
+    volatile size_t *signature_len_dup = signature_len;
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
 
@@ -3673,7 +3680,11 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
 
-    return( 0 );
+    if( signature_len_dup == signature_len )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 /* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites
@@ -3821,6 +3832,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *
                                        const unsigned char *end )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    unsigned char ** volatile p_dup = p;
+    volatile const unsigned char *end_dup = end;
     size_t n;
 
     /*
@@ -3851,7 +3864,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
 
-    return( ret );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( p_dup == p && end_dup == end )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
           MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
@@ -4218,6 +4236,8 @@ static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
         mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
     unsigned char *p, *end;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
 
     p = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
     end = buf + buflen;
@@ -4412,8 +4432,11 @@ static int ssl_in_client_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
     }
-
-    return( ret );
+    if( buf_dup == buf && buflen_dup == buflen )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 /* Update the handshake state */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c
index b74c96d5a..c16bd6154 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls.c
@@ -177,6 +177,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
                               size_t buflen )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t buflen_dup = buflen;
     mbedtls_record rec;
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen );
@@ -228,6 +230,10 @@ exit:
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
     }
 
+    if( buf_dup != buf || buflen_dup != buflen )
+    {
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
+    }
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
     return( ret );
 }
@@ -282,6 +288,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                          unsigned char const *own_cid,
                          size_t own_cid_len )
 {
+    volatile unsigned char const *own_cid_dup = own_cid;
+    volatile size_t own_cid_len_dup = own_cid_len;
+
     if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
@@ -308,7 +317,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
      * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX at most 255. */
     ssl->own_cid_len = (uint8_t) own_cid_len;
 
-    return( 0 );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( own_cid_dup == own_cid && own_cid_len_dup == own_cid_len )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -605,7 +619,13 @@ MBEDTLS_NO_INLINE static int ssl3_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
     mbedtls_sha1_context sha1;
     unsigned char padding[16];
     unsigned char sha1sum[20];
-    ((void)label);
+    volatile const unsigned char *secret_dup = secret;
+    volatile size_t slen_dup = slen;
+    volatile const char *label_dup = label;
+    volatile const unsigned char *random_dup = random;
+    volatile size_t rlen_dup = rlen;
+    volatile unsigned char *dstbuf_dup = dstbuf;
+    volatile size_t dlen_dup = dlen;
 
     mbedtls_md5_init(  &md5  );
     mbedtls_sha1_init( &sha1 );
@@ -650,7 +670,14 @@ exit:
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( padding, sizeof( padding ) );
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( sha1sum, sizeof( sha1sum ) );
 
-    return( ret );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( secret_dup == secret && slen_dup == slen && label_dup == label &&
+        random_dup == random && rlen_dup == rlen && dstbuf_dup == dstbuf &&
+        dlen_dup == dlen )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
 
@@ -668,6 +695,13 @@ MBEDTLS_NO_INLINE static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
     mbedtls_md_handle_t md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
     int ret;
+    volatile const unsigned char *secret_dup = secret;
+    volatile size_t slen_dup = slen;
+    volatile const char *label_dup = label;
+    volatile const unsigned char *random_dup = random;
+    volatile size_t rlen_dup = rlen;
+    volatile unsigned char *dstbuf_dup = dstbuf;
+    volatile size_t dlen_dup = dlen;
 
     mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
 
@@ -754,7 +788,14 @@ MBEDTLS_NO_INLINE static int tls1_prf( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) );
 
-    return( 0 );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( secret_dup == secret && slen_dup == slen && label_dup == label &&
+        random_dup == random && rlen_dup == rlen && dstbuf_dup == dstbuf &&
+        dlen_dup == dlen )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
 
@@ -777,6 +818,13 @@ int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
     mbedtls_md_handle_t md_info;
     mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
     int ret;
+    volatile const unsigned char *secret_dup = secret;
+    volatile size_t slen_dup = slen;
+    volatile const char *label_dup = label;
+    volatile const unsigned char *random_dup = random;
+    volatile size_t rlen_dup = rlen;
+    volatile unsigned char *dstbuf_dup = dstbuf;
+    volatile size_t dlen_dup = dlen;
 
     mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx );
 
@@ -836,7 +884,14 @@ int tls_prf_generic( mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
     (void)mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
     (void)mbedtls_platform_zeroize( h_i, sizeof( h_i ) );
 
-    return( 0 );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( secret_dup == secret && slen_dup == slen && label_dup == label &&
+        random_dup == random && rlen_dup == rlen && dstbuf_dup == dstbuf &&
+        dlen_dup == dlen )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
@@ -1828,6 +1883,7 @@ static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake,
                                const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
 {
     int ret;
+    volatile unsigned char *master_dup = master;
 
 /* #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) */
 /*     ssl = NULL; /\* make sure we don't use it except for debug and EMS *\/ */
@@ -1888,8 +1944,12 @@ static int ssl_compute_master( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake,
 
     mbedtls_platform_zeroize( handshake->premaster,
                               sizeof(handshake->premaster) );
-
-    return( 0 );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( master_dup == master )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
@@ -2406,22 +2466,32 @@ static int ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content,
     size_t pad = ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY -
                    ( len + 1 ) % MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY ) %
         MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY;
+    volatile unsigned char *content_dup = content;
+    volatile size_t *content_size_dup = content_size;
+    volatile size_t remaining_dup = remaining;
 
     /* Write real content type */
     if( remaining == 0 )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
     content[ len ] = rec_type;
     len++;
     remaining--;
 
     if( remaining < pad )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
     mbedtls_platform_memset( content + len, 0, pad );
     len += pad;
     remaining -= pad;
 
     *content_size = len;
-    return( 0 );
+
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( content_dup == content && content_size_dup == content_size &&
+        ( remaining_dup - 1 - pad ) == remaining )
+    {
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 /* This function parses a DTLSInnerPlaintext structure.
@@ -2566,6 +2636,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 
     if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
     {
+        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED;
         /*
          * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure.
          * See ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext() for more information.
@@ -2573,12 +2644,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
          * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence
          * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards.
          */
-        if( ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext( data,
-                        &rec->data_len,
-                        post_avail,
-                        rec->type ) != 0 )
+        if( ( ret = ssl_cid_build_inner_plaintext( data,
+                                                   &rec->data_len,
+                                                   post_avail,
+                                                   rec->type ) ) != 0 )
         {
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
+            return( ret );
         }
 
         rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID;
@@ -4816,6 +4887,7 @@ static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len )
     memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 );
 }
 
+#define BITMASK_CHECK_FAILED 0x75555555
 /*
  * Check that bitmask is full
  */
@@ -4825,11 +4897,11 @@ static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len )
 
     for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ )
         if( mask[i] != 0xFF )
-            return( -1 );
+            return( BITMASK_CHECK_FAILED );
 
     for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ )
         if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 )
-            return( -1 );
+            return( BITMASK_CHECK_FAILED );
 
     return( 0 );
 }
@@ -7057,6 +7129,7 @@ write_msg:
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+#define PEER_CRT_CHANGED 0x75555555
 static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          unsigned char *crt_buf,
                                          size_t crt_buf_len )
@@ -7064,14 +7137,15 @@ static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert;
 
     if( peer_crt == NULL )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
 
     if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
 
     return( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, crt_buf_len ) );
 }
 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+#define PEER_CRT_CHANGED 0x75555555
 static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          unsigned char *crt_buf,
                                          size_t crt_buf_len )
@@ -7089,16 +7163,16 @@ static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     if( peer_cert_digest == NULL ||
         digest_info == MBEDTLS_MD_INVALID_HANDLE )
     {
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
     }
 
     digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( digest_info );
     if( digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
 
     ret = mbedtls_md( digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest );
     if( ret != 0 )
-        return( -1 );
+        return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
 
     return( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) );
 }
@@ -10878,6 +10952,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
 {
     int ret;
     size_t n;
+    volatile unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
 
     if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -11191,7 +11267,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) );
 
-    return( (int) n );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( buf_dup == buf && len_dup == len )
+    {
+        return( (int) n );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -11211,6 +11292,8 @@ static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 {
     int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl );
     const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret;
+    volatile const unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
 
     if( ret < 0 )
     {
@@ -11233,6 +11316,7 @@ static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS)
         {
             len = max_len;
+            len_dup = len;
         }
 #endif
     }
@@ -11268,8 +11352,12 @@ static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
             return( ret );
         }
     }
-
-    return( (int) len );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( buf_dup == buf && len_dup == len )
+    {
+        return( (int) len );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -11318,6 +11406,8 @@ static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
 {
     int ret;
+    volatile const unsigned char *buf_dup = buf;
+    volatile size_t len_dup = len;
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) );
 
@@ -11349,7 +11439,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_
 
     MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) );
 
-    return( ret );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( buf_dup == buf && len_dup == len )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -12933,6 +13028,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 {
     int ret = 0;
     mbedtls_md_context_t ctx;
+    volatile unsigned char* hash_dup = hash;
+    volatile size_t *hashlen_dup = hashlen;
+    volatile unsigned char* data_dup = data;
+    volatile size_t data_len_dup = data_len;
+
     mbedtls_md_handle_t md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
     *hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
 
@@ -12978,7 +13078,13 @@ exit:
         mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
 
-    return( ret );
+    /* Secure against buffer substitution */
+    if( hash_dup == hash && hashlen_dup == hashlen &&
+        data_dup == data && data_len_dup == data_len )
+    {
+        return( ret );
+    }
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FAULT_DETECTED );
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
           MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
diff --git a/tinycrypt/ecc.c b/tinycrypt/ecc.c
index ca91e12f4..805543204 100644
--- a/tinycrypt/ecc.c
+++ b/tinycrypt/ecc.c
@@ -33,16 +33,16 @@
  *  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  *  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
  *
- *    - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
- *     this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *	- Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *	 this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
- *    - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *	- Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *	notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *	documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  *
- *    - Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
- *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *	- Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
+ *	may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *	without specific prior written permission.
  *
  *  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
  *  AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ const uECC_word_t curve_b[NUM_ECC_WORDS] = {
 };
 
 static int uECC_update_param_sha256(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
-				    const uECC_word_t val[NUM_ECC_WORDS])
+					const uECC_word_t val[NUM_ECC_WORDS])
 {
 	uint8_t bytes[NUM_ECC_BYTES];
 
@@ -119,10 +119,10 @@ static int uECC_compute_param_sha256(unsigned char output[32])
 	}
 
 	if (uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_p) != 0 ||
-	    uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_n) != 0 ||
-	    uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_G) != 0 ||
-	    uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_G + NUM_ECC_WORDS) != 0 ||
-	    uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_b) != 0)
+		uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_n) != 0 ||
+		uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_G) != 0 ||
+		uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_G + NUM_ECC_WORDS) != 0 ||
+		uECC_update_param_sha256(&ctx, curve_b) != 0)
 	{
 		goto exit;
 	}
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ void ecc_wait_state_reset(ecc_wait_state_t *ws)
  * know it's always 8. This saves a bit of code size and execution speed.
  */
 static void uECC_vli_mult_rnd(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *left,
-			      const uECC_word_t *right, ecc_wait_state_t *s)
+				  const uECC_word_t *right, ecc_wait_state_t *s)
 {
 
 	uECC_word_t r0 = 0;
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static void uECC_vli_mult_rnd(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *left,
 }
 
 void uECC_vli_modAdd(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *left,
-		     const uECC_word_t *right, const uECC_word_t *mod)
+			 const uECC_word_t *right, const uECC_word_t *mod)
 {
 	uECC_word_t carry = uECC_vli_add(result, left, right);
 	if (carry || uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(mod, result) != 1) {
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ void uECC_vli_modAdd(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *left,
 }
 
 void uECC_vli_modSub(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *left,
-		     const uECC_word_t *right, const uECC_word_t *mod)
+			 const uECC_word_t *right, const uECC_word_t *mod)
 {
 	uECC_word_t l_borrow = uECC_vli_sub(result, left, right);
 	if (l_borrow) {
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ void uECC_vli_modSub(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *left,
 /* Computes result = product % mod, where product is 2N words long. */
 /* Currently only designed to work for curve_p or curve_n. */
 void uECC_vli_mmod(uECC_word_t *result, uECC_word_t *product,
-    		   const uECC_word_t *mod)
+			   const uECC_word_t *mod)
 {
 	uECC_word_t mod_multiple[2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t tmp[2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS];
@@ -608,14 +608,14 @@ void uECC_vli_mmod(uECC_word_t *result, uECC_word_t *product,
 		index = !(index ^ borrow);
 		uECC_vli_rshift1(mod_multiple);
 		mod_multiple[num_words - 1] |= mod_multiple[num_words] <<
-					       (uECC_WORD_BITS - 1);
+						   (uECC_WORD_BITS - 1);
 		uECC_vli_rshift1(mod_multiple + num_words);
 	}
 	uECC_vli_set(result, v[index]);
 }
 
 void uECC_vli_modMult(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *left,
-		      const uECC_word_t *right, const uECC_word_t *mod)
+			  const uECC_word_t *right, const uECC_word_t *mod)
 {
 	uECC_word_t product[2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_vli_mult_rnd(product, left, right, NULL);
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ void uECC_vli_modMult_fast(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *left,
 #define EVEN(vli) (!(vli[0] & 1))
 
 static void vli_modInv_update(uECC_word_t *uv,
-			      const uECC_word_t *mod)
+				  const uECC_word_t *mod)
 {
 
 	uECC_word_t carry = 0;
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static void vli_modInv_update(uECC_word_t *uv,
 }
 
 void uECC_vli_modInv(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *input,
-		     const uECC_word_t *mod)
+			 const uECC_word_t *mod)
 {
 	uECC_word_t a[NUM_ECC_WORDS], b[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t u[NUM_ECC_WORDS], v[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
@@ -674,27 +674,27 @@ void uECC_vli_modInv(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *input,
 	while ((cmpResult = uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(a, b)) != 0) {
 		if (EVEN(a)) {
 			uECC_vli_rshift1(a);
-      			vli_modInv_update(u, mod);
-    		} else if (EVEN(b)) {
+	  			vli_modInv_update(u, mod);
+			} else if (EVEN(b)) {
 			uECC_vli_rshift1(b);
 			vli_modInv_update(v, mod);
 		} else if (cmpResult > 0) {
 			uECC_vli_sub(a, a, b);
 			uECC_vli_rshift1(a);
 			if (uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(u, v) < 0) {
-        			uECC_vli_add(u, u, mod);
-      			}
-      			uECC_vli_sub(u, u, v);
-      			vli_modInv_update(u, mod);
-    		} else {
-      			uECC_vli_sub(b, b, a);
-      			uECC_vli_rshift1(b);
-      			if (uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(v, u) < 0) {
-        			uECC_vli_add(v, v, mod);
-      			}
-      			uECC_vli_sub(v, v, u);
-      			vli_modInv_update(v, mod);
-    		}
+					uECC_vli_add(u, u, mod);
+	  			}
+	  			uECC_vli_sub(u, u, v);
+	  			vli_modInv_update(u, mod);
+			} else {
+	  			uECC_vli_sub(b, b, a);
+	  			uECC_vli_rshift1(b);
+	  			if (uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(v, u) < 0) {
+					uECC_vli_add(v, v, mod);
+	  			}
+	  			uECC_vli_sub(v, v, u);
+	  			vli_modInv_update(v, mod);
+			}
   	}
   	uECC_vli_set(result, u);
 }
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ void uECC_vli_modInv(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *input,
 /* ------ Point operations ------ */
 
 void double_jacobian_default(uECC_word_t * X1, uECC_word_t * Y1,
-			     uECC_word_t * Z1)
+				 uECC_word_t * Z1)
 {
 	/* t1 = X, t2 = Y, t3 = Z */
 	uECC_word_t t4[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ void double_jacobian_default(uECC_word_t * X1, uECC_word_t * Y1,
  * @param curve IN -- elliptic curve
  */
 static void x_side_default(uECC_word_t *result,
-		    const uECC_word_t *x)
+			const uECC_word_t *x)
 {
 	uECC_word_t _3[NUM_ECC_WORDS] = {3}; /* -a = 3 */
 
@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ void vli_mmod_fast_secp256r1(unsigned int *result, unsigned int*product)
 		while (carry < 0);
 	} else  {
 		while (carry ||
-		       uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(curve_p, result) != 1) {
+			   uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(curve_p, result) != 1) {
 			carry -= uECC_vli_sub(result, result, curve_p);
 		}
 	}
@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ void apply_z(uECC_word_t * X1, uECC_word_t * Y1, const uECC_word_t * const Z)
 {
 	uECC_word_t t1[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 
-	uECC_vli_modMult_fast(t1, Z, Z);    /* z^2 */
+	uECC_vli_modMult_fast(t1, Z, Z);	/* z^2 */
 	uECC_vli_modMult_fast(X1, X1, t1); /* x1 * z^2 */
 	uECC_vli_modMult_fast(t1, t1, Z);  /* z^3 */
 	uECC_vli_modMult_fast(Y1, Y1, t1); /* y1 * z^3 */
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ static void XYcZ_add_rnd(uECC_word_t * X1, uECC_word_t * Y1,
 }
 
 void XYcZ_add(uECC_word_t * X1, uECC_word_t * Y1,
-	      uECC_word_t * X2, uECC_word_t * Y2)
+		  uECC_word_t * X2, uECC_word_t * Y2)
 {
 	XYcZ_add_rnd(X1, Y1, X2, Y2, NULL);
 }
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ static uECC_word_t regularize_k(const uECC_word_t * const k, uECC_word_t *k0,
 	bitcount_t num_n_bits = NUM_ECC_BITS;
 
 	uECC_word_t carry = uECC_vli_add(k0, k, curve_n) ||
-			     uECC_vli_testBit(k0, num_n_bits);
+				 uECC_vli_testBit(k0, num_n_bits);
 
 	uECC_vli_add(k1, k0, curve_n);
 
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ int EccPoint_mult_safer(uECC_word_t * result, const uECC_word_t * point,
 	carry = regularize_k(scalar, tmp, s);
 
 	/* If an RNG function was specified, get a random initial Z value to
-         * protect against side-channel attacks such as Template SPA */
+		 * protect against side-channel attacks such as Template SPA */
 	if (g_rng_function) {
 		if (uECC_generate_random_int(k2[carry], curve_p, num_words) != UECC_SUCCESS) {
 			r = UECC_FAILURE;
@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ uECC_word_t EccPoint_compute_public_key(uECC_word_t *result,
 
 /* Converts an integer in uECC native format to big-endian bytes. */
 void uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(uint8_t *bytes, int num_bytes,
-			    const unsigned int *native)
+				const unsigned int *native)
 {
 	wordcount_t i;
 	for (i = 0; i < num_bytes; ++i) {
@@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ void uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(uint8_t *bytes, int num_bytes,
 
 /* Converts big-endian bytes to an integer in uECC native format. */
 void uECC_vli_bytesToNative(unsigned int *native, const uint8_t *bytes,
-			    int num_bytes)
+				int num_bytes)
 {
 	wordcount_t i;
 	uECC_vli_clear(native);
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ void uECC_vli_bytesToNative(unsigned int *native, const uint8_t *bytes,
 }
 
 int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
-			     wordcount_t num_words)
+				 wordcount_t num_words)
 {
 	uECC_word_t mask = (uECC_word_t)-1;
 	uECC_word_t tries;
@@ -1170,10 +1170,10 @@ int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
 
 	for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
 		if (g_rng_function((uint8_t *)random, num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE) != num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
-      			return UECC_FAILURE;
-    		}
+	  			return UECC_FAILURE;
+			}
 		random[num_words - 1] &=
-        		mask >> ((bitcount_t)(num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE * 8 - num_bits));
+				mask >> ((bitcount_t)(num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE * 8 - num_bits));
 		if (!uECC_vli_isZero(random) &&
 			uECC_vli_cmp(top, random) == 1) {
 			return UECC_SUCCESS;
@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ int uECC_valid_point(const uECC_word_t *point)
 	/* Make sure that y^2 == x^3 + ax + b */
 	diff = uECC_vli_equal(tmp1, tmp2);
 	if (diff == 0) {
-	    mbedtls_platform_random_delay();
+		mbedtls_platform_random_delay();
 		if (diff == 0) {
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -1239,6 +1239,8 @@ int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key)
 	int ret = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
 	uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
+	volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
 
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(
 	_private,
@@ -1264,5 +1266,8 @@ int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key)
 	uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(
 	public_key +
 	NUM_ECC_BYTES, NUM_ECC_BYTES, _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
+	if (private_key_dup != private_key || public_key_dup != public_key){
+		return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+	}
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c b/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
index a63c84bba..bf3a80343 100644
--- a/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
+++ b/tinycrypt/ecc_dh.c
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
  *  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
- *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *	this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
- *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
- *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *	this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ *	and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
  * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@@ -36,16 +36,16 @@
  *  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  *  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
  *
- *    - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
- *     this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *	- Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *	 this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
- *    - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *	- Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *	notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *	documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  *
- *    - Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
- *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *	- Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
+ *	may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *	without specific prior written permission.
  *
  *  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
  *  AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@@ -91,14 +91,14 @@ int uECC_make_key_with_d(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key,
 
 	/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
 	uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(private_key,
-			       BITS_TO_BYTES(NUM_ECC_BITS),
-			       _private);
+				   BITS_TO_BYTES(NUM_ECC_BITS),
+				   _private);
 	uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(public_key,
-			       NUM_ECC_BYTES,
-			       _public);
+				   NUM_ECC_BYTES,
+				   _public);
 	uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(public_key + NUM_ECC_BYTES,
-			       NUM_ECC_BYTES,
-			       _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
+				   NUM_ECC_BYTES,
+				   _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
 
 exit:
 	/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
@@ -114,13 +114,15 @@ int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key)
 	uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
 	uECC_word_t tries;
+	volatile uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
+	volatile uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
 
 	for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
 		/* Generating _private uniformly at random: */
 		uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng();
 		if (!rng_function ||
 			rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) != 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
-        		return UECC_FAILURE;
+				return UECC_FAILURE;
 		}
 
 		/* computing modular reduction of _random (see FIPS 186.4 B.4.1): */
@@ -136,26 +138,31 @@ int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key)
 
 			/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
 			uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(private_key,
-					       BITS_TO_BYTES(NUM_ECC_BITS),
-					       _private);
+						   BITS_TO_BYTES(NUM_ECC_BITS),
+						   _private);
 			uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(public_key,
-					       NUM_ECC_BYTES,
-					       _public);
+						   NUM_ECC_BYTES,
+						   _public);
 			uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(public_key + NUM_ECC_BYTES,
- 					       NUM_ECC_BYTES,
-					       _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
+ 						   NUM_ECC_BYTES,
+						   _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
 
 			/* erasing temporary buffer that stored secret: */
 			mbedtls_platform_memset(_private, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
 
-      			return UECC_SUCCESS;
-    		}
+			if (private_key == private_key_dup && public_key == public_key_dup) {
+				return UECC_SUCCESS;
+			}
+			/* Erase key in case of FI */
+			mbedtls_platform_memset(public_key, 0, 2*NUM_ECC_BYTES);
+			return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+		}
   	}
 	return UECC_FAILURE;
 }
 
 int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
-		       uint8_t *secret)
+			   uint8_t *secret)
 {
 
 	uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
@@ -163,23 +170,31 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
 	wordcount_t num_words = NUM_ECC_WORDS;
 	wordcount_t num_bytes = NUM_ECC_BYTES;
 	int r = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+	volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *secret_dup = secret;
 
 	/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_private,
-      			       private_key,
-			       BITS_TO_BYTES(NUM_ECC_BITS));
+	  				   private_key,
+				   BITS_TO_BYTES(NUM_ECC_BITS));
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_public,
-      			       public_key,
-			       num_bytes);
+	  				   public_key,
+				   num_bytes);
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_public + num_words,
-			       public_key + num_bytes,
-			       num_bytes);
+				   public_key + num_bytes,
+				   num_bytes);
 
 	r = EccPoint_mult_safer(_public, _public, _private);
 	uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(secret, num_bytes, _public);
 
 	/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
 	mbedtls_platform_zeroize(_private, sizeof(_private));
+	if (public_key_dup != public_key || private_key_dup != private_key || secret_dup != secret) {
+	    /* Erase secret in case of FI */
+	    mbedtls_platform_memset(secret, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
+		return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+	}
 
 	return r;
 }
diff --git a/tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c b/tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c
index bb3ed813b..2a676dc8f 100644
--- a/tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c
+++ b/tinycrypt/ecc_dsa.c
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
  *  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
- *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *	this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
- *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
- *    and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *	this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ *	and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
  * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@@ -34,16 +34,16 @@
  *  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  *  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
  *
- *    - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
- *     this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *	- Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *	 this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  *
- *    - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *	- Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *	notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *	documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  *
- *    - Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
- *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
- *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *	- Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
+ *	may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *	without specific prior written permission.
  *
  *  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
  *  AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
 #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
 
 static void bits2int(uECC_word_t *native, const uint8_t *bits,
-		     unsigned bits_size)
+			 unsigned bits_size)
 {
 	unsigned num_n_bytes = BITS_TO_BYTES(NUM_ECC_BITS);
 
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static void bits2int(uECC_word_t *native, const uint8_t *bits,
 }
 
 int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
-		     unsigned hash_size, uECC_word_t *k, uint8_t *signature)
+			 unsigned hash_size, uECC_word_t *k, uint8_t *signature)
 {
 
 	uECC_word_t tmp[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
@@ -94,12 +94,12 @@ int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 
 	/* Make sure 0 < k < curve_n */
   	if (uECC_vli_isZero(k) ||
-	    uECC_vli_cmp(curve_n, k) != 1) {
+		uECC_vli_cmp(curve_n, k) != 1) {
 		return UECC_FAILURE;
 	}
 
 	r = EccPoint_mult_safer(p, curve_G, k);
-        if (r != UECC_SUCCESS) {
+		if (r != UECC_SUCCESS) {
 		return r;
 	}
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 	/* Prevent side channel analysis of uECC_vli_modInv() to determine
 	bits of k / the private key by premultiplying by a random number */
 	uECC_vli_modMult(k, k, tmp, curve_n); /* k' = rand * k */
-	uECC_vli_modInv(k, k, curve_n);       /* k = 1 / k' */
+	uECC_vli_modInv(k, k, curve_n);	   /* k = 1 / k' */
 	uECC_vli_modMult(k, k, tmp, curve_n); /* k = 1 / k */
 
 	uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(signature, NUM_ECC_BYTES, p); /* store r */
@@ -140,18 +140,22 @@ int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 }
 
 int uECC_sign(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
-	      unsigned hash_size, uint8_t *signature)
+		  unsigned hash_size, uint8_t *signature)
 {
 	int r;
 	uECC_word_t _random[2*NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t k[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
 	uECC_word_t tries;
+	volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *message_hash_dup = message_hash;
+	volatile unsigned hash_size_dup = hash_size;
+	volatile uint8_t *signature_dup = signature;
 
 	for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
 		/* Generating _random uniformly at random: */
 		uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng();
 		if (!rng_function ||
-		    rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) != 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
+			rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) != 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
 			return UECC_FAILURE;
 		}
 
@@ -161,9 +165,15 @@ int uECC_sign(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 		r = uECC_sign_with_k(private_key, message_hash, hash_size, k, signature);
 		/* don't keep trying if a fault was detected */
 		if (r == UECC_FAULT_DETECTED) {
+		    mbedtls_platform_memset(signature, 0, 2*NUM_ECC_BYTES);
 			return r;
 		}
 		if (r == UECC_SUCCESS) {
+			if (private_key_dup != private_key || message_hash_dup != message_hash ||
+				hash_size_dup != hash_size || signature_dup != signature) {
+			    mbedtls_platform_memset(signature, 0, 2*NUM_ECC_BYTES);
+				return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+			}
 			return UECC_SUCCESS;
 		}
 		/* else keep trying */
@@ -194,6 +204,10 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 	bitcount_t i;
 	bitcount_t flow_control;
 	volatile uECC_word_t diff;
+	volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
+	volatile const uint8_t *message_hash_dup = message_hash;
+	volatile unsigned hash_size_dup = hash_size;
+	volatile const uint8_t *signature_dup = signature;
 
 	uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
 	uECC_word_t r[NUM_ECC_WORDS], s[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
@@ -207,7 +221,7 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_public, public_key, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_public + num_words, public_key + NUM_ECC_BYTES,
-			       NUM_ECC_BYTES);
+				   NUM_ECC_BYTES);
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(r, signature, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
 	uECC_vli_bytesToNative(s, signature + NUM_ECC_BYTES, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
 
@@ -218,7 +232,7 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 
 	/* r, s must be < n. */
 	if (uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(curve_n, r) != 1 ||
-	    uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(curve_n, s) != 1) {
+		uECC_vli_cmp_unsafe(curve_n, s) != 1) {
 		return UECC_FAILURE;
 	}
 
@@ -252,7 +266,7 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 	uECC_vli_numBits(u2));
 
 	point = points[(!!uECC_vli_testBit(u1, num_bits - 1)) |
-                       ((!!uECC_vli_testBit(u2, num_bits - 1)) << 1)];
+					   ((!!uECC_vli_testBit(u2, num_bits - 1)) << 1)];
 	uECC_vli_set(rx, point);
 	uECC_vli_set(ry, point + num_words);
 	uECC_vli_clear(z);
@@ -288,13 +302,17 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
 	/* Accept only if v == r. */
 	diff = uECC_vli_equal(rx, r);
 	if (diff == 0) {
-	    flow_control++;
-	    mbedtls_platform_random_delay();
-	    
-	    /* Re-check the condition and test if the control flow is as expected. 
-	     * 1 (base value) + num_bits - 1 (from the loop) + 5 incrementations.
-	     */
+		flow_control++;
+		mbedtls_platform_random_delay();
+
+		/* Re-check the condition and test if the control flow is as expected.
+		 * 1 (base value) + num_bits - 1 (from the loop) + 5 incrementations.
+		 */
 		if (diff == 0 && flow_control == (num_bits + 5)) {
+			if (public_key_dup != public_key || message_hash_dup != message_hash ||
+				hash_size_dup != hash_size || signature_dup != signature) {
+				return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
+			}
 			return UECC_SUCCESS;
 		}
 		else {