yuzu-emu/mbedtls
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git synced 2024-11-22 12:35:40 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Start using an explicit stack for callback info

Browse Source 
This is the first step towards making verify_chain() iterative. While from a
readability point of view the current recursive version is fine, one of the
goals of this refactoring is to prepare for restartable ECC integration, which
will need the explicit stack anyway.
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2017-07-05 13:28:45 +02:00
parent a468eb1764
commit c547d1ab1f
1 changed files with 46 additions and 12 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

58
library/x509_crt.c
View File

@ -77,6 +77,19 @@
#endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */
#endif
/*
* Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
*/
typedef struct {
mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
uint32_t flags;
} x509_crt_verify_chain_item;
/*
* Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
*/
#define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 )
/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
@ -2069,7 +2082,8 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
int top, int path_cnt, int self_cnt, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
void *p_vrfy,
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE] )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
@ -2138,17 +2152,14 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
/* verify the rest of the chain starting from parent */
ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
parent_is_trusted, path_cnt + 1, self_cnt,
&parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
&parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy, ver_chain );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
callback:
/* chain upwards of child done, call callback on child */
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, child, path_cnt, flags ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*flags |= parent_flags;
/* chain upwards of child done, add to callback stack */
ver_chain[path_cnt].crt = child;
ver_chain[path_cnt].flags = *flags;
return( 0 );
}
@ -2247,8 +2258,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
{
int ret;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE];
size_t i;
uint32_t cur_flags;
uint32_t *ee_flags = &ver_chain[0].flags;
*flags = 0;
memset( ver_chain, 0, sizeof( ver_chain ) );
if( profile == NULL )
{
@ -2258,20 +2274,38 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
/* check name if requested */
if( cn != NULL )
x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, flags );
x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, ee_flags );
/* Check the type and size of the key */
pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
*ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, pk_type, &crt->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
*ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
/* Check the chain */
ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
0, 0, 0, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
0, 0, 0, &ver_chain[0].flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy, ver_chain );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
/* Build final flags, calling calback on the way if any */
for( i = X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i != 0; --i )
{
if( ver_chain[i-1].crt == NULL )
continue;
cur_flags = ver_chain[i-1].flags;
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, ver_chain[i-1].crt, i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
*flags |= cur_flags;
}
exit:
/* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by