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Finally merge the remains of top() into child()

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This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2017-07-04 00:00:24 +02:00
parent 63642776b1
commit cb39610093
1 changed files with 9 additions and 61 deletions
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70
library/x509_crt.c
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@ -1993,53 +1993,6 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
return parent; return parent;
} }
/*
* Verify a certificate whose parent is a trusted root
*
* See comments for mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile()
* (also for notation used below)
*
* This function is called when child was found to have a parent in trusted roots,
* and trust_ca pointing directly to that parent (not the full list).
* - this happens in cases 2 and 3 of the comment on verify()
*/
static int x509_crt_verify_top(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
int path_cnt, int self_cnt, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
int ret;
uint32_t ca_flags = 0;
(void) self_cnt;
((void) ca_crl);
(void) profile;
(void) child;
/* Check time-validity of the parent */
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &trust_ca->valid_to ) )
ca_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &trust_ca->valid_from ) )
ca_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
/* Call callback on trusted root */
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
{
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, trust_ca, path_cnt + 1, &ca_flags ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
}
*flags |= ca_flags;
return( 0 );
}
/* /*
* Verify a certificate with a parent inside the chain * Verify a certificate with a parent inside the chain
* *
@ -2049,7 +2002,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_child(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
int path_cnt, int self_cnt, uint32_t *flags, int top, int path_cnt, int self_cnt, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy ) void *p_vrfy )
{ {
@ -2064,6 +2017,9 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_child(
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) ) if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
if( top )
goto callback;
if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 ) if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD; *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
@ -2124,18 +2080,10 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_child(
*flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile ); *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile );
#endif #endif
if( parent_is_trusted ) /* verify the rest of the chain starting from parent */
{ ret = x509_crt_verify_child( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( child, parent, ca_crl, profile, parent_is_trusted, path_cnt + 1, self_cnt,
path_cnt, self_cnt, &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
}
else
{
/* verify the rest of the chain starting from parent */
ret = x509_crt_verify_child( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl,
profile, path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
}
if( ret != 0 ) if( ret != 0 )
return( ret ); return( ret );
@ -2276,7 +2224,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
ret = x509_crt_verify_child( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, ret = x509_crt_verify_child( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
0, 0, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ); 0, 0, 0, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
exit: exit:
/* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by