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https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
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Make verify_chain() iterative
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
parent
f86f491f25
commit
ce6e52ff42
@ -2071,11 +2071,9 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
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* -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq
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*
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* Arguments:
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* - child: the current bottom of the chain to verify
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* - trust_ca, ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
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* - top: 1 if child is known to be locally trusted
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* - path_cnt: current depth as passed to f_vrfy() (EE = 0, etc)
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* - self_cnt: number of self-issued certs seen so far in the chain
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* - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn
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* - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp
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* - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
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* - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain
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*
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* Return value:
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@ -2084,88 +2082,99 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
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* even if it was found to be invalid
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*/
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static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
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mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
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mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
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mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
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mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
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mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
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const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
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int top, int path_cnt, int self_cnt,
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x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE] )
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{
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uint32_t *flags;
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mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
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mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
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int parent_is_trusted = 0;
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int child_is_trusted = 0;
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int path_cnt = 0;
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int self_cnt = 0;
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/* Add certificate to the verification chain */
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ver_chain[path_cnt].crt = child;
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flags = &ver_chain[path_cnt].flags;
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child = crt;
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/* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
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if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
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while( 1 ) {
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/* Add certificate to the verification chain */
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ver_chain[path_cnt].crt = child;
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flags = &ver_chain[path_cnt].flags;
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if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
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/* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
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if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
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/* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */
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if( top )
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return( 0 );
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if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
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/* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */
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if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
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/* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */
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if( child_is_trusted )
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return( 0 );
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if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
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/* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */
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if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
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/* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
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if( path_cnt == 0 &&
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x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )
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{
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return( 0 );
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}
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if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
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/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
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parent = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent_is_trusted,
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path_cnt, self_cnt );
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/* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
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if( path_cnt == 0 &&
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x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )
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{
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return( 0 );
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}
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/* No parent? We're done here */
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if( parent == NULL )
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{
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
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return( 0 );
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}
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/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
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parent = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent_is_trusted,
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path_cnt, self_cnt );
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/* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
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* These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
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* and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
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if( ( path_cnt != 0 ) && x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
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self_cnt++;
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/* No parent? We're done here */
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if( parent == NULL )
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{
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
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return( 0 );
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}
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/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
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* and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
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if( ! parent_is_trusted &&
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1 + path_cnt > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
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{
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/* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
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}
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/* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
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* These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
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* and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
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if( ( path_cnt != 0 ) && x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
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self_cnt++;
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/* if parent is trusted, the signature was checked by find_parent() */
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if( ! parent_is_trusted && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
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/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
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* and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
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if( ! parent_is_trusted &&
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1 + path_cnt > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
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{
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/* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
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}
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/* check size of signing key */
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if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &parent->pk ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
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/* if parent is trusted, the signature was checked by find_parent() */
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if( ! parent_is_trusted && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
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/* check size of signing key */
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if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &parent->pk ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
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/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
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*flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile );
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/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
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*flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile );
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#else
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(void) ca_crl;
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#endif
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/* verify the rest of the chain starting from parent */
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return( x509_crt_verify_chain( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
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parent_is_trusted, path_cnt + 1, self_cnt,
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ver_chain ) );
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/* prepare for next iteration */
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child = parent;
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parent = NULL;
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child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;
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++path_cnt;
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}
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}
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/*
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@ -2290,9 +2299,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
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*ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
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/* Check the chain */
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ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
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0, 0, 0,
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ver_chain );
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ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, ver_chain );
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if( ret != 0 )
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goto exit;
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