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Rename mbedtls_platform_memcmp() to mbedtls_platform_memequal()

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Signed-off-by: Piotr Nowicki <piotr.nowicki@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Piotr Nowicki 2020-06-23 12:59:56 +02:00
parent c6319a70ab
commit e3c4ee51b2
21 changed files with 61 additions and 61 deletions
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4
include/mbedtls/asn1.h
View File

@ -130,11 +130,11 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(oid_str, oid_buf) \
( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf)->len ) || \
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf)->p, (oid_buf)->len) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( (oid_str), (oid_buf)->p, (oid_buf)->len) != 0 )
#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(oid_str, oid_buf, oid_buf_len) \
( ( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf_len) ) || \
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( (oid_str), (oid_buf), (oid_buf_len) ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( (oid_str), (oid_buf), (oid_buf_len) ) != 0 )
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {

2
include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h
View File

@ -2231,7 +2231,7 @@
#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext
#define rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test
#define rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding
#define safer_memcmp mbedtls_platform_memcmp
#define safer_memcmp mbedtls_platform_memequal
#define set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm
#define sha1 mbedtls_sha1
#define sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context

12
include/mbedtls/platform_util.h
View File

@ -215,12 +215,12 @@ void *mbedtls_platform_memcpy( void *dst, const void *src, size_t num );
int mbedtls_platform_memmove( void *dst, const void *src, size_t num );
/**
* \brief Secure memcmp
* \brief Secure check if the buffers have the same data.
*
* This is a constant-time version of memcmp(). If
* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT is defined, the order is also
* randomised using the hardware RNG in order to further harden
* against side-channel attacks.
* This is a constant-time version of memcmp(), but without checking
* if the bytes are greater or lower. If MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT
* is defined, the order is also randomised using the hardware RNG in
* order to further harden against side-channel attacks.
*
* \param buf1 First buffer to compare.
* \param buf2 Second buffer to compare against.
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_memmove( void *dst, const void *src, size_t num );
* \return 0 if the buffers were equal or an unspecified non-zero value
* otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_platform_memcmp( const void *buf1, const void *buf2, size_t num );
int mbedtls_platform_memequal( const void *buf1, const void *buf2, size_t num );
/**
* \brief RNG-function for getting a random 32-bit integer.

2
library/asn1parse.c
View File

@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data *
while( list != NULL )
{
if( list->oid.len == len &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 )
{
break;
}

2
library/asn1write.c
View File

@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data(
while( list != NULL )
{
if( list->oid.len == len &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( list->oid.p, oid, len ) == 0 )
{
break;
}

2
library/des.c
View File

@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak( const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] )
int i;
for( i = 0; i < WEAK_KEY_COUNT; i++ )
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( weak_key_table[i], key, MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( weak_key_table[i], key, MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE) == 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );

2
library/oid.c
View File

@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
if( p == NULL || oid == NULL ) return( NULL ); \
while( cur->asn1 != NULL ) { \
if( cur->asn1_len == oid->len && \
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len ) == 0 ) { \
mbedtls_platform_memequal( cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len ) == 0 ) { \
return( p ); \
} \
p++; \

14
library/pem.c
View File

@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const
enc = 0;
if( s2 - s1 >= 22 && mbedtls_platform_memcmp( s1, "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED", 22 ) == 0 )
if( s2 - s1 >= 22 && mbedtls_platform_memequal( s1, "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED", 22 ) == 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) )
@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
if( s2 - s1 >= 23 && mbedtls_platform_memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,", 23 ) == 0 )
if( s2 - s1 >= 23 && mbedtls_platform_memequal( s1, "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,", 23 ) == 0 )
{
enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC;
@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const
s1 += 16;
}
else if( s2 - s1 >= 18 && mbedtls_platform_memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: DES-CBC,", 18 ) == 0 )
else if( s2 - s1 >= 18 && mbedtls_platform_memequal( s1, "DEK-Info: DES-CBC,", 18 ) == 0 )
{
enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC;
@ -309,15 +309,15 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if( s2 - s1 >= 14 && mbedtls_platform_memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-", 14 ) == 0 )
if( s2 - s1 >= 14 && mbedtls_platform_memequal( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-", 14 ) == 0 )
{
if( s2 - s1 < 22 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG );
else if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 )
else if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 )
enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC;
else if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 )
else if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 )
enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC;
else if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 )
else if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( s1, "DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,", 22 ) == 0 )
enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC;
else
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG );

2
library/pk.c
View File

@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static int uecc_eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
const mbedtls_uecc_keypair *uecc_prv =
(const mbedtls_uecc_keypair *) prv;
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( uecc_pub->public_key,
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( uecc_pub->public_key,
uecc_prv->public_key,
2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES ) == 0 )
{

2
library/pkparse.c
View File

@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_
return( ret );
if( len != MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD ) ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( p, MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD, len ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( p, MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD, len ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}

2
library/platform_util.c
View File

@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_memmove( void *dst, const void *src, size_t num )
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
int mbedtls_platform_memcmp( const void *buf1, const void *buf2, size_t num )
int mbedtls_platform_memequal( const void *buf1, const void *buf2, size_t num )
{
volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) buf1;
volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) buf2;

2
library/rsa.c
View File

@ -2275,7 +2275,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if ( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) != 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( hash_start, result, hlen ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto exit;

4
library/ssl_cache.c
View File

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get( void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
continue;
}
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( session->id, entry->session.id,
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( session->id, entry->session.id,
entry->session.id_len ) != 0 )
continue;
@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set( void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session )
}
#endif
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( session->id, cur->session.id, cur->session.id_len ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( session->id, cur->session.id, cur->session.id_len ) == 0 )
break; /* client reconnected, keep timestamp for session id */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)

12
library/ssl_cli.c
View File

@ -1164,9 +1164,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( buf + 1,
mbedtls_platform_memequal( buf + 1,
ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
mbedtls_platform_memequal( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
@ -1495,7 +1495,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ )
{
if( name_len == strlen( *p ) &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *p;
return( 0 );
@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_platform_memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 );
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 ) == 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_SET;
}
@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate ) != i ||
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_compression( ssl->session_negotiate ) != comp ||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->resume = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_UNSET;
}
@ -2876,7 +2876,7 @@ static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( p, ecdh_group, sizeof( ecdh_group ) ) != 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( p, ecdh_group, sizeof( ecdh_group ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad server key exchange (unexpected header)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );

2
library/ssl_cookie.c
View File

@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check( void *p_ctx,
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof( ref_hmac ) ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)

14
library/ssl_srv.c
View File

@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
mbedtls_platform_memequal( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
cur_len = *theirs++;
if( cur_len == ours_len &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours;
return( 0 );
@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_UNSET;
memset( ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64 );
mbedtls_platform_memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len );
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_SET;
}
@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ read_record_header:
* fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ClientHello fragmentation not supported" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
@ -1728,7 +1728,7 @@ read_record_header:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
mbedtls_platform_memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 );
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 ) == 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_SET;
}
@ -2827,7 +2827,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
p += 28;
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_UNSET;
mbedtls_platform_memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 );
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 ) == 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_SET;
}
@ -4119,7 +4119,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha
/* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
* but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
}

2
library/ssl_ticket.c
View File

@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *ssl_ticket_select_key(
unsigned char i;
for( i = 0; i < sizeof( ctx->keys ) / sizeof( *ctx->keys ); i++ )
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( name, ctx->keys[i].name, 4 ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( name, ctx->keys[i].name, 4 ) == 0 )
return( &ctx->keys[i] );
return( NULL );

18
library/ssl_tls.c
View File

@ -3164,7 +3164,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
*
* Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at
* least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to
* mbedtls_platform_memcmp() below.
* mbedtls_platform_memequal() below.
*
* Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
@ -3186,7 +3186,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
transform->maclen );
/* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
transform->maclen ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
@ -3525,7 +3525,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen );
#endif
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
transform->maclen ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
@ -4734,8 +4734,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush )
static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 )
{
return( PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT );
}
@ -7070,7 +7070,7 @@ static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len )
return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
return( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, crt_buf_len ) );
return( mbedtls_platform_memequal( peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, crt_buf_len ) );
}
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
#define PEER_CRT_CHANGED 0x75555555
@ -7102,7 +7102,7 @@ static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( ret != 0 )
return( PEER_CRT_CHANGED );
return( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) );
return( mbedtls_platform_memequal( tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
@ -8350,7 +8350,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED );
}
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ),
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ),
buf, hash_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
@ -12125,7 +12125,7 @@ static int ssl_context_load( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
{
if( strlen( *cur ) == alpn_len &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( p, cur, alpn_len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( p, cur, alpn_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur;
break;

4
library/x509.c
View File

@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a,
{
if( a->tag == b->tag &&
a->len == b->len &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static int mbedtls_x509_name_cmp_raw( mbedtls_x509_buf_raw const *a,
goto exit;
if( oid[0].len != oid[1].len ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( oid[0].p, oid[1].p, oid[1].len ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( oid[0].p, oid[1].p, oid[1].len ) != 0 )
{
return( 1 );
}

4
library/x509_crl.c
View File

@ -511,10 +511,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain,
}
if( crl->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( crl->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crl->sig_oid.len ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_platform_memequal( crl->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crl->sig_oid.len ) != 0 ||
sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len ||
( sig_params1.len != 0 &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) )
{
mbedtls_x509_crl_free( crl );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH );

8
library/x509_crt.c
View File

@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_frame( unsigned char *start,
* signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate (Section 4.1.2.3).
*/
if( outer_sig_alg.len != inner_sig_alg_len ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( outer_sig_alg.p, inner_sig_alg_start, inner_sig_alg_len ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( outer_sig_alg.p, inner_sig_alg_start, inner_sig_alg_len ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH );
}
@ -2594,7 +2594,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ext_key_usage_cb( void *ctx,
return( 1 );
}
if( data_len == cb_ctx->oid_len && mbedtls_platform_memcmp( data, cb_ctx->oid,
if( data_len == cb_ctx->oid_len && mbedtls_platform_memequal( data, cb_ctx->oid,
data_len ) == 0 )
{
return( 1 );
@ -2652,7 +2652,7 @@ static int x509_serial_is_revoked( unsigned char const *serial,
while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 )
{
if( serial_len == cur->serial.len &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( serial, cur->serial.p, serial_len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( serial, cur->serial.p, serial_len ) == 0 )
{
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &cur->revocation_date ) )
return( 1 );
@ -3191,7 +3191,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
for( cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )
{
if( crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}