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Merge pull request #3408 from AndrzejKurek/hamming-distance-improvements
Hamming distance improvements
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commit
e5425a0944
@ -155,7 +155,8 @@ extern const uECC_word_t curve_b[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
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* @param random OUT -- random integer in the range 0 < random < top
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* @param random OUT -- random integer in the range 0 < random < top
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* @param top IN -- upper limit
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* @param top IN -- upper limit
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* @param num_words IN -- number of words
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* @param num_words IN -- number of words
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* @return a random integer in the range 0 < random < top
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* @return UECC_SUCCESS in case of success
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* @return UECC_FAILURE upon failure
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*/
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*/
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int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
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int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
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wordcount_t num_words);
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wordcount_t num_words);
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@ -163,9 +164,9 @@ int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
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/* uECC_RNG_Function type
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/* uECC_RNG_Function type
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* The RNG function should fill 'size' random bytes into 'dest'. It should
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* The RNG function should fill 'size' random bytes into 'dest'. It should
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* return 1 if 'dest' was filled with random data, or 0 if the random data could
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* return 'size' if 'dest' was filled with random data of 'size' length, or 0
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* not be generated. The filled-in values should be either truly random, or from
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* if the random data could not be generated. The filled-in values should be
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* a cryptographically-secure PRNG.
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* either truly random, or from a cryptographically-secure PRNG.
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*
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*
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* A correctly functioning RNG function must be set (using uECC_set_rng())
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* A correctly functioning RNG function must be set (using uECC_set_rng())
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* before calling uECC_make_key() or uECC_sign().
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* before calling uECC_make_key() or uECC_sign().
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@ -181,8 +182,8 @@ typedef int(*uECC_RNG_Function)(uint8_t *dest, unsigned int size);
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/*
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/*
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* @brief Set the function that will be used to generate random bytes. The RNG
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* @brief Set the function that will be used to generate random bytes. The RNG
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* function should return 1 if the random data was generated, or 0 if the random
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* function should return 'size' if the random data of length 'size' was
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* data could not be generated.
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* generated, or 0 if the random data could not be generated.
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*
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*
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* @note On platforms where there is no predefined RNG function, this must be
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* @note On platforms where there is no predefined RNG function, this must be
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* called before uECC_make_key() or uECC_sign() are used.
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* called before uECC_make_key() or uECC_sign() are used.
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@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
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#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
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#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
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#endif
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#endif
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#define PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT 0x75555555
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
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static int uecc_rng_wrapper( uint8_t *dest, unsigned int size )
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static int uecc_rng_wrapper( uint8_t *dest, unsigned int size )
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{
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{
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@ -4736,7 +4738,7 @@ static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 ||
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mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 )
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mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 )
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{
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{
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return( 1 );
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return( PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT );
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}
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}
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return( 0 );
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return( 0 );
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}
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}
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@ -4929,7 +4931,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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* messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and
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* messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and
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* future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the
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* future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the
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* handshake logic layer. */
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* handshake logic layer. */
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if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 )
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if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT )
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{
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
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@ -6053,7 +6055,7 @@ static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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size_t reassembly_buf_sz;
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size_t reassembly_buf_sz;
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hs_buf->is_fragmented =
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hs_buf->is_fragmented =
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( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 );
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( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT );
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/* We copy the message back into the input buffer
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/* We copy the message back into the input buffer
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* after reassembly, so check that it's not too large.
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* after reassembly, so check that it's not too large.
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@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ int EccPoint_mult_safer(uECC_word_t * result, const uECC_word_t * point,
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/* If an RNG function was specified, get a random initial Z value to
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/* If an RNG function was specified, get a random initial Z value to
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* protect against side-channel attacks such as Template SPA */
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* protect against side-channel attacks such as Template SPA */
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if (g_rng_function) {
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if (g_rng_function) {
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if (!uECC_generate_random_int(k2[carry], curve_p, num_words)) {
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if (uECC_generate_random_int(k2[carry], curve_p, num_words) != UECC_SUCCESS) {
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r = UECC_FAILURE;
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r = UECC_FAILURE;
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goto clear_and_out;
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goto clear_and_out;
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}
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}
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@ -1165,21 +1165,21 @@ int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
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bitcount_t num_bits = uECC_vli_numBits(top);
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bitcount_t num_bits = uECC_vli_numBits(top);
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if (!g_rng_function) {
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if (!g_rng_function) {
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return 0;
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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}
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}
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for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
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for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
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if (!g_rng_function((uint8_t *)random, num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE)) {
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if (g_rng_function((uint8_t *)random, num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE) != num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
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return 0;
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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}
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}
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random[num_words - 1] &=
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random[num_words - 1] &=
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mask >> ((bitcount_t)(num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE * 8 - num_bits));
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mask >> ((bitcount_t)(num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE * 8 - num_bits));
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if (!uECC_vli_isZero(random) &&
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if (!uECC_vli_isZero(random) &&
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uECC_vli_cmp(top, random) == 1) {
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uECC_vli_cmp(top, random) == 1) {
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return 1;
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return UECC_SUCCESS;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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return 0;
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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}
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}
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@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key)
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/* Generating _private uniformly at random: */
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/* Generating _private uniformly at random: */
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uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng();
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uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng();
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if (!rng_function ||
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if (!rng_function ||
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!rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE)) {
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rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) != 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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}
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}
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@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
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uECC_vli_clear(tmp);
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uECC_vli_clear(tmp);
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tmp[0] = 1;
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tmp[0] = 1;
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}
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}
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else if (!uECC_generate_random_int(tmp, curve_n, num_n_words)) {
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else if (uECC_generate_random_int(tmp, curve_n, num_n_words) != UECC_SUCCESS) {
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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}
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}
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@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int uECC_sign(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
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/* Generating _random uniformly at random: */
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/* Generating _random uniformly at random: */
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uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng();
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uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng();
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if (!rng_function ||
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if (!rng_function ||
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!rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE)) {
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rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) != 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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return UECC_FAILURE;
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}
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}
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