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Add pre and post-validation to mult_safer()
Validating the input is always a good idea. Validating the output protects against some fault injections that would make the result invalid. Note: valid_point() implies that the point is not zero. Adding validation to mult_safer() makes it redundant in compute_shared_secret().
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@ -936,6 +936,11 @@ int EccPoint_mult_safer(uECC_word_t * result, const uECC_word_t * point,
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if (curve != uECC_secp256r1())
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if (curve != uECC_secp256r1())
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return 0;
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return 0;
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/* Protects against invalid curves attacks */
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if (uECC_valid_point(point, curve) != 0 ) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* Regularize the bitcount for the private key so that attackers cannot use a
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/* Regularize the bitcount for the private key so that attackers cannot use a
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* side channel attack to learn the number of leading zeros. */
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* side channel attack to learn the number of leading zeros. */
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carry = regularize_k(scalar, tmp, s);
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carry = regularize_k(scalar, tmp, s);
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@ -952,7 +957,9 @@ int EccPoint_mult_safer(uECC_word_t * result, const uECC_word_t * point,
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EccPoint_mult(result, point, k2[!carry], initial_Z);
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EccPoint_mult(result, point, k2[!carry], initial_Z);
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if (EccPoint_isZero(result, curve)) {
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/* Protect against fault injections that would make the resulting
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* point not lie on the intended curve */
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if (uECC_valid_point(result, curve) != 0 ) {
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r = 0;
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r = 0;
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goto clear_and_out;
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goto clear_and_out;
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}
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}
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@ -158,12 +158,6 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
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wordcount_t num_bytes = curve->num_bytes;
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wordcount_t num_bytes = curve->num_bytes;
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int r;
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int r;
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/* Protect against invalid curve attacks */
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if (uECC_valid_public_key(public_key, curve) != 0) {
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r = 0;
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goto clear_and_out;
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}
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/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
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/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
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uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_private,
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uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_private,
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private_key,
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private_key,
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@ -176,13 +170,8 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
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num_bytes);
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num_bytes);
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r = EccPoint_mult_safer(_public, _public, _private, curve);
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r = EccPoint_mult_safer(_public, _public, _private, curve);
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if (r == 0)
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goto clear_and_out;
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uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(secret, num_bytes, _public);
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uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(secret, num_bytes, _public);
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r = !EccPoint_isZero(_public, curve);
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clear_and_out:
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/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
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/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize(_private, sizeof(_private));
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize(_private, sizeof(_private));
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