Merge pull request #97 from ARMmbed/psa-renamings_for_alpha1

Function renamings for alpha1
This commit is contained in:
Jaeden Amero 2018-07-12 12:32:37 +01:00 committed by itayzafrir
commit ed35da2b6f
5 changed files with 414 additions and 344 deletions

View File

@ -414,13 +414,13 @@ typedef uint32_t psa_key_type_t;
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEYPAIR(type) \
(((type) & (PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG)) == \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG))
/** Whether a key type is an RSA key pair or public key. */
/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEYPAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG)
/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR(type) \
((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_PAIR_FLAG)
/** Whether a key type is an RSA key pair or public key. */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \
(PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEYPAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair or public key. */
@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t;
* is as follows:
* -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
* listed here.
* -# Call psa_hash_start() to specify the algorithm.
* -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm.
* -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
* of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash
* of the concatenation of these messages in order.
@ -1173,9 +1173,9 @@ typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t;
* To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify().
*
* The application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation
* has been initialized with psa_hash_start().
* has been initialized with psa_hash_setup().
*
* After a successful call to psa_hash_start(), the application must
* After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must
* eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
* operation:
* - A failed call to psa_hash_update().
@ -1194,12 +1194,12 @@ typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t;
* \retval PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_hash_start(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
psa_algorithm_t alg);
/** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation.
*
* The application must call psa_hash_start() before calling this function.
* The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
*
* If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
*
@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message.
*
* The application must call psa_hash_start() before calling this function.
* The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
* This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
* the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update().
*
@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with
* an expected value.
*
* The application must call psa_hash_start() before calling this function.
* The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
* This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
* the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then
* compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a
@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
/** Abort a hash operation.
*
* This function may be called at any time after psa_hash_start().
* This function may be called at any time after psa_hash_setup().
* Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
* \c operation structure itself.
*
@ -1333,29 +1333,32 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation);
* as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */
typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t;
/** Start a multipart MAC operation.
/** Start a multipart MAC calculation operation.
*
* The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC (message authentication code)
* is as follows:
* This function sets up the calculation of the MAC
* (message authentication code) of a byte string.
* To verify the MAC of a message against an
* expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead.
*
* The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows:
* -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
* listed here.
* -# Call psa_mac_start() to specify the algorithm and key.
* -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
* The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
* of the key slot changes.
* -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
* of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
* of the concatenation of these messages in order.
* -# To calculate the MAC, call psa_mac_finish().
* To compare the MAC with an expected value, call psa_mac_verify().
* -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish
* calculating the MAC value and retrieve it.
*
* The application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
* has been initialized with psa_mac_start().
* has been initialized with psa_mac_sign_setup().
*
* After a successful call to psa_mac_start(), the application must
* eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
* operation:
* After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must
* eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
* - A failed call to psa_mac_update().
* - A call to psa_mac_finish(), psa_mac_verify() or psa_mac_abort().
* - A call to psa_mac_sign_finish() or psa_mac_abort().
*
* \param operation The operation object to use.
* \param key Slot containing the key to use for the operation.
@ -1375,22 +1378,70 @@ typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t;
* \retval PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_mac_start(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg);
/** Start a multipart MAC verification operation.
*
* This function sets up the verification of the MAC
* (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value.
*
* The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows:
* -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
* listed here.
* -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
* The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
* of the key slot changes.
* -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
* of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
* of the concatenation of these messages in order.
* -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish
* calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against
* the expected value.
*
* The application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
* has been initialized with psa_mac_verify_setup().
*
* After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must
* eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
* - A failed call to psa_mac_update().
* - A call to psa_mac_verify_finish() or psa_mac_abort().
*
* \param operation The operation object to use.
* \param key Slot containing the key to use for the operation.
* \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
* such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true).
*
* \retval PSA_SUCCESS
* Success.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
* \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
* \c key is not compatible with \c alg.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
* \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
* \retval PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* \retval PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_size,
size_t *mac_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_size,
size_t *mac_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation);
@ -1413,10 +1464,10 @@ typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t;
* is as follows:
* -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
* listed here.
* -# Call psa_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
* -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
* The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
* of the key slot changes.
* -# Call either psa_encrypt_generate_iv() or psa_encrypt_set_iv() to
* -# Call either psa_encrypt_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to
* generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use
* psa_encrypt_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing
* requires a specific IV value.
@ -1425,12 +1476,12 @@ typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t;
* -# Call psa_cipher_finish().
*
* The application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation
* has been initialized with psa_encrypt_setup().
* has been initialized with psa_cipher_encrypt_setup().
*
* After a successful call to psa_encrypt_setup(), the application must
* After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must
* eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
* operation:
* - A failed call to psa_encrypt_generate_iv(), psa_encrypt_set_iv()
* - A failed call to psa_encrypt_generate_iv(), psa_cipher_set_iv()
* or psa_cipher_update().
* - A call to psa_cipher_finish() or psa_cipher_abort().
*
@ -1452,9 +1503,9 @@ typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t;
* \retval PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg);
/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation.
*
@ -1462,7 +1513,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
* is as follows:
* -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
* listed here.
* -# Call psa_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
* -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
* The key remains associated with the operation even if the content
* of the key slot changes.
* -# Call psa_cipher_update() with the IV (initialization vector) for the
@ -1474,9 +1525,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
* -# Call psa_cipher_finish().
*
* The application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation
* has been initialized with psa_encrypt_setup().
* has been initialized with psa_cipher_decrypt_setup().
*
* After a successful call to psa_decrypt_setup(), the application must
* After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must
* eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
* operation:
* - A failed call to psa_cipher_update().
@ -1500,18 +1551,18 @@ psa_status_t psa_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
* \retval PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
* \retval PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
*/
psa_status_t psa_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_encrypt_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_size,
size_t *iv_length);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_size,
size_t *iv_length);
psa_status_t psa_encrypt_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_length);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_length);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *input,
@ -1680,7 +1731,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt( psa_key_slot_t key,
* \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key.
*
* Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
* first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_start(), psa_hash_update()
* first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
* and psa_hash_finish(). Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash
* parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg)
* to determine the hash algorithm to use.
@ -1733,7 +1784,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_sign(psa_key_slot_t key,
* \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key.
*
* Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
* first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_start(), psa_hash_update()
* first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
* and psa_hash_finish(). Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash
* parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg)
* to determine the hash algorithm to use.

View File

@ -142,9 +142,9 @@
/** The size of the output of psa_mac_finish(), in bytes.
/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes.
*
* This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify() expects.
* This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects.
*
* \param key_type The type of the MAC key.
* \param key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits.

View File

@ -102,8 +102,7 @@ struct psa_mac_operation_s
int iv_required : 1;
int iv_set : 1;
int has_input : 1;
int key_usage_sign : 1;
int key_usage_verify : 1;
int is_sign : 1;
uint8_t mac_size;
union
{

View File

@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_abort( psa_hash_operation_t *operation )
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
psa_status_t psa_hash_start( psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
psa_status_t psa_hash_setup( psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
int ret;
@ -1296,8 +1296,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_init( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
operation->iv_set = 0;
operation->iv_required = 0;
operation->has_input = 0;
operation->key_usage_sign = 0;
operation->key_usage_verify = 0;
operation->is_sign = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
if( alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
@ -1311,7 +1310,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_init( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
{
status = psa_hash_start( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx,
status = psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx,
PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH( alg ) );
}
else
@ -1328,38 +1327,37 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_init( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_status_t psa_mac_abort( psa_mac_operation_t *operation )
{
switch( operation->alg )
if( operation->alg == 0 )
{
case 0:
/* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not
* in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's
* nothing to do. */
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
/* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not
* in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's
* nothing to do. */
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
case PSA_ALG_CMAC:
mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cmac );
break;
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
{
mbedtls_cipher_free( &operation->ctx.cmac );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
default:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
{
size_t block_size =
psa_get_hash_block_size( PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH( operation->alg ) );
if( block_size == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
psa_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx );
mbedtls_zeroize( operation->ctx.hmac.opad, block_size );
}
else
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
{
size_t block_size =
psa_get_hash_block_size( PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH( operation->alg ) );
if( block_size == 0 )
goto bad_state;
psa_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx );
mbedtls_zeroize( operation->ctx.hmac.opad, block_size );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
{
/* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should
* always have been initialized to a valid value). */
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
{
/* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should
* always have been initialized to a valid value). */
goto bad_state;
}
operation->alg = 0;
@ -1367,14 +1365,21 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_abort( psa_mac_operation_t *operation )
operation->iv_set = 0;
operation->iv_required = 0;
operation->has_input = 0;
operation->key_usage_sign = 0;
operation->key_usage_verify = 0;
operation->is_sign = 0;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
bad_state:
/* If abort is called on an uninitialized object, we can't trust
* anything. Wipe the object in case it contains confidential data.
* This may result in a memory leak if a pointer gets overwritten,
* but it's too late to do anything about this. */
memset( operation, 0, sizeof( *operation ) );
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
static int psa_cmac_start( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
static int psa_cmac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
size_t key_bits,
key_slot_t *slot,
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info )
@ -1395,7 +1400,7 @@ static int psa_cmac_start( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
static int psa_hmac_start( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
static int psa_hmac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_type_t key_type,
key_slot_t *slot,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
@ -1445,7 +1450,7 @@ static int psa_hmac_start( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
opad[i] = ipad[i] ^ 0x36 ^ 0x5C;
memset( opad + key_length, 0x5C, block_size - key_length );
status = psa_hash_start( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx,
status = psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx,
PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH( alg ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
@ -1457,70 +1462,63 @@ cleanup:
mbedtls_zeroize( ipad, key_length );
/* opad is in the context. It needs to stay in memory if this function
* succeeds, and it will be wiped by psa_mac_abort() called from
* psa_mac_start in the error case. */
* psa_mac_setup in the error case. */
return( status );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
psa_status_t psa_mac_start( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
int is_sign )
{
psa_status_t status;
key_slot_t *slot;
size_t key_bits;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = NULL;
psa_key_usage_t usage =
is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY;
status = psa_mac_init( operation, alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
if( is_sign )
operation->is_sign = 1;
status = psa_get_key_from_slot( key, &slot, 0, alg );
status = psa_get_key_from_slot( key, &slot, usage, alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
/* Since this function is called identically for a sign or verify
* operation, we don't know yet whether the operation is permitted.
* Store the part of the key policy that we can't check in the
* operation structure. psa_mac_finish() or psa_mac_verify() will
* check that remaining part. */
if( ( slot->policy.usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN ) != 0 )
operation->key_usage_sign = 1;
if( ( slot->policy.usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY ) != 0 )
operation->key_usage_verify = 1;
goto exit;
key_bits = psa_get_key_bits( slot );
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) )
{
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg, slot->type, key_bits,
NULL );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
operation->mac_size = cipher_info->block_size;
}
switch( alg )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
case PSA_ALG_CMAC:
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( psa_cmac_start( operation,
key_bits,
slot,
cipher_info ) );
break;
if( alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
{
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info =
mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( alg, slot->type, key_bits, NULL );
int ret;
if( cipher_info == NULL )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
}
operation->mac_size = cipher_info->block_size;
ret = psa_cmac_setup( operation, key_bits, slot, cipher_info );
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
default:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) )
status = psa_hmac_start( operation, slot->type, slot, alg );
else
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) )
{
status = psa_hmac_setup( operation, slot->type, slot, alg );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
{
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* If we reach this point, then the algorithm-specific part of the
* context may contain data that needs to be wiped on error. */
exit:
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
psa_mac_abort( operation );
@ -1532,57 +1530,136 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_start( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
return( status );
}
psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 1 ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
return( psa_mac_setup( operation, key, alg, 0 ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_mac_update( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *input,
size_t input_length )
{
int ret = 0 ;
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
if( ! operation->key_set )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
goto cleanup;
if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
goto cleanup;
operation->has_input = 1;
switch( operation->alg )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
case PSA_ALG_CMAC:
ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &operation->ctx.cmac,
input, input_length );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
default:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
{
status = psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, input,
input_length );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
break;
}
if( ret != 0 || status != PSA_SUCCESS )
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
{
psa_mac_abort( operation );
if( ret != 0 )
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update( &operation->ctx.cmac,
input, input_length );
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
{
status = psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, input,
input_length );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
{
/* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by
* a setup function. */
status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
}
cleanup:
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
psa_mac_abort( operation );
return( status );
}
static psa_status_t psa_mac_finish_internal( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_size,
size_t *mac_length )
size_t mac_size )
{
int ret = 0;
psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
psa_status_t status;
if( ! operation->key_set )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( mac_size < operation->mac_size )
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC )
{
int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &operation->ctx.cmac, mac );
return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
{
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char *opad = operation->ctx.hmac.opad;
size_t hash_size = 0;
size_t block_size =
psa_get_hash_block_size( PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH( operation->alg ) );
if( block_size == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
status = psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, tmp,
sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
/* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */
status = psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx,
PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH( operation->alg ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto hmac_cleanup;
status = psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, opad,
block_size );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto hmac_cleanup;
status = psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, tmp,
hash_size );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto hmac_cleanup;
status = psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, mac,
mac_size, &hash_size );
hmac_cleanup:
mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, hash_size );
return( status );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
{
/* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by
* a setup function. */
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
}
}
psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_size,
size_t *mac_length )
{
psa_status_t status;
/* Fill the output buffer with something that isn't a valid mac
* (barring an attack on the mac and deliberately-crafted input),
@ -1593,117 +1670,59 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_finish_internal( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
if( mac_size != 0 )
memset( mac, '!', mac_size );
if( ! operation->key_set )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( operation->iv_required && ! operation->iv_set )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( mac_size < operation->mac_size )
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
switch( operation->alg )
if( ! operation->is_sign )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
case PSA_ALG_CMAC:
ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish( &operation->ctx.cmac, mac );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
default:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( operation->alg ) )
{
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char *opad = operation->ctx.hmac.opad;
size_t hash_size = 0;
size_t block_size =
psa_get_hash_block_size( PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH( operation->alg ) );
if( block_size == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
status = psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, tmp,
sizeof( tmp ), &hash_size );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto cleanup;
/* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */
status = psa_hash_start( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx,
PSA_ALG_HMAC_HASH( operation->alg ) );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto hmac_cleanup;
status = psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, opad,
block_size );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto hmac_cleanup;
status = psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, tmp,
hash_size );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto hmac_cleanup;
status = psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.hmac.hash_ctx, mac,
mac_size, mac_length );
hmac_cleanup:
mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, hash_size );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
break;
status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
if( ret == 0 && status == PSA_SUCCESS )
status = psa_mac_finish_internal( operation, mac, mac_size );
cleanup:
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
{
*mac_length = operation->mac_size;
return( psa_mac_abort( operation ) );
status = psa_mac_abort( operation );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
*mac_length = operation->mac_size;
else
memset( mac, '!', mac_size );
}
else
{
psa_mac_abort( operation );
if( ret != 0 )
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret );
return( status );
}
return( status );
}
psa_status_t psa_mac_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_size,
size_t *mac_length )
{
if( ! operation->key_usage_sign )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
return( psa_mac_finish_internal( operation, mac,
mac_size, mac_length ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_length )
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
const uint8_t *mac,
size_t mac_length )
{
uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
size_t actual_mac_length;
psa_status_t status;
if( ! operation->key_usage_verify )
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
if( operation->is_sign )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
goto cleanup;
}
if( operation->mac_size != mac_length )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
goto cleanup;
}
status = psa_mac_finish_internal( operation,
actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ),
&actual_mac_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
if( actual_mac_length != mac_length )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
if( safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length ) != 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
actual_mac, sizeof( actual_mac ) );
if( safer_memcmp( mac, actual_mac, mac_length ) != 0 )
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
cleanup:
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
status = psa_mac_abort( operation );
else
psa_mac_abort( operation );
return( status );
}
@ -2341,24 +2360,24 @@ static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
}
psa_status_t psa_encrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_decrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
psa_key_slot_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg )
{
return( psa_cipher_setup( operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT ) );
}
psa_status_t psa_encrypt_generate_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_size,
size_t *iv_length )
psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_size,
size_t *iv_length )
{
int ret = PSA_SUCCESS;
if( operation->iv_set || ! operation->iv_required )
@ -2377,7 +2396,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_encrypt_generate_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
}
*iv_length = operation->iv_size;
ret = psa_encrypt_set_iv( operation, iv, *iv_length );
ret = psa_cipher_set_iv( operation, iv, *iv_length );
exit:
if( ret != PSA_SUCCESS )
@ -2385,9 +2404,9 @@ exit:
return( ret );
}
psa_status_t psa_encrypt_set_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_length )
psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_length )
{
int ret = PSA_SUCCESS;
if( operation->iv_set || ! operation->iv_required )

View File

@ -138,12 +138,13 @@ static int exercise_mac_key( psa_key_slot_t key,
if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN )
{
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_start( &operation, key, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation,
key, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation,
input, sizeof( input ) ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_finish( &operation,
mac, sizeof( input ),
&mac_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation,
mac, sizeof( input ),
&mac_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
}
if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY )
@ -152,10 +153,13 @@ static int exercise_mac_key( psa_key_slot_t key,
( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN ?
PSA_SUCCESS :
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_start( &operation, key, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation,
key, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation,
input, sizeof( input ) ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify( &operation, mac, mac_length ) == verify_status );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation,
mac,
mac_length ) == verify_status );
}
return( 1 );
@ -180,10 +184,11 @@ static int exercise_cipher_key( psa_key_slot_t key,
if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT )
{
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_generate_iv( &operation,
iv, sizeof( iv ),
&iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation,
key, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation,
iv, sizeof( iv ),
&iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
plaintext, sizeof( plaintext ),
ciphertext, sizeof( ciphertext ),
@ -205,9 +210,10 @@ static int exercise_cipher_key( psa_key_slot_t key,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_get_key_information( key, &type, &bits ) );
iv_length = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( type );
}
TEST_ASSERT( psa_decrypt_setup( &operation, key, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_set_iv( &operation,
iv, iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation,
key, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation,
iv, iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation,
ciphertext, ciphertext_length,
decrypted, sizeof( decrypted ),
@ -734,7 +740,6 @@ void mac_key_policy( int policy_usage,
psa_mac_operation_t operation;
psa_status_t status;
unsigned char mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE];
size_t output_length;
TEST_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
@ -745,10 +750,7 @@ void mac_key_policy( int policy_usage,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key_data->x, key_data->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_mac_start( &operation, key_slot, exercise_alg );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
status = psa_mac_finish( &operation,
mac, sizeof( mac ), &output_length );
status = psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key_slot, exercise_alg );
if( policy_alg == exercise_alg &&
( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN ) != 0 )
TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS );
@ -757,12 +759,10 @@ void mac_key_policy( int policy_usage,
psa_mac_abort( &operation );
memset( mac, 0, sizeof( mac ) );
status = psa_mac_start( &operation, key_slot, exercise_alg );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
status = psa_mac_verify( &operation, mac, sizeof( mac ) );
status = psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key_slot, exercise_alg );
if( policy_alg == exercise_alg &&
( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY ) != 0 )
TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE );
TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS );
else
TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ void cipher_key_policy( int policy_usage,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key_data->x, key_data->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_encrypt_setup( &operation, key_slot, exercise_alg );
status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key_slot, exercise_alg );
if( policy_alg == exercise_alg &&
( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) != 0 )
TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS );
@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ void cipher_key_policy( int policy_usage,
TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED );
psa_cipher_abort( &operation );
status = psa_decrypt_setup( &operation, key_slot, exercise_alg );
status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation, key_slot, exercise_alg );
if( policy_alg == exercise_alg &&
( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) != 0 )
TEST_ASSERT( status == PSA_SUCCESS );
@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ void hash_setup( int alg_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_hash_start( &operation, alg );
status = psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg );
psa_hash_abort( &operation );
TEST_ASSERT( status == expected_status );
@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ void hash_finish( int alg_arg, data_t *input, data_t *expected_hash )
TEST_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_hash_start( &operation, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation,
input->x, input->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_hash_finish( &operation,
@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ void hash_verify( int alg_arg, data_t *input, data_t *expected_hash )
TEST_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_hash_start( &operation, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_hash_setup( &operation, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_hash_update( &operation,
input->x,
input->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ void mac_setup( int key_type_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_mac_start( &operation, key_slot, alg );
status = psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key_slot, alg );
psa_mac_abort( &operation );
TEST_ASSERT( status == expected_status );
@ -1194,13 +1194,14 @@ void mac_verify( int key_type_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_start( &operation, key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_destroy_key( key_slot ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_update( &operation,
input->x, input->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify( &operation,
expected_mac->x,
expected_mac->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation,
expected_mac->x,
expected_mac->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
exit:
psa_destroy_key( key_slot );
@ -1231,7 +1232,7 @@ void cipher_setup( int key_type_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
status = psa_encrypt_setup( &operation, key_slot, alg );
status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation, key_slot, alg );
psa_cipher_abort( &operation );
TEST_ASSERT( status == expected_status );
@ -1280,11 +1281,11 @@ void cipher_encrypt( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_set_iv( &operation,
iv, iv_size ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation,
iv, iv_size ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
output_buffer_size = (size_t) input->len +
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type );
output = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output_buffer_size );
@ -1355,11 +1356,11 @@ void cipher_encrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_set_iv( &operation,
iv, sizeof( iv ) ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation,
iv, sizeof( iv ) ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
output_buffer_size = (size_t) input->len +
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type );
output = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output_buffer_size );
@ -1433,11 +1434,11 @@ void cipher_decrypt_multipart( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_decrypt_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_set_iv( &operation,
iv, sizeof( iv ) ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation,
iv, sizeof( iv ) ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
output_buffer_size = (size_t) input->len +
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type );
@ -1513,11 +1514,11 @@ void cipher_decrypt( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_decrypt_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_set_iv( &operation,
iv, iv_size ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation,
iv, iv_size ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
output_buffer_size = (size_t) input->len +
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type );
@ -1587,14 +1588,14 @@ void cipher_verify_output( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_setup( &operation1,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_decrypt_setup( &operation2,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation1,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation2,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_generate_iv( &operation1,
iv, iv_size,
&iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation1,
iv, iv_size,
&iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
output1_size = (size_t) input->len +
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type );
output1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output1_size );
@ -1615,8 +1616,8 @@ void cipher_verify_output( int alg_arg, int key_type_arg,
output2 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output2_size );
TEST_ASSERT( output2 != NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_set_iv( &operation2,
iv, iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation2,
iv, iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation2, output1, output1_length,
output2, output2_size,
&output2_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
@ -1679,14 +1680,14 @@ void cipher_verify_output_multipart( int alg_arg,
TEST_ASSERT( psa_import_key( key_slot, key_type,
key->x, key->len ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_setup( &operation1,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_decrypt_setup( &operation2,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation1,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation2,
key_slot, alg ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_generate_iv( &operation1,
iv, iv_size,
&iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_generate_iv( &operation1,
iv, iv_size,
&iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
output1_buffer_size = (size_t) input->len +
PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE( key_type );
output1 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output1_buffer_size );
@ -1718,8 +1719,8 @@ void cipher_verify_output_multipart( int alg_arg,
output2 = mbedtls_calloc( 1, output2_buffer_size );
TEST_ASSERT( output2 != NULL );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_encrypt_set_iv( &operation2,
iv, iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation2,
iv, iv_length ) == PSA_SUCCESS );
TEST_ASSERT( psa_cipher_update( &operation2, output1, first_part_size,
output2, output2_buffer_size,