diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 64c72a56d..dc2acf760 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ Security untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) to fully recover an ECDSA private key. Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley and Cesar Pereida Garcia. CVE-2020-10932 + * Fix a potentially remotely exploitable buffer overread in a + DTLS client when parsing the Hello Verify Request message. Bugfix * Fix compilation failure when both MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and diff --git a/library/ssl_cli.c b/library/ssl_cli.c index afced7a99..c5c3af69d 100644 --- a/library/ssl_cli.c +++ b/library/ssl_cli.c @@ -1417,6 +1417,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) ); + /* Check that there is enough room for: + * - 2 bytes of version + * - 1 byte of cookie_len + */ + if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen ) + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, + ( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) ); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); + return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); + } + /* * struct { * ProtocolVersion server_version; @@ -1445,8 +1458,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) } cookie_len = *p++; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len ); - if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, @@ -1455,6 +1466,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO ); } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len ); mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );