From efc8d8078b16c756f1c02d2da9c93248c164f8ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2014 19:36:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Use safer names for macros --- include/polarssl/hmac_drbg.h | 16 ++++++++-------- library/hmac_drbg.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/polarssl/hmac_drbg.h b/include/polarssl/hmac_drbg.h index 1f830d843..36d120049 100644 --- a/include/polarssl/hmac_drbg.h +++ b/include/polarssl/hmac_drbg.h @@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0038 /**< Input too large (Entropy + additional). */ #define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003A /**< Read/write error in file. */ -#define HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ -#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ -#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ -#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */ +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */ +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */ +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ -#define HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 /**< No prediction resistance */ -#define HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON 1 /**< Prediction resistance enabled */ +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 /**< No prediction resistance */ +#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON 1 /**< Prediction resistance enabled */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int hmac_drbg_init_buf( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, * Only use this if you have ample supply of good entropy! * * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context - * \param resistance HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF + * \param resistance POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF */ void hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int resistance ); @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, /** * \brief Set the reseed interval - * (Default: HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) + * (Default: POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) * * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context * \param interval Reseed interval diff --git a/library/hmac_drbg.c b/library/hmac_drbg.c index 4195bf1f6..43ab8f2a0 100644 --- a/library/hmac_drbg.c +++ b/library/hmac_drbg.c @@ -90,17 +90,17 @@ int hmac_drbg_init_buf( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int hmac_drbg_reseed( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) { - unsigned char seed[HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; + unsigned char seed[POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; size_t seedlen; /* III. Check input length */ - if( len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || - ctx->entropy_len + len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) + if( len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || + ctx->entropy_len + len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) { return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); } - memset( seed, 0, HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); + memset( seed, 0, POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ if( ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) != 0 ) @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; - ctx->reseed_interval = HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; + ctx->reseed_interval = POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; /* * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by @@ -217,16 +217,16 @@ int hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, unsigned char *out = output; /* II. Check request length */ - if( out_len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) + if( out_len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); /* III. Check input length */ - if( add_len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) + if( add_len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */ - if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && - ( ctx->prediction_resistance == HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON || + if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */ + ( ctx->prediction_resistance == POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON || ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ) ) { if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )