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Fix leakage of projective coordinates in ECC

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See the comments in the code for how an attack would go, and the ChangeLog
entry for an impact assessment. (For ECDSA, leaking a few bits of the scalar
over several signatures translates to full private key recovery using a
lattice attack.)

Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2020-03-25 12:41:29 +01:00
parent bfa0f7d540
commit f60041688c
2 changed files with 35 additions and 0 deletions
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7
ChangeLog
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@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
Security
* Fix side channel in ECC code that allowed an adversary with access to
precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an
untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) to fully recover
an ECDSA private key. Found and reported by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya,
Billy Brumley and Cesar Pereida Garcia. CVE-2020-10932
Bugfix
* Fix compilation failure when both MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and
MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL are enabled.

28
library/ecp.c
View File

@ -1938,6 +1938,20 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
final_norm:
#endif
/*
* Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
* scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow,
* inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value
* of its input via side-channels [2].
*
* [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191
* [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
if( f_rng != 0 )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, RR ) );
@ -2308,6 +2322,20 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( &R->Z, &RP.Z, b ) );
}
/*
* Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
* scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow,
* inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value
* of its input via side-channels [2].
*
* [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191
* [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
if( f_rng != NULL )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) );
cleanup: