Fix undocumented feature of pem_read_buffer()

Used to work only for RSAPrivateKey content, now accepts ECPrivateKey too,
and may even work with similar enough structures when they appear.
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2013-07-03 21:01:35 +02:00
parent e366342233
commit f8648d51b1
2 changed files with 19 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ void pem_init( pem_context *ctx );
* POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT, use_len is
* the length to skip)
*
* \note Checks password correctness by verifying if the decrypted
* text looks like a RSAPrivateKey or ECPrivateKey structure
*
* \return 0 on success, ior a specific PEM error code
*/
int pem_read_buffer( pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer,

View File

@ -332,8 +332,22 @@ int pem_read_buffer( pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer,
pem_aes_decrypt( pem_iv, 32, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen );
#endif /* POLARSSL_AES_C */
if( buf[0] != 0x30 || buf[1] != 0x82 ||
buf[4] != 0x02 || buf[5] != 0x01 )
/*
* The result should look like RSAPrivateKey or ECPrivateKey
* We use the following heuristic:
* len must be more than 6
* byte 1 must be 0x30 (SEQUENCE tag)
* then allow for one to 3 length bytes
* then we must have 0x02 0x01 (INTEGER tag + length, for version)
* version must be less than 4 (leaves some room)
*/
if( ! ( len > 6 && buf[0] == 0x30 && (
( buf[1] <= 0x7f && /* 1 length byte */
buf[2] == 0x02 && buf[3] == 0x01 && buf[4] < 4 ) ||
( buf[1] == 0x81 && /* 2 length bytes */
buf[3] == 0x02 && buf[4] == 0x01 && buf[5] < 4 ) ||
( buf[1] == 0x82 && /* 2 length bytes */
buf[4] == 0x02 && buf[5] == 0x01 && buf[6] < 4 ) ) ) )
{
polarssl_free( buf );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH );