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Avoid false positives in bounds check
The size of the buffer already accounts for the extra data before the actual message, so the allowed length is SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN starting from _msg
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@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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{
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{
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int ret;
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int ret;
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t kkpp_len;
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size_t kkpp_len;
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*olen = 0;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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{
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{
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int ret;
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int ret;
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t kkpp_len;
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size_t kkpp_len;
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*olen = 0;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -2679,7 +2679,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
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if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
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{
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{
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size_t jlen;
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size_t jlen;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
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ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
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p, end - p, &jlen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
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p, end - p, &jlen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
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