From fe0af405f945bad119cbf3475dc2fd5b4f6e3d60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2013 18:14:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Adapt ecp_gen_keypair() to Curve25519 --- library/ecp.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data | 4 +++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c index 08ca68250..78b7a6528 100644 --- a/library/ecp.c +++ b/library/ecp.c @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ * FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf * RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants * + * [M255] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * * [2] CORON, Jean-Sébastien. Resistance against differential power analysis * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. @@ -1534,7 +1536,7 @@ int ecp_check_pubkey( const ecp_group *grp, const ecp_point *pt ) if( ecp_is_montgomery( grp ) ) { - /* Just check X is the correct number of bytes */ + /* [M255 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */ if( mpi_size( &pt->X ) > ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8 ) return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY ); @@ -1587,7 +1589,7 @@ int ecp_check_privkey( const ecp_group *grp, const mpi *d ) { if( ecp_is_montgomery( grp ) ) { - /* see the Curve25519 paper */ + /* see [M255] page 5 */ if( mpi_get_bit( d, 0 ) != 0 || mpi_get_bit( d, 1 ) != 0 || mpi_get_bit( d, 2 ) != 0 || @@ -1606,7 +1608,7 @@ int ecp_check_privkey( const ecp_group *grp, const mpi *d ) } /* - * Generate a keypair (SEC1 3.2.1) + * Generate a keypair */ int ecp_gen_keypair( ecp_group *grp, mpi *d, ecp_point *Q, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -1615,20 +1617,40 @@ int ecp_gen_keypair( ecp_group *grp, mpi *d, ecp_point *Q, int count = 0; size_t n_size = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; - /* - * Generate d such that 1 <= n < N - */ - do + if( ecp_is_montgomery( grp ) ) { + /* [M225] page 5 */ + size_t b; + mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ); - while( mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) - mpi_shift_r( d, 1 ); + /* Make sure the most significant bit is nbits */ + b = mpi_msb( d ) - 1; /* mpi_msb is one-based */ + if( b > grp->nbits ) + mpi_shift_r( d, b - grp->nbits ); + else + mpi_set_bit( d, grp->nbits, 1 ); - if( count++ > 10 ) - return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + /* Make sure the last three bits are unset */ + mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ); + mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ); + mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ); + } + else + { + /* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */ + do + { + mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ); + + while( mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 ) + mpi_shift_r( d, 1 ); + + if( count++ > 10 ) + return( POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED ); + } + while( mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 ); } - while( mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 ); return( ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, &grp->G, f_rng, p_rng ) ); } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data index 2d33904a9..dcf8ed6ec 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data @@ -325,6 +325,10 @@ ECP gen keypair depends_on:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED ecp_gen_keypair:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 +ECP gen keypair +depends_on:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED +ecp_gen_keypair:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255 + ECP gen keypair wrapper depends_on:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED ecp_gen_key:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1