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Add entropy callbacks to HMAC_DRBG
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@ -29,19 +29,40 @@
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#include "md.h"
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/*
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* ! Same values as ctr_drbg.h !
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*/
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#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0034 /**< The entropy source failed. */
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#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0036 /**< Too many random requested in single call. */
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#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0038 /**< Input too large (Entropy + additional). */
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#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003A /**< Read/write error in file. */
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#define HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */
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#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */
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#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */
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#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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/*
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* Simplified HMAC_DRBG context.
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* No reseed counter, no prediction resistance flag.
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/**
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* HMAC_DRBG context.
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* TODO: reseed counter, prediction resistance flag.
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*/
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typedef struct
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{
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md_context_t md_ctx;
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unsigned char V[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
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unsigned char K[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
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size_t entropy_len; /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */
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/*
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* Callbacks (Entropy)
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*/
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int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t);
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void *p_entropy; /*!< context for the entropy function */
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} hmac_drbg_context;
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/**
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@ -49,18 +70,47 @@ typedef struct
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*
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* \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised
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* \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG
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* \param data Concatenation of entropy string and additional data
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* \param data_len Length of data in bytes
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* \param f_entropy Entropy callback (p_entropy, buffer to fill, buffer
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* length)
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* \param p_entropy Entropy context
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* \param custom Personalization data (Device specific identifiers)
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* (Can be NULL)
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* \param len Length of personalization data
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*
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* \todo Use entropy callback rather than buffer.
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* \note The "security strength" as defined by NIST is set to:
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* 128 bits if md_alg is SHA-1,
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* 192 bits if md_alg is SHA-224,
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* 256 bits if md_alg is SHA-256 or higher.
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* Note that SHA-256 is just as efficient as SHA-224.
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*
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* \return 0 if successful, or
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* POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA, or
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* POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED
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* POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED, or
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* POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED.
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*/
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int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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const md_info_t * md_info,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len );
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int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
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void *p_entropy,
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const unsigned char *custom,
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size_t len );
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/**
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* \brief Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation.
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* (For use with deterministic ECDSA.)
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*
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* \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised
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* \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG
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* \param data Concatenation of entropy string and additional data
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* \param data_len Length of data in bytes
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*
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* \return 0 if successful, or
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* POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA, or
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* POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED.
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*/
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int hmac_drbg_init_buf( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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const md_info_t * md_info,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len );
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/**
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* \brief HMAC_DRBG update state
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@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int ecdsa_sign_det( ecp_group *grp, mpi *r, mpi *s,
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MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
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MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
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MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
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hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
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hmac_drbg_init_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
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ret = ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
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hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
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@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ void hmac_drbg_update( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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}
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/*
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* Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation.
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* Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA)
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*/
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int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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const md_info_t * md_info,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
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int hmac_drbg_init_buf( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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const md_info_t * md_info,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
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{
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int ret;
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@ -84,6 +84,78 @@ int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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return( 0 );
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}
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/*
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* HMAC_DRBG initialisation
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*/
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int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
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const md_info_t * md_info,
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int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
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void *p_entropy,
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const unsigned char *custom,
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size_t len )
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{
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int ret;
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unsigned char seed[HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
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size_t seedlen, init_entropy_len;
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memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) );
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if( ( ret = md_init_ctx( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info ) ) != 0 )
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return( ret );
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/*
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* See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by
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* each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2,
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* min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength.
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*/
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ctx->entropy_len = md_info->size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 */
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md_info->size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 */
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32; /* better (256+) -> 256 */
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ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
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ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy;
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/*
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* For initialisation, use more entropy to emulate a nonce
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*/
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init_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2;
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if( init_entropy_len + len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
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memset( seed, 0, HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
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/*
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* Gather init_entropy_len bytes of entropy for initial seed
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*/
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if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed,
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init_entropy_len ) )
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{
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return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
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}
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seedlen = init_entropy_len;
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/*
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* Add additional data
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*/
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if( custom != NULL && len != 0 )
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{
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memcpy( seed + seedlen, custom, len );
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seedlen += len;
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}
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/*
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* Set initial state and update it with initialisation data
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*/
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memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_info->size );
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/* ctx->K is already 0 */
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hmac_drbg_update( ctx, seed, seedlen );
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return( 0 );
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}
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/*
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* HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data (10.1.2.5)
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*/
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